ARBITAL AWARD OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WOODROW WILSON

FULL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE UPON THE ARBITRATION OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA
WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 22ND, 1920

PREPARED with an introduction by ARA PAPIAN
WOODROW WILSON
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Arbitral Award of the President of the
United States of America Woodrow Wilson
Full Report of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the
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Washington, November 22nd, 1920.

Prepared with an introduction by Ara Papian.
Includes indices.

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This book is dedicated
to all who support Armenia in their
daily lives, wherever they may live, with
the hope that the information contained in this book
will be of great use and value in advocating Armenia’s cause.
Woodrow Wilson

(December 28, 1856 – February 3, 1924)
28th President of the United States of America
(March 4, 1913 – March 4, 1921)
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Yerevan – 2011
There was a time when every American schoolboy knew of Armenia, the entire proceeds of the Yale-Harvard Game (1916) were donated to the relief of “the starving Armenians,” and President Woodrow Wilson’s arbitration to determine the border between Armenia and Ottoman Turkey was seen as natural, given the high standing the 28th President enjoyed in the Old World. What is forgotten today is that Wilson’s Arbitral Award, according to the canons of international law, was “final and binding” on the parties to the Sèvres Treaty, despite the fact that Sèvres itself was later superseded by the Treaties of Lausanne. In this valuable volume, scholar-diplomat Ara Papian brings the facts of this matter back to life in a presentation that is sure to fascinate all who are concerned about the seemingly intractable issues surrounding Armenian-Turkish relations today.

John Marshall Evans
U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, 2004-2006

From the almost “Forgotten Genocide” of 1915, to the much-neglected Treaty of Sevres of 1920, to the largely unknown Arbitral Award in the same year by American President Woodrow Wilson, the world in general, and Armenians and Turks in particular, need to better understand an important document in international relations history. Former Ambassador Ara Papian outlines and analyzes the potentially precedent-setting ruling that sought to give justice to the victims of the Armenian Genocide.

Alan Whitehorn
Professor of Political Science,
Royal Military College of Canada

Clearly, the question pointing to Turkish occupation of historical Armenian, Cyprian, Kurdish and Assyrian ancestral homelands is unfinished international business. As a global leader, Woodrow Wilson was party to a modern legal procedure that ended in multilateral and diplomatic shenanigans. Ambassador Ara Papian has argued a strong case for reexamining a legitimate arbitral process, which bears the signature of America’s 28th president that was duly administered, fairly resolved, but never executed.

Donald Wilson Bush
President, The Woodrow Wilson Legacy Foundation
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THE ARBITRAL AWARD
ON TURKISH-ARMENIAN BOUNDARY
BY WOODROW WILSON

[Historical Background, Legal Aspects and International Dimensions]

Jus est ars boni et aequi (lat.)
(The law is the art of the good and the just)

No other single issue has aroused as much passion and controversy and occupied the attention of the present Armenian public and political life as the relationship with Turkey. The claims of Armenians for moral satisfaction, financial indemnification and territorial readjustment, remain the longest, most intractable, and potentially one of the most dangerous unsolved problems of international relations and world community of the modern times.

The emergence of the Armenian state, the Republic of Armenia, and its presence on the world political stage as the successor of the first Armenian Republic (1918-20), adds a critical dimension to the matter. The importance of this new dimension is based on the fact that, as a subject of international law, the Republic of Armenia is in full power and has all legal rights to pursue the implementation of the legal instruments and to insist on the fulfillment of international obligations assumed by the Turkish states (the Republic of Turkey or the Ottoman Empire) as a legal predecessor of the Turkish Republic.

One must analyze all relevant legal instruments, i.e. bilateral and multilateral treaties, Woodrow Wilson’s Arbitral Award, diplomatic documents and international papers, resolutions of international organizations, recommendations of special missions, decisions of law-determining agencies (particularly of the International Court of Justice), the opinions of authoritative institutions to clarify the legal state of Armenian-Turkish confrontation and determinate the legal aspects of the Armenian claims regarding Turkey.

Due to final and binding character of the arbitral awards, one should begin with the elaboration of the legal instruments, with the arbitral award of the President of the United States of America Woodrow Wilson (November 22, 1920).

Arbitration as a procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes between the States

Arbitration exists under both domestic and international law, and arbitration can be carried out between private individuals, between states, or between states and private individuals. Arbitration is a legal alternative to the courts whereby the parties in a dispute agree to submit their respective positions (through agreement or hearing) to a neutral third party – the arbitrator(s) for resolution.

International Public Arbitration (hereinafter – Arbitration) is an effective legal procedure for dispute settlement between the states.¹ According to 1953 report of the International Law Commission,² arbitration is a procedure for the settlement of disputes between States by a binding award on the basis of law and as a result of an undertaking voluntary accepted.³ The

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essential elements of Arbitration consist of: 1) An agreement on the part of States having a matter, or several matters, in dispute, to refer the decision of them to a tribunal, believed to be impartial, and constituted in such a way as the terms of the agreement specify, and to abide by its judgment; and 2) Consent on the part of the person, persons, or states, nominated for the tribunal, to conduct the inquiry and to deliver judgment.\(^4\)

Arbitration has been practiced already in antiquity and in the middle ages. The history of modern arbitration is usually considered to begin with the treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States of 1794 (Jay’s Treaty – Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, by their President, Signed on 19 November, 1794, ratified on June 24, 1795).\(^5\) The rules of arbitration were codified by The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, concluded on July 29, 1899 and very slightly amended in the Convention of the same name concluded on October 18, 1907 (entered into force January 26, 1910). The Hague Convention (Article 15 of 1899 and article 37 of 1907) defines international arbitration as: the settlement of disputes between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect of law.\(^6\)

The Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 13) provides arbitration and judicial settlement as one of two major procedures of peaceful settlements: The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.\(^7\)

The Charter of the United Nations (Article 33, paragraph 1) expresses its preference for a dispute settlement through arbitration: The parties in any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

**The Historical Background of Wilson’s Arbitration**

On January 19, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Paris (Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy; respectively Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Nitti)\(^8\) agreed to recognize the government of the Armenian State as a de facto government on the condition that the recognition should not prejudge the question of the eventual frontier.\(^9\) The United States recognized the de facto government of the Republic of Armenia on April 23, 1920,\(^10\) on the condition that the territorial frontiers should be left for later determination.\(^11\)

On April 26, 1920, the Supreme Council (including this time the Japanese Ambassador to Paris Matsui as well) meeting at San Remo requested: a) The United States to assume

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\(^6\) *The Hague Court Reports* (James Brown Scott, ed.), NY, 1916:LVI-LVII.

\(^7\) *Manual of Public International Law*, op. cit.: 717.


mandate over Armenia; b) The President of the United States to make an Arbitral Decision to fix the boundaries of Armenia with Turkey: 12 The Supreme Council hopes that, however the American Government may reply to the wider matter of the Mandate, the President will undertake this honourable duty not only for the sake of the country chiefly concerned but for that of the peace of the Near East. 13

On May 17, 1920, the Secretary of State informed the American Ambassador in France that the President had agreed to act as arbitrator. 14 In mid-July the State Department began to assemble a team of experts for the assignment: The Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia. The Boundary Committee was headed by Professor William Westermann; his key associates were Lawrence Martin and Harrison G. Dwight. As the Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920, The Boundary Committee began its deliberations.

The guidelines adopted by the committee were to draw the southern and western boundaries of Armenia on the basis of a combination of ethnic, religious, economic, geographic, and military factors. The Committee had at its disposal all the papers of The American Peace Delegation and The Harbord Mission, the files of the Department of State, War, and Interior, and the cartological services of the United States Geological Survey. Aside from the advice of experts in government service and direct consultations with General Harbord, The Committee sought input of missionaries and others with field experience who could give detailed information about the ethnic makeup of particular villages near the border; the roads and markets connecting certain villages, towns, and cities, and specific physical landmarks.

The Full Report of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia was submitted to the Department of State on September 28, 1920, five months after the Allied Supreme Council’s invitation to President Wilson. 15 The Report defined the area submitted for arbitration, the sources available to and used by The Committee, the principles and bases on which the work had proceeded, the need for the inclusion of Trebizond to guarantee unimpeded access to the sea, the desirability of demilitarization frontier line, the character of the resulting Armenian state, the immediate financial outlook of Armenia, and the existing political situation in the Near East. The seven appendices of the report included the documents relative to the arbitration, the maps used in drawing the boundaries, issue of Kharput, the question of Trebizond, the status of the boundary between Turkey and Persia, the military situation in relation to Armenia, and the financial position of those parts of the four vilayets (provinces) assigned to Armenia.

Insofar as the four provinces in question were concerned, the key factors were geography, economy, and ethnography. Historic and ethical considerations were passed over. The committee tried to draw boundaries in which the Armenian element, when combined with the inhabitants of the exiting state in Russian Armenia, would constitute almost half of total population and within few years from an absolute majority in nearly all districts. Such calculations took into account the wartime deportations and massacres of the Armenians, Muslim losses during the war, as well as the probability that some part of the remaining Muslim population would take advantage of the provisions of the peace

13 FRUS: 780.
14 Ibid: 783.
treaty regarding voluntary relocation to territories that were to be left to Turkey or to an autonomous Kurdistan.

The Territory that was being allocated to Armenia by arbitration (40,000 square miles = 103,599 square kilometers) was less than half of the territory (108,000 square miles = 279,718 square kilometers), which in Ottoman, as well as in all non-ottoman, sources and maps throughout centuries had largely been identified as Ermenistan (Armenia, as the historical title) and since 1878 was the holder of the legal title Armenia or The Six Armenian vilayets (provinces), as was defined in the Article 24 of the Mudros Armistice. It should be underlined that the territory was referred just as The six Armenian vilayets not The six Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

The drastic cutback of the territory for Armenians was due to far-reaching reduction of native Armenian population because of the Turkish policy of annihilation of Armenians: The Armenian provisions of the Sevres Treaty were agreed upon by the Powers after due consideration of the facts that Turkish Armenia was emptied of its Armenian inhabitants.

The committee made calculations, based on prewar statistics, that the population of the territories to be included in the new Armenian state had been 3,570,000 of whom Muslims (Turks, Kurds, “Tartar” Azerbaijanis, and others) had formed 49%, Armenians 40%, Lazis 5%, Greeks 4%, and other groups 1%. It was anticipated that large numbers of Armenian refugees and exiles would return to an independent Armenia. Hence, after the first year of repatriation and readjustment, the population of the Armenian Republic would be around 3 million, of whom Armenians would make up 50%, Muslims 40%, Lazis 6%, Greeks 3%, and other groups 1%. The rise in the absolute number and proportion of Armenians was expected to increase steadily and rapidly in subsequent years.

Even though Westermann’s boundary committee submitted its findings to the Department of State on September 28, 1920, two more months were to pass before President Wilson relayed his arbitration decision to the Allied governments. The State Department: 1) sent the committee’s report to the War Department for its observations, and 2) requested through Ambassador Hugh Wallace in Paris formal notification from the Allied Supreme Council about the signing of the Treaty of Sevres and an authenticated copy of the document. It was only on November 12, 1920, that The Committee’s Report was finally delivered to the White House.

Ten days later, on November 22, 1920, Woodrow Wilson signed the final Report, titled: Decision of the President of the United States of America respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Armenia, Access for Armenia to the Sea, and the Demilitarization of Turkish Territory adjacent to the Armenian Frontier.

The Full Report of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia (The Report – 89 pages, and Appendices to the Report – 152 pages) consists of ten chapters:

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16 The notion of an historic title is well known in international law. Historic title is a title that has been so long established by common usage that this common knowledge is itself a sufficient title.


21 Ibid: 40.


23 Ibid: 31; Hackworth, op. cit.: 715.

2. Chapter II. Strict Limitations of the Area Submitted to the Arbitration of President Wilson, pp. 4-6. (Definition of the area submitted for arbitration).

3. Chapter III. Sources of Information Available to the Committee Formulating this Report, pp. 7-9. (The sources available to and used by the committee).

4. Chapter IV. Factors Used as the Basis of the Boundary Decision, pp. 10-15. (The principles and bases on which the work had proceeded).

5. Chapter V. The Necessity of Supplying an Unimpeded Sea Terminal in Trebizond Sandjak, pp. 16-23. (The need for the inclusion of Trebizond in the new Armenian state).


7. Chapter VI. Covering Letter of the President Wilson to the Supreme Council and the Arbitral Decision of President Wilson, pp. 38-65. (The Arbitral Award of the President with attached letter).


9. Chapter IX. The Present Political Situation in the Near East, pp. 74-83. (The existing political state of affairs in the Near East).


Maps: Boundary between Turkey and Armenia as determined by Woodrow Wilson President, President of the United States of America, November 22, 1920:
- Scale – 1: 1,000,000.
- Scale – 1: 200,000 (19 sheets).

The seven appendices of the report included:

Appendix I. Documents upon the Request for the Arbitral Decision.
- No. 4. Mr. Colby’s Reply to the above, March 24, 1920.
- No. 5. American Recognition of Armenia, April 23, 1920.
- No. 6-10. Telegrams from San Remo, April 24-27, 1920.
- No. 11. The President’s Acceptance of the Invitation to Arbitrate, May 17, 1920.

Appendix II. (Is not available).

Appendix III. Maps Used in Determining the Actual Boundaries of the Four Vilayets and in Drawing the frontier of Armenia.

Appendix IV. The Question of Kharpout. Discussion of the Possibility of Including Kharpout in the Boundary Decision.

Appendix V. The Necessity of supplying an Unimpeded Sea Terminal in Trebizond Sandjak.
- No. 2. Railroad Project for Turkish Armenia before the War (Karshut Valley).
- No. 3. M. Venizelos’ Statement on Trebizond before the Council of Ten (February 4, 1919).
- No. 4. M. Venizelos’ Statement on Trebizond before the Greek Parliament (May 13, 1920).
- No. 5. The Petition of the Pontic Greeks (July 10, 1920).
No. 7. General Discussion of Armenia’s Access to the Sea.
No. 8. Text of the Armenian Minorities Treaty.
No. 9. The Petition to President Wilson from the Armenian Delegation.

Appendix VI. (Is not available).
Appendix VII. Status of the Old Boundary between Turkey and Persia, at the Point where the Boundary Between Turkey (Autonomous Area of Kurdistan) and Armenia Joins it.
Appendix VIII. (Is not available).
Appendix X. Financial Position of the Portion of the Four Vilayets Assigned to the New State of Armenia.

MAPS

1. Boundaries of Armenia, as proposed by the London Inter-Allied Commission of February 1920 (See Appendix I, No. 2).
2. Armenian Claims (See Appendix IV).
   Original Claim of the Armenian National Delegation at the Peace Conference; Reduced Claim of the two Armenian Delegations, since January, 1920; Boundary established by President Wilson’s Decision.
3. Claims of the Pontic Greeks (See Appendix V, Nos. 3, 4, 5).
   Original Claim at Peace Conference; Reduced Claim, 1920; Greek Territory in Thrace and in Smyrna District Boundary established by President Wilson's Decision.
4. Armenia's Routes of Access to the Sea (See Appendix V, Nos. 2, 4, 9).
   Trebizond-Erzerum Caravan Route; Trebizond-Erzerum Railway Project; Western frontier Essential to Armenia.
5. Armenia in Relation to the new Turkish Empire (See Appendix IX).
   Frontiers of Turkey as established by the Treaty of Sèvres and by President Wilson’s Decision; Areas of Especial Interest as established by the Tripartite Convention of August 10, 1920, between Great Britain, France and Italy; Existing Railways.

In the cover letter to the Supreme Council, Wilson wrote: With full consciousness of the responsibility placed upon me by the request, I have approached this difficult task with eagerness to serve the best interests of the Armenian people as well as the remaining inhabitants, of whatever race or religious belief they may be, in this stricken country, attempting to exercise also the strictest possible justice toward the populations, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Greek or Armenian, living in the adjacent areas.24

The text of the Arbitration Decision, reasonably not The Full Report, was cabled to Ambassador Wallace in Paris on November 24, 1920, with instructions that it should be handed to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference for submission to the Allied Supreme Council.25 Wallace responded on December 7, 1920, that he had delivered the documents that morning. Wallace’s attached note was dated December 6, 1920.

So under the *Arbitral Award* of November 22, 1920, the boundary between Armenia and Turkey was settled conclusively and Turkish-Armenian international boundary was subsequently delimited as clearly states The Hague Convention 27 (article 54 of the 1899; article 81 of the 1907): *The Award, duly pronounced and notified to the agents of the parties, settles [puts an end to] the dispute definitively and without appeal.*

### The Validity of the Arbitral Award

For the Arbitral Award to be valid it must meet certain criteria:

1. The arbitrators must not have been subjected to any undue external influence such as coercion, bribery or corruption;
2. The production of proofs must have been free from fraud and the proofs produced must not have contained any essential errors;
3. The compromis must have been valid;
4. The arbitrators must not have exceeded their powers. 29

**Criterion 1.** The arbitrators must not have been subjected to any undue external influence such as coercion, bribery or corruption.

In Armenian-Turkish boundary case the arbitrator, as was agreed in the *compromis*, (i.e. Article 89, the Treaty of Sevres) was *the President of the United States*, namely Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson was often challenged for his policy and had various disagreements with other politicians and political bodies. Nevertheless, never has anyone questioned his political or personal integrity and he was never blamed acting under external influence.

**Conclusion:** It is apparent and doubtless that the arbitrator have not been subjected to any undue external influence, to coercion, bribery or corruption.

**Criterion 2.** The production of proofs must have been free from fraud and the proofs produced must not have contained any essential errors.

As mentioned above, the assignment the State Department organized (mid-July 1920) a special task group, which was officially named: *Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia*.

The head of *The Committee* was William Linn Westermann, professor of the University of Wisconsin and Columbia University (1923-48), a prominent expert in the history and politics of the Near and Middle East. In 1919 he had been the chief of the Western Asia division of the *American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris*. 30 The principal collaborators and contributors in the committee were Major (Dr.) Lawrence Martin of the Army General Staff, who had participated as the geographer of the *Harbord Mission*, and Harrison G. Dwight of the Near Eastern division of the Department of State. 31

All experts in the task group were knowledgeable, experienced and impartial professionals. After over two months of intensive and thorough work, at the end of September 1920, the task group produced a *Full Report of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia*.

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27 The 1899 Convention was ratified by Turkey on July 12, 1907. (The Hague Court Reports, *op. cit.*: CII).
28 The Hague Court Reports, *op. cit.* LXXXIX. Cf. also the Article # 54 of the 1899 Convention with slightly deferent wording: *The Award, duly pronounced and notified to the agents of the parties [at variance, puts an end to] the dispute definitively and without appeal.*
The Report was sent to the War Department for its observations on September 28, 1920. After seven weeks of comprehensive and scrupulous observations the committee’s report was finally delivered to the White House on November 12, 1920. Ten days later, on November 22, 1920, Woodrow Wilson signed the final report, and officially delivered the award through the US Embassy in Paris on December 6, 1920.

President Wilson’s Award is highly regarded by international lawyers at present. Cf.: President Wilson’s arbitral decision was not implemented. Nevertheless, this award must be regarded as one of the most significant analyses of the various factors that have to be taken into account in the determination of international boundaries and of the relationship among them.\(^{32}\) Cf. also: President Wilson’s determination of the territorial frontiers of the newly established Armenian State is particularly interesting because its includes an explanation of the reasons motivating it: the need for a “natural frontier”; “geographical and economic unity for the new state”; ethic and religious factors of the population were taken account of so far as compatible; security, and the problem of access to the sea, were other important conditions.\(^{33}\)

Conclusion: The Arbitral Award was drawn by respectful and well-informed experts, and, in addition, passed through the United States Government’s two relevant department’s scrutiny and inspection. It is obvious that the State Department and the Department of War were capable of excluding any fraud or to notice any essential error in the production of proofs. Finally the award was signed by the US President, who would never tolerate any misconduct.

Criterion 3. The compromis must have been valid.

There are several factors that prove the validity of the compromis.

Factor a) The compromis was duly incorporated in the treaty.

The consent of States to submit a dispute to arbitration may be expressed in different ways: a) by a special arbitration treaty or compromis; b) by the inclusion in any treaty of a special arbitration clause providing for arbitration of any dispute between the parties, which might arise in connection with the application of that treaty; c) by a general treaty of arbitration according to which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all, or certain kinds, of disputes between them which might arise in the future.\(^{34}\)

The consent of Armenia and Turkey, as well as of other High Contracting Parties to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States the determination the question of frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia, and to be bound by the award to accept his decision thereupon was done by the inclusion of a special arbitration clause in the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920), [Article 89]: Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon , as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.\(^{35}\)


\(^{34}\) Manual of the Terminology of Public International Law, op. cit.: 586.

Factor b) The compromis was duly negotiated.

In a joint note, on April 20, 1920, the Allied High Commissioners in Istanbul
summoned the Turkish authorities to send a Peace Delegation to receive the draft peace
treaty. The Ottoman delegation, headed by Senator Tevfik Pasha (Bey) [former Grand
Vezier] left for Paris in May 1, 1920.36 Ten days later, on May 11, it was formally given the
draft peace treaty. Turkish Government was accorded one month to submit in writing any
observations or objections it might have relative to the treaty.37 Tevfik Bey officially
acknowledged the receipt of the treaty and pronounced that the document would be given
the earnest and immediate attention of his government.38 At the end of May, Damad Ferid,
the Grand Vezier of Turkey, applied to the Supreme Council for one-month extension in
presenting the Turkish observations on the settlement. The Supreme Council compromised
by granting a 2-week extension until June 25, 1920.39

The first set of Turkish observations, bearing the signature of Damad Ferid Pasha, was
submitted on June 25, 1920. On July 7 second Turkish memorandum was received. In
adopting a reply Supreme Council authorized the drafting committee to make minor
revisions on the wording of the treaty without altering the substance.40 Regarding the
future of Armenia and the arbitration of the boundaries, the Supreme Council stated: they
can make no change in the provisions which provide for the creation of a free Armenia
within boundaries which the President of the United States will determine as fair and just.41

The certitude that Armenians will not be safe and will not be treated fairly by
Turkish authorities was based on lifelong understanding that: During the past twenty years
Armenians have been massacred under conditions of unexampled barbarity, and during the
war the record of the Turkish Government in massacre, in deportation and in maltreatment
of prisoners of war immeasurably exceeded even its own previous record (...) Not only has
the Turkish government failed to protect its subjects of other races from pillage, outrage
and murder, but there is abundant evidence that it has been responsible for directing and
organizing savagery against people to whom it owed protection.42

The Allied response was delivered to the Turkish delegation on July 17, 1920.

Factor c) The compromis was signed by authorized representatives of a lawful
government.

In 1918-1922, Sultan-Caliph Memed VI was the head of the Ottoman Empire,
politically recognized legitimate ruler.43 Sultan represents the de jure Government.44
Pursuant to article 3 of the Ottoman constitution [December 23, 1876; July 23, 1908]: The
Ottoman sovereignty (...) belongs to the eldest Prince of the House of Ottomans. Treaty
making power was vested in the Sultan. The Sultan had the sole power to legislate.45
Among the sovereign rights of the Sultan (the Ottoman Constitution, article 7) was the
conclusion of the treaties.

36 R. Hovannisian, op. cit., v. III: 106.
to Sevres. Ohio, 1974:309.
38 British Papers, v. XIII: 70.
39 Ibid: 79.
40 Ibid, v. VIII: 553-556.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
45 [Lord] Eversley. The Turkish Empire, From 1288 to 1914, and From 1914 to 1924 (Abridged version by Sir
On July 22, 1920, Sultan Mehmed VI, the constitutional head of the state, convened a Suray-i Saltanat (Crown Council), at the Yildiz Palace. The argument for signature was based on the necessities of the situation. The Council, which was attended by fifty prominent Turkish political and military figures, including former ministers, senators and generals, as well as by Prime Minister Damad Ferid Pasha, recommended in favor of signing the treaty. The Sultan rounded up the proceedings by asking those in favor of signature to stand up. Everybody but one stood up. The Treaty was accepted.\textsuperscript{46} The final treaty, including the arbitral clause [Article 89] was signed by Turkish plenipotentiaries [General Haadi Pasha, Senator; Riza Tevfik Bey, Senator; Rechad Haliss Bey, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Turkey at Berne] sent by the Sultan’s Government at Constantinople under the leadership of Damad Ferid Pasha.\textsuperscript{47}

**Conclusion:** The compromis was valid.

**Criterion 4.** The arbitrators must not have exceeded their powers.

The compromis [Article 89 of the Sevres Treaty] asked the arbitrator: 1) to fix the frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, 2) to provide access for Armenia to sea, 3) to prescribe stipulations for the demilitarization of Turkish territory adjacent to the Turkish-Armenian frontier.

President Woodrow Wilson strictly remained within the assignment, which has been prescribed by compromis. Even there was a strong pressure on him by missionary groups to include town of Kharput and vicinities in the future Republic of Armenia, but Wilson did not exceed his powers.

**Conclusion:** The official title of President Wilson’s decision clearly shows that he accurately fulfilled his duty.

**Legal Features and the Current Status of the Award**

a) Though the arbitration mainly is done out of courts, but it is a legal procedure. The arbitration is based either upon contract law or, in the case of international arbitration, the law of treaties, and the agreement between the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration is a legally binding contract. Thus, the indispensable feature of arbitration is that it produces an award that is final and binding: *The arbitral award is the final and binding decision by an arbitrator in the full settlement of a dispute*.\textsuperscript{48} By agreeing to submit the dispute to arbitration, i.e. compromis,\textsuperscript{49} the parties in advance agree to accept the decision.\textsuperscript{50}

b) Pursuant to Article 89 of the Treaty of Sevres, the arbitral clause was endorsed by the other High Contracting Parties, so the issue of determination of the boundary was submitted to the arbitration on behalf of all state-signatories of the Treaty of Sevres as well. As the Treaty of Sevres was signed by lawful representatives (*having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form*) of the 18 countries (The British Empire [separately] 1. United Kingdom, 2. Canada, 3. Australia, 4. New Zealand, 5. Union of South Africa, 6. India,\textsuperscript{51} 7. France, 8. Italy and 9. Japan [as Principal Allied Powers], as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel. *Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923, Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement*. London, 1975: 82
  \item \textsuperscript{48} *A Dictionary of Arbitration and its Terms, op. cit.: 32.*
  \item \textsuperscript{49} The compromis is the arbitration agreement between sovereign States, which empowers them to arbitrate an existing dispute. (*A Dictionary of Arbitration and its Terms, op. cit.: 54*)
  \item \textsuperscript{50} *Ibid.*: 27.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} At present: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
\end{itemize}
well as by 10. Armenia, 11. Belgium, 12. Greece, 13. Poland, 14. Portugal, 15. Romania, 16. Kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes, 52 and 17. Czecho-Slovak Republic 53 of the one part and 18. Turkey of the other part), and they pledged to accept the decision thereupon. Thus, it is definitely compulsory arbitration and is obligatory for all of them.

c) Once arbitration has been properly executed it becomes irrevocable. It employs the legal doctrine of Res Judicata \((\text{finality of judgments})\), which holds that once a legal claim has come to final conclusion it can never again be litigated. 54 The doctrine of res judicata is considered applicable to all arbitral awards, whether the special agreement or general treaty of arbitration contains such a provision or not.

d) The arbitral awards and court judgments are similar in their nature, as both are based on law. 55 They both are legal decisions. Therefore, the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, which affirms that an issue, which has already been legally duly determined, cannot be reopened or litigated again in a subsequent proceeding, applies in arbitration cases as well. 56

e) If an arbitration party conforms the award or, by lack of any action in a reasonable period, never confront the award, which believed to be a tacit agreement, the award considered valid and biding. It is there after precluded from going back on that recognition and challenging the validity of the award [Arbitral Award by the King of Spain (1960) International Court of Justice, Rep. 213]. 57

Turkey never has challenged the validity of President Wilson’s arbitral award, never started any action for cancellation of the award, and by lack of any action gave its \textit{tacit agreement}, therefore the award is absolutely and definitely \textit{valid and binding}.

f) The arbitration decisions engage the parties for an unlimited period. 58 The validity of the arbitration is not dependent upon its subsequent implementation.

g) The President is the representative authority in the United States; \textit{his voice is the voice of the nation}. 59 The President’s representative character also implies that all official utterances of the President are of international cognizance and are presumed to be authoritative. 60 Foreign nations must accept the assertion of the President as final. 61 By virtue of the arbitrator’s position, the award is binding for the US as well.

h) Annulment (nullification of the legality) of an arbitral award occurs only when there is some authoritative public or judicial confirmation of the ground for such an annulment. This confirmation might come from an international agency such as the International Court of Justice. Confirmation of the ground of an annulment might also be based on international public opinion deriving from general principals of law common to all nations. 62 Refusal by the losing party to comply with the award is not in itself equivalent to a lawful annulment. The plea of nullity is not admissible at all and this view is based upon Article 81 of The Hague Convention I of 1907, and the absence of any international machinery to declare an award null and void. 63

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52 At present: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.
53 At present: Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.
54 \textit{A Dictionary of Arbitration and its Terms}, \textit{op. cit.}: 198.
56 \textit{A Dictionary of Arbitration and its Terms}, \textit{op. cit.}: 49.
57 \textit{Manual of Public International Law}, \textit{op. cit.}: 694.
60 \textit{Ibid}: 37.
61 \textit{Ibid}: 38.
62 \textit{A Dictionary of Arbitration and its Terms}, \textit{op. cit.}: 15.
63 \textit{Manual of Public International Law}, \textit{op. cit.}: 693-694.
Conclusions

Territorial disputes, even when they are of law intensity, continue to represent a significant threat to the international peace and security. It is particularly true of those conflicts that remain unresolved for a long time, allowing the rational bases of settlement to be layered by painful emotions. For example, Ararat is not a mere mountain for Armenians. It is not a number of million tones of stone, soil and snow. It is the core of the Armenian national and Biblical-Christian identity. Thus, the Turkish captivity of Ararat and the world ignorance of the fact have grown into a very considerable psychological factor, which is impossible to ignore.

After the arbitral award of the President of the USA (signed on 22 November 22, 1920, and duly notified on December 6, 1920) the presence and all acts taken by the Turkish Republic in the Wilsonian Armenia are, in fact, illegal and invalid. Consequently, in spite of the long-standing occupation, Turkey does not possess any legal title to the territory, and its de facto sovereignty is not more than an administrative control by force of arms. Belligerent occupation does not yield lawful rule over a territory. A single act of control is not enough to establish a transfer of title as Turkey might hope. Not even continuous occupation since 1920, forced changed demography of the territories and practices (turkification of the ancient Armenian names of the localities, towns, villages, districts, etc.) aiming at altering the heritage and the character of the country would help Turkey get the title.

The Arbitral Award of the President of the United States never was revoked and it can’t be done. There is not a single legal instrument that conceded Wilsonian Armenia to Turkey. Furthermore, the boundary between Armenia and Turkey, as determined by President of the United States, was reconfirmed by the Republic of Turkey by virtue Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923). By the Treaty of Lausanne, which is considered birth certificate of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey and other High Contracting Parties recognized the Turkish title only over the territories situated inside the frontiers laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne. No frontier was laid down between Armenia and Turkey, thus, Wilsonian Armenia defiantly and evidently was not included in the Republic of Turkey. By renouncing all rights and title over territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey renounced its title whatsoever over Wilsonian Armenia and by virtue of international treaty reconfirmed the legal effects of the arbitral award of the President of the United States: Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of those territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned (Article 16).

It is true that Armenia possesses the legal validity to the Wilsonian Armenia, but it is also true that legal validity by itself will not lead to a solution. Indeed, Armenia is the de jure holder of the title and Turkey grips the control, and none would relinquish its claims, based on Armenian side on the legal validity and on Turkish side on the military power.

It is true that international law by itself will not be able to bring about a solution for the Armenian-Turkish confrontation. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that international law is the only way to bring about a just and peaceful resolution, thus a durable and permanent solution.

Ara Papian
Head of Modus Vivendi Center

Brill, Leiden-Boston
RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE RELATING TO POLITICAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA AND
OTHER STATES, 1910-1929

Roll 2

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FULL REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE UPON THE ARBITRATION
OF THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA

Composition of the Reporting Committee

Mr. W. L. Westermann, Chief of the Division of Western
Asia, American Commission
to Negotiate Peace.

Major Lawrence Martin, General Staff Corps, U. S. Army;
Geographer to the Harbord Mission.

Mr. H. G. Dwight, Division of Near Eastern Affairs,
Department of State.
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IV Factors Used as the Basis of the Boundary Decision. pp. 10-15

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VI Provisions for Demilitarization of Adjacent Turkish Territory. pp. 24-36

VII The President's Covering Letter and Technical Boundary Decision. pp. 38-65


IX The Present Political Situation in the Near East. pp. 74-83

X Immediate Financial Outlook of the Republic of Armenia. pp. 84-86

Map:

Turkish-Armenian Boundary Decision of President Wilson, October, 1920, with boundaries of the four vilayets, and the new frontier.

Scale 1:1,000,000.
The Request for the Arbitral Decision of President Wilson.

During the London Conference of the Supreme Council the independence of the de facto government of the Armenian Republic was recognized by the Allied Powers on January 19, 1920. In the period of this London Conference an understanding was also reached upon the substantial parts of the treaty with Turkey, preparatory to the final formulation of the treaty, which took place at the San Remo Conference. An Inter-Allied Expert Commission was appointed to consider the delimitation of the boundaries of the new state of Armenia. This Commission made its report on February 24th. The report contained definite recommendations upon the boundaries to be established between Turkey and Armenia, which would constitute the southern and western boundaries of the new state. It also made provisions for outlets to the sea by the establishment of Batum as a free port, and by granting special rights to Armenia over the district of Lazistan and special privileges for import and export over the highway to Trebizond and in its harbor.

On March 12th the French Ambassador, M. Jusserand, submitted to the Secretary of State of the United States a note which embodied the main outlines of the tentative decisions agreed upon by the Supreme Council at the London Conference regarding the Turkish Treaty. The note of M.
Jusserand stated that the new Armenian Republic was to be guaranteed an outlet to the Black Sea by the grant of special rights over the Sandjak of Lazistan, which was to be autonomous under nominal Armenian suzerainty. The note of M. Jusserand gave no intimation of the other arrangement contemplated by the Supreme Council for an Armenian outlet via the free port of Batum nor of the special arrangements providing freedom of transit upon the old highway from Erzerum via Baiburt to the port of Trebizond.

In his reply to this note, dated March 24th, the Secretary of State expressed the view that the arrangement for an outlet for Armenia by way of Lazistan would not "assure to Armenia that access to the sea indispensable to its existence." He further expressed the hope that the Powers would consider the question of granting Trebizond to Armenia.

On April 23d the Secretary of State informed the Armenian Representative that the United States recognized the de facto government of the Armenian Republic.

At the San Remo Conference on April 26th the Supreme Council drafted a note to the Government of the United States requesting that the United States assume a mandate over Armenia, within the limits stated in Section 5 (Section 6?) of the first printed draft of the Turkish Treaty, and inviting the President of the United States,
whatever the decision of the American Government might be as to the mandate, to arbitrate the question of the boundaries between Armenia and Turkey.

On May 17th the Secretary of State telegraphed President Wilson's acceptance of the invitation of the Supreme Council that he delimit the southern and western boundaries of Armenia; but the request of President Wilson to the Senate that the United States assume a mandate over Armenia was rejected by the Senate upon June 1st.

After several postponements, the treaty with Turkey was signed at Sèvres on Tuesday, August 10. Avetis Aharonian, President of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic at Paris, affixed his signature to the treaty as binding the Armenian state to the acceptance of its terms. For Turkey the treaty was signed by General Haadi Pasha, Senator, by Riza Tevfik Bey, Senator, and by Rechad Haliss Bey, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne. The treaty has not yet been ratified by the Turkish Parliament, as is required by the Turkish constitution.
II

**Strict Limitation of the Area submitted to the Arbitration of President Wilson.**

The decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo in regard to the boundaries of Armenia, as finally adopted in the Treaty of Sèvres, was based, in its main outlines, upon the report of the Expert Commission of London, dated February 24th. The treaty proposes that the boundaries upon the north and northeast, between Russian Armenia and the districts inhabited by the Georgians and the Azerbaidjan Tartars, shall be determined by a direct agreement of the states concerned. It provides further that in case these states* have not determined their common frontiers by the time President Wilson’s decision of the Turkish-Armenian frontiers shall have been rendered, the Principal Allied Powers shall determine these northern boundaries. The eastern boundary of Armenia, between the Armenian state and Persia, is fixed by Article 27 II (4) of the Treaty of Sèvres. It is to be the line of the old Turco-Persian frontier. The boundary arbitration referred to President Wilson contemplates, therefore, the decision only of the southern and western frontiers of

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* The government of the United States has never recognized the de facto governments either of Georgia or of Azerbaidjan.
the new Armenian State. All the Powers signatory to the treaty have, by the fact of signature by their Plenipotentiaries, expressed their intention of accepting the terms of the President's arbitral decision.

The disposition of the Allied Powers, as it crystallized after the American withdrawal from Paris in December, was to grant to the new Armenian State an unimpeded sea terminal only on the Lazistan Coast. This intention, however, was modified before the request for the American mandate and the boundary decision of President Wilson was submitted to the State Department (Telegram of Ambassador Johnson to Secretary of State Colby dated April 27th). According to this modification, which was embodied in the Turkish Treaty, the possibility of including in the Armenian State any part of, or all of, the Vilayet of Trebizond, lies in the power of President Wilson as the arbitrating agent. According to the terms of the treaty, however, the boundaries are to be fixed "in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis" (Article 89).

President Wilson is empowered:
1. To transfer "the whole or any part of the territory of the said vilayets to Armenia,"
2. to provide for the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the frontiers established, and
3. to formulate arrangements for access of Armenia to the sea

This delimitation of the area within which President Wilson's competence to arbitrate is confined, is emphasized in the wording of the invitation sent to him upon April 27th in the note of Ambassador Johnson to Secretary of State Colby, which reads as follows:

"To invite the President --------- to arbitrate the frontiers of Armenia as described in the draft article."*

An earlier portion of the invitation sent to President Wilson also emphasizes this limitation; It remained to decide what parts of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond, which the Turks still hold, might be added without danger or impropriety to Russian Armenia."

The attitude of the Government of the United States regarding Trebizond, as expressed in the communication of the Secretary of State to Mr. Jusserand upon March 24th, had undoubtedly been effective in bringing about the inclusion of the western sandjakes of the Vilayet of Trebizond within the sphere of the general area which might be considered by President Wilson in making his boundary decision. The total area is, nevertheless, strictly confined to the four Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis.

* Namely, Article 89 of the draft of the treaty published upon May 11, 1920. This Article is unchanged in the final draft of the treaty signed upon August 10th at Sèvres.
III

Sources of Information Available to the Committee Formulating this Report.

The present report is based upon a wide range of information, including special investigations of all the published materials upon the vilayets under discussion and adjacent vilayets, consultations with American consuls, missionaries, and teachers who have spent years in the regions under discussion, special reports from the personnel of the mission of General Harbord and of the staff of Colonel Haskell, questionnaires sent to such persons who by reason of distance could not be consulted in person, and the like.

The chief sources of reliable information and advice were these:

1. The complete library, reports, and current information gathered and used at Paris by the advisers to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Division of Western Asia.

2. The full text of the Harbord Report and the original materials used in Turkey by the Harbord Mission, added to by personal reports of several of the members of that Mission. The Harbord report furnished material upon all the problems which arose in the formulation of this document.
3. Questionnaires sent out to missionaries and teachers long established in eastern Anatolia. Their information was especially valuable upon close questions of the ethnographic character of the border villages lying in the districts which required especial scrutiny, and upon the roads and the market and religious affiliations of villages and cities in those districts, one with another.

4. The military-strategic strength of the frontier of Armenia was regarded as of vital importance to the new state, both immediately and in the future. Upon all such questions we have sought the advice of military experts of the War Department.

5. The four existing large-scale maps of the area in which the Turkish-Armenian boundaries must lie are:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map Type</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>1:200,000</td>
<td>1911-1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1:210,000 (5-verst)</td>
<td>1886-1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>1:250,000 (Eastern Turkey in Asia)</td>
<td>1901-1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1:400,000 (Kiepert's Kleinasien)</td>
<td>1902-1906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upon all of these maps the lines of the administrative boundaries of the vilayets as well as the geographic features of the country differ markedly in detail. We have followed the Turkish General
Staff map as decisive because of its greater fullness of detail and our confidence in its much greater accuracy. This confidence is warranted by our knowledge that the map is based upon plane-table surveys of the entire area and by the fact that the Harbord Mission, having tested all the maps upon the ground in numerous places, is confident of its superiority over the others. The Turkish General Staff map has therefore been made the basis of the President's report and has been recommended for the use of the Boundary Commission provided for in Article 91 of the Turkish Treaty.

6. The Committee has had the invaluable advice and criticism of Major General James G. Harbord upon all phases of its report.
Factors used as the Basis of the Boundary Decision.

In the formulation of this report we have proceeded upon the following assumptions:
1. That the Turkish Treaty states clearly that Armenia is not to extend, upon the south and west, beyond the confines of the four vilayets;
2. That it is to have access to the sea if President Wilson deems it necessary; and
3. That a zone of adjacent Turkish territory is to be demilitarized if President Wilson regards this as an essential requirement for the immediate and the future welfare of the Armenian State.

Despite the obvious conclusion that President Wilson has no technical or legal competence to deal with any territory outside the boundaries of the four vilayets specifically named, the Armenian Delegation at Paris sent a petition to the President, dated July 22d, requesting that he draw the boundaries so as to include the city of Kharpoot and the district about it in Armenia. This area is a part of the Vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz. They beg the President to consider the fact that the historical frontier of Armenia has always lain west of Kharpoot, that it is geographically an indivis-
ible portion of the central plateau of Armenia, and that it is economically necessary to Armenia because of its mineral wealth. They suggest that the boundary line follow that of the former province of Erzerum, that is, the administrative division of Erzerum of the early nineteenth century, which included the Kharpout area.

American organizations interested in the Armenian question have also sent in letters and petitions that the President use his good offices to include Kharpout in the Armenian state.

By the terms of the Turkish Treaty, which has been signed and is technically in operation, the city and Sandjak of Kharpout are already a part of Kurdistan, which is to be immediately an autonomous state in Turkey, and, after a year, possibly an independent state. It is our belief that it is now beyond the power of President Wilson to assign any portion of the Vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz to Armenia and that it is very doubtful whether he should so assign it if he had the technical right to do so. It would also, in our judgment, be inadvisable that he recommend to the Supreme Council that Kharpout be included in Armenia. Assent to such recommendation on their part would necessitate a revision of the treaty already signed, which would only serve to alienate further the Turkish Nationalists and further complicate for the Armenians the task of establishing their state, which is already difficult enough.
We have restricted our boundary consideration, therefore, to the four vilayets named in the treaty, Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis. In this fixed and limited field of operation, the guiding considerations which we followed were those of the geography and of the people. Historic and ethical arguments as to the rights in the case did not enter into consideration. These were regarded as settled by the consensus of Allied opinion and the general feeling throughout the world as expressed in the fact of the reestablishment of the Armenian State by the terms of the Turkish Treaty. The area which may possibly be assigned to Armenia by the decision of President Wilson is less than one-half of that originally claimed by the Armenians and their friends. We have, therefore, felt that as much territory within the four vilayets should be assigned to the new state of Armenia as possible, in conformity with the best interests of Armenia itself. Its interests will undoubtedly be best served, in the long run, by adherence to the strategic, economic, and ethnographic considerations which have been our guiding principles.

The geographic factor we have considered from three points of view, physiographic unity, military-strategic unity and defensibility, and economic unity.

The correct settlement of the problem of military defense, which brings in the question of demilitarization of adjacent Turkish areas, will be of primary immediate
importance to the new Armenian State, inasmuch as no one of the Allied Powers has accepted responsibility for the enforcement of the Turkish Treaty in Armenian Turkey; nor is it probable that any one of the Great Powers will do so.

The factor of the economic unity of the four vilayets was necessarily looked upon in two ways:

1. As a question of the present commercial connection of definite valley areas with their market towns by existing highways and camel-and-donkey caravan routes;

2. The railway lines under construction and those projected which will, in the future, furnish the transportation facilities for the economic wellbeing of the country. With this latter question, that of an adequate sea terminal for the Armenian State is indissolubly connected.

The consideration of the ethnographic elements comprising the present and prospective population of the four vilayets is greatly beclouded. This uncertainty is caused by the original lack of genuine statistics upon the pre-war population of these vilayets, by the deportations and massacres of the Armenians, and by the terrible losses also among the Moslem Turkish and Kurdish inhabitants. These Moslem losses resulted from war cas-
ualties, refugee movements of the Moslems consequent upon the Russian military advance over these areas, and most of all from the ravages of typhus and other diseases among the local Moslems, both military and civilian. We regard it as entirely safe to assume that the Moslem population within the four vilayets suffered losses proportionally almost equal to those of the Armenians.

Within the range of possibility set by these disturbing factors the attempt was made to consider the ethnographic distribution of Armenians, Kurds, and Turks by sandjaks (administrative sub-divisions of the vilayets), and even by villages along those boundaries which the more important strategic and economic factors tended to establish for us beforehand. By this method of approach the obvious natural, economic, and military barrier extending from the Persian border south of Lake Van and south of the Armenian city of Bitlis as far as the city of Mush, was so strongly supported as to become inevitable. The mountain ridges along this natural frontier range from 7,500 feet in height to 11,000 feet. The passes themselves are from 5,500 feet above sea level to 8,800 feet, with one pass, that below Bitlis, at 2,100 feet. The adoption of this natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia cuts off from the area which President Wilson might assign to Armenia the Sandjaks of Hakkari and Sairt and the south-
western part of the Sandjak of Bitlis. Ethnographically, this is justified by the population estimates for the Sandjaks of Hakkiari and Sairt given in the report upon the "Population of Asiatic Turkey", used by the American Peace Delegation at the Paris Conference. These estimates are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hakkiari</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sairt</td>
<td></td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

or by percentages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hakkiari</td>
<td>4.15%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>4.15%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sairt</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exclusion of these two sandjaks from Armenia is accepted as proper and inevitable by the Armenian leaders.

It was considered advisable to reduce the westward extent of Armenian territory in Trebizond Vilayet as much as possible so that the latitudinal stretch of the country might not be over-extended. In Trebizond Vilayet the Moslem and Greek elements outweigh the Armenian to such an extent that Armenia has no ethnic claim whatsoever to any portion of the vilayet. It is only the requirement of a sea terminal which gives Armenia any right to the territory granted to it. But this economic requirement seemed absolute and decisive.
The necessity of Supplying an Unimpeded Sea Terminal in Trebizond Sandjak.

In the report of the Interallied Commission appointed by the Conference at London the attempt was made to secure to Armenia an outlet upon the Black Sea in three ways, by creating a free port at Batum, by granting to Armenia control over Lazistan Sandjak, and by assuring to Armenia the right to the free use of the road from Erzerum via Baiburt to Trebizond and the free use of that port. To your Committee, as to the London Interallied Commission, provision for a sea terminal for the highland state of Armenia, appeared as a *sine qua non*; but the provisions of the London Commission appeared to be quite inadequate for the attainment of that end.

The creation of the free port of Batum in Georgia, provided for in Articles 335-345 of the Turkish Treaty, affords for Russian Armenia the only provision for an economic outlet toward the west which the political situation in Transcaucasia and the ethnic distribution of the Armenians seem to warrant. For it is extremely doubtful that the Georgians, in their boundary negotiations with Armenia, will consent to the claim of the Armenians to the left bank of the Chorokh river and the territory south thereof. Any outlet in this northern district, whether at Batum or below it through the

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1 A Latin legal term for “a condition without which it could not be.” (A.P.)
Chorokh valley offers direct commercial drainage, so far as the Armenians are concerned, only to those Armenian districts which were formerly parts of the Russian Empire. In view of the remoteness of the territory concerned, its relative inaccessibility to the guidance of the great Allied Powers or of the League of Nations, and the kaleidoscopic uncertainty of the politics of Transcaucasia, the continued maintenance of freedom of access for Armenia to the port of Batum, as arranged for in the treaty, is highly problematic. The statement of Colonel Wm. N. Haskell, Allied High Commissioner in Armenia, dated June 24, 1920, was made specifically in regard to his own relief work; but it describes vividly the political uncertainty which exists, and will continue to exist, in Transcaucasia: "The whole business here for the last two or three months has been a hand-to-mouth proposition, which has changed each day and with no one able to foretell what the next day will bring forth."

We have therefore regarded the Batum provision of the treaty, in itself praiseworthy and a just and necessary arrangement for northern Armenia and the adjacent countries, as entirely inadequate to meet the requirement of a complete commercial outlet for Armenia.

The harbors of the Lazistan coast, at Riza and Off, afford only poor anchorage and are so exposed to rough weather that in certain months of the year vessels cannot
land cargoes. Back of Lazistan lie the great height's of the Pontic Range. The mountains are from 8,000 to 12,000 feet high, the passes from 6,500 to 11,000 feet. The gradients are tremendous. At present there are no roads leading southward into Erzerum Vilayet which are suitable even for vehicle traffic; and the cost of construction of railway connections into the Armenian valleys to the south is entirely prohibitive.

In agreement with the attitude of President Wilson, as expressed in the note of the Secretary of State to the Allied Supreme Council of March 24th, that access to the sea is indispensable to the existence of Armenia, we have come to the conclusion that this access is only to be obtained by including some portion of the coastal area of the Sandjak of Trebizond under the complete sovereignty of the Armenian State. In view of the history of Turkish-Armenian relations since 1876, we have regarded it as impossible to establish such an outlet by attempting to impose upon the Turkish government, if Trebizond should be left under Turkish suzerainty, arrangements for freedom of transit through Turkish territory to Trebizond and for freedom of use of the port of Trebizond.

In the settlement of the problem of Trebizond Vilayet it was obvious that the assignment of any portion of the territory to Armenia could not be justified upon ethnographic lines. Our estimate of its pre-war population
gives to the Armenians about 3% of the total, to the Greeks about 18%. The remaining 79% were Moslems of the two races of Turks and Lazes. The last-named people comprised about 20% of the total population of the vilayet. They are related to the Georgians, are exceedingly independent, and have little feeling of loyalty to or affection for the Turks, and none for Armenians. Deducting this 20% of Laz population we still have a distinct Turkish majority for the entire vilayet.

Accepting these estimates as approximately correct, the question of the incorporation of any part of, or all of, the Vilayet of Trebizond became purely a matter of an economic outlet for Armenia. In our study of the Black Sea ports all of our testimony, including personal observations and estimates of competent observers upon the Harbord Mission, led to the conclusion that railway connection along the old highway from Persia through Erzerum and Baiburt ending at Trebizond could not be developed successfully because of the prohibitive cost of the long tunnel through the Pontic range back of Trebizond and the steep gradients upon both sides of this range. The obvious course of the future railway which will drain the Armenian Vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis and Van is along the Karshut Su with its terminal at Tirebolu. This conclusion is supported by Turkish, Armenian, French and American expert testimony.
The settlement of the question of the outlet for Armenia at Trebizond and Tireboli has recently been be-
clouded by pressure from the Pontic Greeks, who are demand-
ing immediate autonomy, with the probable intention of gain-
ing entire independence or some form of political connec-
tion with Greece in the future. At the Peace Conference
at Paris on February 4, 1919, Premier Venizelos stated
before a meeting of the Council of Ten, that the Pontic
Greeks desired that they be formed into a small independ-
ent Republic. "He did not favor this proposal as he
thought it would be very undesirable to create a large
number of small states, especially as the country surround-
ing the town (of Trebizond) comprised a very large number
of Turks. In his opinion the vilayet of Trebizond should
form part of the State of Armenia."

During the Conference at London in January, 1920, the
tendency to restrict the Armenians to the Lazistan coast
gave the Pontic Greeks a renewed opportunity to enforce
their desire for independence. This change, moreover,
seems to have affected materially the attitude of Premier
Venizelos. For, in speaking upon the treaty with Turkey
in the Greek Chamber on May 13, 1920, he stated that he
no longer considered it possible to split the Pontic Greeks
by giving a part of Trebizond Vilayet to Armenia and
another part to Turkey, and that he did not believe that
President Wilson would thus separate the Pontic Greeks in
order to provide Armenia with an access to the sea. Since this public statement, representations have been made to the United States government that Premier Venizelos preferred to see Trebizond Vilayet, except Lazistan, assigned to Turkey rather than to have it divided, as must be the case if President Wilson decides that Armenia have an unimpeded outlet to Trebizond and Tireboli. The Pontic Greeks also have petitioned the Supreme Council and President Wilson that they be granted autonomy over an area extending from Sinob (Sinope) to Riza.

By the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (Article 89) it is impossible for President Wilson to deal with the Greeks inhabiting the coastal area of the independent Sandjak of Djanik and the Vilayet of Kastamuni (Uniya to Sinob inclusive). This area is definitely assigned by the Treaty terms to Turkey. Consequently the boundary decision of the President can only satisfy the desire of the Pontic Greeks for unity under Turkish sovereignty, and this can only be done by transferring all of Trebizond Vilayet except Lazistan to Turkey. The Armenian delegation in Paris has acceded to the wishes of the Pontic Greeks, now strengthened by the expressed desire of Premier Venizelos, and have renounced their claim to all of the coastal area of Trebizond westward of the town of Surmena. They feel, however, that they must have a large part of
the Sandjak of Gumush-khana, in the Vilayet of Trebizond, which contains some 50,000 Greeks. Their renouncement of claim to the Karshut valley outlet, debouching at Tireboli, forces them to appeal for an outlet through the Chorokh valley below Batum. In other words the Armenians have felt compelled to ask the Supreme Council, and now President Wilson, to assign them a portion of territory which is ethnologically Georgian and, from the American point of view, still politically a part of Russia. The terms of the Turkish Treaty do not contemplate that President Wilson is to assign any territory outside of the four vilayets, Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond. Even were this not decisive against the Armenian request for the Chorokh valley, the consistent attitude of our government in regard to Russian territory, and particularly that of Georgia and Azerbaidjan, as expressed in the note of the Secretary of State of August 10, 1920, would preclude the assignment of this valley to Armenia.

The question of the Pontic Greeks and the Armenian sea terminal has seemed to us quite analogous to that of Fiume. The desire for unity and independence or autonomy on the part of a relatively small population, racially and religiously distinct from the Armenians, runs athwart the economic necessity of a great hinterland for an outlet. The conditions which originally led Premier Venizelos
to declare that Trebizond should go to Armenia have not changed. Unalterable and imperative economic considerations, involving the entire hinterland, have forced us to recommend the assignment of the coastal area, including Tireboli, to Armenia despite the small number of Armenians living there. The sound Turkish claim thereto, based upon a decisive Moslem majority, as well as the Pontic Greek desire, must be regarded as secondary to the economic welfare of the Kurdish, Turkish and Armenian population of the three Vilayets of Van, Bitlis and Erzerum.

The elimination of the coastal region of Kerasun and Ordu from Armenia was dictated by three considerations; first, to include in Armenia as little as possible of territory which was predominantly Turkish in population and feeling; second, to make Armenian territory as compact and strongly defensible as possible by diminishing its westward extent; third, because the highways from the south debouching at Kerasun and Ordu form the commercial outlet for the eastern portion of the Vilayet of Sivas which is strongly Turkish. According to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres all of Sivas remains a part of Turkey. It would therefore, be as unwise and unjust politically to include these ports under Armenian control as to leave Trebizond and Tireboli under Turkish control.
Provisions for Demilitarization of Adjacent Turkish Territory.

General J. G. Harbord, Major C. H. Mason and Major Lawrence Martin, having been requested to express their opinions regarding the advisability and means for demilitarization of the Turkish-Armenian border, presented in substance the following views:

GENERAL HARBORD:

The primary purpose of such demilitarized zone is the protection of citizens of the Republic of Armenia from the Moslem population living adjacent to its boundaries. For centuries the Armenians living in that region have been considered to be more or less legitimate prey for the Moslem population. With the Turkish government practically powerless beyond the limits of Constantinople; with the Nationalists in the field in active operations to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it is not probable that there is any Moslem subject of Turkey, official or non-official, in the whole region touching the contemplated boundaries, who is not hostile to the creation of the Armenian Republic and burning with resentment and wounded pride at the dismemberment of his country.

After the Armistice the demobilization of the Turkish Army was accomplished by discharging the soldiers and allow-
ing them to take their individual arms to their homes with them. The Armenian throughout Turkey has never been al-
lowed to own or carry arms. Practically every non-Christian
subject in the region under consideration has arms in his
possession. Banditry prevails against Moslems as well as
Christians. To arm the Armenian population, leaving weapons
in the possession of the Moslems, means individual warfare
every day, perhaps every hour, in some portion of the ter-
ritory. To take up the arms, leaving aside the practical
difficulties of such disarmament, means that neither
Moslem nor Christian will be able to protect himself against
roving bandits until the region can be so thoroughly
policed that security of life and property will be estab-
lished. The rough mountainous character of the country
renders doubly difficult the suppression of outlawry.

Under the Treaty of Sèvres, the military forces of
Turkey are limited to an Imperial Bodyguard of seven hun-
dred men and a gendarmerie of fifty thousand. Provision
is made for a number of officers to be named for duty
with the gendarmerie by the several Allied Powers, a
further proviso being that the Allied officers in any
one region are to be from the same Allied Power. There
is no municipal police in Turkey worthy of the name and
upon the gendarmerie will involve the entire task of
maintaining order.
The situation seems to be:

A Central Government powerless within the region;
An armed Moslem population hostile to Christians as individuals and to the idea of a separate Armenia;
A Christian population in the minority and all unarmed;
A region where banditry reaches the dignity of a profession and is almost hereditary among certain classes;
A Christian population which, unless prevented by force, will, as soon as it is able, seek reprisals against Moslems on the Turkish side of the line in revenge for centuries of oppression.

There seem to be two ways in which Allied supervision could be applied:

First, the actual occupation of such demilitarized zone by troops of an Allied power. It is doubtful if any one of the Allied Powers to the Treaty would be willing to undertake such occupation. The reputation of every one of the Allied Powers for seeking territorial aggrandizement, and for the exploitation of occupied regions, is such that the occupation would be the signal for turmoil only to be quieted by bayonets and bullets.

Second, the use of Turkish Gendarmerie, if provided with a liberal number of Allied officers conscious of the importance of their duty and committed by sympathy and on principle to the protection of the population on both sides of the boundary.

Were it not for the widespread distrust of Great Britain, and her intriguing in this region, the best
material for this duty with the gendarmerie, conceding that America is out of the question, would be British officers. The senior officer of gendarmerie should be independent of any control by local Turkish provincial authorities, responsible perhaps to some inter-allied commission, such as the Government of the Straits, and the control of his actions and of his prisoners before trial should not be subject to the jurisdiction of local Turkish courts. In other words, to be effective, he would have to be practically a benevolent despot in his zone. The success of the whole plan would come down to the choice of the right officer and his subordinates for this duty.

A demilitarized zone, if less in width than a day's march of horsemen or footmen, would permit raids across it, eluding the gendarmerie. Such raiding parties in any numbers could not raid and return beyond twenty-five miles in a day and it is believed the minimum width of such neutral zone, if established, should be about fifty miles. Instead of a zone of fixed width parallel to the boundary, it would be practicable and save dispute over the limits of the zone if the adjoining vilayets, Diarbekir, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, etc., were declared the zone to be neutral under allied officers controlling their gendarmerie.
MAJOR MASON:

To demilitarize the Turkish-Armenian frontier it is necessary that there be no establishments of military colonies, points d'appui, strategic transportation systems or excessive garrisons within the areas under consideration.

Under the present situation a prescription for the disarmament of these border peoples would be both ineffective and ill-advised — ineffective because impracticable of accomplishment, ill-advised as it would tend to lessen the present scanty means of individual self-defense, which in this region of long maladministration is a fundamental necessity.

Armenia is of military importance to the world through its location at the point of frictional contact of several great national interests, all of which Armenia flanks or lies athwart of in such manner as to make of her an object of jealousy and grave temptation to aggression — aggression that may be either direct, through the construction of strategic railways and highways and points d'appui for use in sudden conquest, as exemplified by the German procedure against Belgium, or indirect through the encouragement of border lawlessness. In the region under consideration the primitive character and present disorganization of the border peoples, their divergent religions and culture, their traditional antagonisms and in some cases
nomadic life, their present isolation from modern conditions and the topography of their countryside, separately and together make for lawlessness and present a tempting opportunity for the play of those sinister influences whose aims are turbulence and military aggression.

The devastated regions offer special opportunities for establishing an army in residence along the frontier through the well-known method of military colonies (Cossacks, as they are called in Russian territory). Such aggregations are peculiarly inimical to contiguous territories, due to their independence of railway and supply systems, which are usually prerequisites of frontier mobilization. To eliminate this phase of militarization, it is essential that military colonies along the frontier be prohibited. Such a prohibition to be effective must apply to a zone at least a day's march on each side of the frontier and must be subject to the constant supervision of a disinterested power. Without such supervision, the inherent characteristics of frontier life make it easy to covertly militarize the resident population.

As regards the depopulated regions, it is, of course, most desirable that they be repopulated as quickly as may be and it is peculiarly desirable that no prohibition should be permitted to operate to prevent the accomplishment of this. However, unless local disinterested observation is keen and continuous in permitting legitimate settlement
and yet preventing military colonies the pressure of frontier conditions, in conjunction with sinister propaganda and intrigues, will very quickly produce militarization and subsequent turbulence and aggression. But this is not the only method of frontier militarization — there is that produced by railway and highway systems, which in conjunction with supply depots provide the essential bases for large modern offensive operations. Such depots of supply are not needed for defensive purposes nor for the normal garrisons and therefore they have no legitimate reason for existing in this region. Since, however, these depots are essential to large formal offensive operations, such operations can be prevented by prohibiting the establishment of these depots of supply and by making the transportation systems conform strictly to the needs of the economic situation, solely. By limiting the amount of supplies kept within a frontier area the number of troops that can be maintained in that area or concentrated therein is limited. This provides one of the best means of insuring that garrisons are restricted to their authorized strength. An unreasonable application of such a prohibition, on the other hand, will tend to defeat the object sought, by hampering the development of communications, when roads and railroads are among the most important elements for dissipating the medievalism of this region and opening it to the civilizing influences of world intercourse.
Thus the objectives of demilitarization of the Turkish-Armenian boundary are as follows:

(1) The prevention of strategic railway and highway construction and the non-establishment of points d'appui and military colonies within striking distance of the international boundary.

(2) The prevention of inimical propaganda and the activities of provocateurs in the border regions.

(3) The quashing of quasi-military turbulence by the establishment of civil law and order.

The first objective involves the acquiescence of the Armenian and Turkish Governments and the obligation of decision and enforcement by the League of Nations.

The second objective is one of peculiar importance at the present time when the methods of the propagandists and the provocateurs are so generally effectively in use. General colonial experience indicates that the most effective means of dealing with these methods is through the personal contacts of the local occidental governor, commissioner, or whatever the colonial official's title may be — provided he is a man fitted for the work — a man who having the necessary qualities of character to establish himself as the revered counselor and friend of the natives can, through their chiefs, allay unrest and eliminate hostile influences. The type of man, his methods and achievements are so well known in colonial work as to obviate the necessity of
analyzing the rather intangible methods by which his very tangible results are accomplished. Such a man commissioned by the League of Nations as Commissioner or Warden of the Turkish-Armenian frontier and operating under large discretionary powers for the peace of the border country, offers about the only means available under present conditions for accomplishing the second objective and also for providing that close and continuous disinterested observation requisite to the various phases of successful demilitarization.

The third objective would gradually accrue through the work of the Warden or Commissioner of the border upon his being endowed with the necessary diplomatic and superior magisterial powers. To this end he should be given the necessary sanctions by the League and by the Armenian and Turkish Governments, together with such sanctions from local headmen as he can gradually obtain from them.

As demilitarization is the object sought, the Warden must ipso facto work through civil methods, but equally obviously he must have force back of him and subject to his call. The obvious ability to apply force promptly and efficiently is an axiomatic prerequisite to success. The essence of such application is promptness and incisiveness — deficiency in either causing a reaction that but feeds the flame. Promptness of summons can be obtained through the
Warden being provided with an adequate radio telegraph system throughout the border zone. Incisiveness of application can be achieved by providing the Warden with an occidental constabulary, including an aerial unit. If this contingent consists of picked men it need not be large. It should be under the sole jurisdiction and orders of the Warden. Through this means the Warden should be able to produce at need such a prompt show of power as to minimize the necessity for its use.

MAJOR MARTIN:

The frontier provided, and the limitations placed upon the Turkish army by the Treaty of Sèvres, furnish Western Armenia with adequate military security.

The Treaty of Sèvres (Articles 152, 156, 165, 170, and 200 (2) limits the size of the military forces which Turkey may maintain within the territorial areas adjacent to the Armenian frontier to a small proportion of 35,000 men, or at most of 50,000 men — say 5,000 to 10,000 men. These forces may not include either artillery or technical services, except in case of serious trouble. The legions of gendarmerie from one territorial area may not be employed outside this area. The legions are to be made up of local inhabitants, including both Non-Moslem and Moslem soldiers.

The nature of the terrain and of the population within Turkish territory adjacent to the new Armenian frontier
is such that small armed forces are and always will be neces-
sary for the maintenance of order. Within these mountains no
strategic highways or railways are likely to be built except
those needed for peace-time commerce.

It would be inconsistent to demilitarize the Turkish ter-
ritory adjacent to the northern portion of the new Armenian
frontier without also demilitarizing the southern and eastern
portions of the Armenian frontier in the autonomous Kurdish
area of eastern Turkey, including the Dersim, Kharput, Sairt,
and HAKKIAI districts. It would be unsafe to limit perma-
nently the gendarmerie of these Kurdish areas to the small
number provided by the Turkish treaty and to forbid the use
of artillery and of such technical services as are provided
with pontoons, airplanes and dirigibles. The Armenians
and many of the Kurds, Turks and other peaceable inhabi-
tants of these Kurdish districts may need more protection
than can be provided in a rigidly demilitarized zone.

If a zone in Turkey or in Kurdistan were to be demili-
tarized the Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian and Greek inhabitants
of the demilitarized zone might feel that a corresponding
zone in Armenia ought to be also demilitarized. This the
President is not authorized to do.

For all these reasons it is thought best, in the inter-
est of good-feeling between the local populations of all
races and religions inside and outside the new Armenian
frontier, that no Turkish territory adjacent to the new Armenian frontier be demilitarized.

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Having considered the foregoing an unanimity of opinion between these three officers quickly developed, in substance as follows:

That the Treaty of Sèvres in its provisions for demobilizing and demilitarizing the Turkish Empire has provided adequate means for demilitarizing the frontier, provided certain special applications are made of the prescriptions in that Treaty, to wit: that in the vilayets contiguous to Armenia the superior officers of the gendarmerie provided for in the Treaty be without exception officers of the Allied, Associate or neutral Powers to the exclusion of others and that these officers be specifically charged with observing and reporting any tendency within these border vilayets that would make for militarization — such as military colonies, strategic railways and highways, excessive depots of supply, arming fortifications, etc.

That under the limitations of the request under which the President is rendering his decision and prescription, it would not be feasible for him to prescribe like supervision on the Armenian side of the border; therefore, the
supervision here provided for is restricted to the Turkish side, though it is felt that to accomplish a wholly satisfactory result similar measures should be applied to the Armenian side.
SECTION VII

Covering Letter of President Wilson
to the Supreme Council and
Arbitral Decision of President Wilson.
The President
of the Supreme Council
of the Allied Powers.

Mr. President:

By action of the Supreme Council taken on April 26th of this year an invitation was tendered to me to arbitrate the question of the boundaries between Turkey and the new state of Armenia. Representatives of the powers signatory on August 10th of this year to the Treaty of Sèvres have acquiesced in conferring this honor upon me and have signified their intention of accepting frontiers which are to be determined by my decision, as well as any stipulations which I may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea and any arrangements for the demilitarization of Turkish territory lying along the frontier thus established. According to the terms of the arbitral reference set forth in Part III, Section 6, Article 89, of the Treaty of Sèvres, the scope of the arbitral competence assigned to me is clearly limited to the determination of the frontiers of Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis. With full consciousness of the responsibility placed upon me by your request, I have approached this difficult task with eagerness to serve the best interests of the Armenian people as well as the remaining inhabitants, of whatever race or religious
belief they may be, in this stricken country, attempting to 
exercise also the strictest possible justice toward the 
populations, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Greek or Armenian, 
living in the adjacent areas.

In approaching this problem it was obvious that the 
existing ethnic and religious distribution of the populations 
in the four vilayets could not, as in other parts of the 
world, be regarded as the guiding element of the decision. 
The ethnic consideration, in the case of a population originally 
so complexly intermingled, is further beclouded by the terrible 
results of the massacres and deportations of Armenians and 
Greeks, and by the dreadful losses also suffered by the Moslem 
inhabitants through refugee movements and the scourge of 
typhus and other diseases. The limitation of the arbitral 
assignment to the four vilayets named in Article 89 of the 
Treaty made it seem a duty and an obligation that as large an 
area within these vilayets be granted to the Armenian state 
as could be done, while meeting the basic requirements of 
an adequate natural frontier and of geographic and economic 
unity for the new state. It was essential to keep in mind 
that the new state of Armenia, including as it will a large 
section of the former Armenian provinces of Transcaucasian 
Russia, will at the outset have a population about equally 
divided between Moslem and Christian elements and of diverse 
racial and tribal relationship. The citizenship of the 
Armenian Republic will, by the tests of language and religion,
be composed of Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Kizilbashis, Lazes and others, as well as Armenians. The conflicting territorial desires of Armenians, Turks, Kurds and Greeks along the boundaries assigned to my arbitral decision could not always be harmonized. In such cases it was my belief that consideration of a healthy economic life for the future state of Armenia should be decisive. Where, however, the requirements of a correct geographic boundary permitted, all mountain and valley districts along the border which were predominantly Kurdish or Turkish have been left to Turkey rather than assigned to Armenia, unless trade relations with definite market towns threw them necessarily into the Armenian state. Wherever information upon tribal relations and seasonal migrations was obtainable, the attempt was made to respect the integrity of tribal groupings and nomad pastoral movements.

From the Persian border southwest of the town of Kotur the boundary line of Armenia is determined by a rugged natural barrier of great height, extending south of Lake Van and lying southwest of the Armenian cities of Bitlis and Mush. This boundary line leaves as a part of the Turkish state the entire Sandjak of Hakkiari, or about one-half of the Vilayet of Van, and almost the entire Sandjak of Sairt. The sound physiographic reason which seemed to justify this decision was further strengthened by the ethnographic consideration that Hakkiari and Sairt are predominantly Kurdish in population and economic relations.
It did not seem to the best interest of the Armenian state to include in it the upper valley of the Great Zab River, largely Kurdish and Nestorian Christian in population and an essential element of the great Tigris river irrigation system of Turkish Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. The control of these headwaters should be kept, wherever possible, within the domain of the two interested states, Turkey and Mesopotamia. For these reasons the Armenian claim upon the upper valley of the Great Zab could not be satisfied.

The boundary upon the west from Bitlis and Mush northward to the vicinity of Erzingan lies well within Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets. It follows a natural geographic barrier, which furnishes Armenia with perfect security and leaves to the Turkish state an area which is strongly Kurdish. Armenian villages and village nuclei in this section, such as Kighi and Temran, necessarily remain Turkish because of the strong commercial and church ties which connect them with Kharput rather than with any Armenian market and religious centers which lie within Bitlis or Erzerum vilayets. This decision seemed an unavoidable consequence of the inclusion of the city and district of Kharput in the Turkish state as determined by Article 27 II (4) and Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

From the northern border of the Dersim the nature and direction of the frontier decision was primarily dependent upon the vital question of supplying an adequate access to the sea for the
state of Armenia. Upon the correct solution of this problem depends, in my judgment, the future economic well-being of the entire population, Turkish, Kurdish, Greek, Armenian, or Yezidi, in those portions of the Vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis and Van which will lie within the state of Armenia. I was not unmindful of the desire of the Pontic Greeks, submitted to me in a memorandum similar, no doubt, in argument and content to that presented to the Supreme Council last March at its London Conference, that the unity of the coastal area of the Black Sea inhabited by them be preserved and that arrangements be made for an autonomous administration for the region stretching from Riza to a point west of Sinope. The arbitral jurisdiction assigned to me by Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres does not include the possibility of decision or recommendation by me upon the question of their desire for independence, or failing that, for autonomy. Nor does it include the right to deal with the littoral of the independent Sandjak of Djanik or of the Vilayet of Kastamuni into which extends the region of the unity and autonomy desired by the Pontic Greeks.

Three possible courses lay open to me: to so delimit the boundary that the whole of Trebizond Vilayet would lie within Turkey, to grant it in its entirety to Armenia, or to grant a part of it to Armenia and leave the remainder to Turkey. The majority of the population of Trebizond Vilayet is incontestably Moslem
and the Armenian element, according to all pre-war estimates, was undeniably inferior numerically to the Greek portion of the Christian minority. Against a decision so clearly indicated on ethnographic grounds weighed heavily the future of Armenia. I could only regard the question in the light of the needs of a new political entity, Armenia, with mingled Moslem and Christian populations, rather than as a question of the future of the Armenians alone. It has been and is now increasingly my conviction that the arrangements providing for Armenia's access to the sea must be such as to offer every possibility for the development of this state as one capable of reassuming and maintaining that useful role in the commerce of the world which its geographic position, athwart a great historic trade route, assigned to it in the past. The civilization and happiness of its mingled population will largely depend upon the building of railways and the increased accessibility of the hinterland of the three vilayets to European trade and cultural influences.

Eastward from the port of Trebizond along the coast of Lazistan no adequate harbor facilities are to be found and the rugged character of the Pontic range separating Lazistan Sandjak from the Vilayet of Erzerum is such as to isolate the hinterland from the coast so far as practicable railway construction is concerned. The existing caravan route from Persia across the plains of Bayazid and Erzerum, which passes
through the towns of Baiburt and Gumush-khana and debouches upon the Black Sea at Trebizond, has behind it a long record of persistent usefulness.

These were the considerations which have forced me to revert to my original conviction that the town and harbor of Trebizond must become an integral part of Armenia. Because of the still greater adaptability of the route of the Karshut valley, ending at the town of Tireboli, for successful railway construction and operation I have deemed it also essential to include this valley in Armenia, with enough territory lying west of it to insure its adequate protection. I am not unaware that the leaders of the Armenian delegations have expressed their willingness to renounce claim upon that portion of Trebizond Vilayet lying west of Surmena. Commendable as is their desire to avoid the assumption of authority over a territory so predominantly Moslem, I am confident that, in acquiescing in their eagerness to do justice to the Turks and Greeks in Trebizond I should be doing an irreparable injury to the future of the land of Armenia and its entire population, of which they will be a part.

It was upon such a basis, Mr. President, that the boundaries were so drawn as to follow mountain ridges west of the city of Erzingan to the Pontic range and thence to the Black Sea, in such a way as to include in Armenia the indentation called
Zephyr Bay. The decision to leave to Turkey the harbor towns and hinterland of Kerasun and Ordu in Trebizond Sandjak was dictated by the fact that the population of this region is strongly Moslem and Turkish and that these towns are the outlets for the easternmost sections of the Turkish vilayet of Sivas. The parts of Erzerum and Trebizond Vilayets which, by reason of this delimitation, remain Turkish rather than become Armenian comprise approximately 12,120 square kilometers.

In the matter of the demilitarization of Turkish territory adjacent to the Armenian border as it has been broadly described above, it seemed both impracticable and unnecessary to establish a demilitarized zone which would require elaborate prescriptions and complex agencies for their execution. Fortunately, Article 177 of the Treaty of Sèvres prescribes the disarming of all existing forts throughout Turkey. Articles 159 and 196-200 provide in addition agencies entirely adequate to meet all the dangers of disorder which may arise along the borders, the former by the requirement that a proportion of the officers of the gendarmerie shall be supplied by the various Allied or neutral Powers, the latter by the establishment of a Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organization. In these circumstances the only additional prescriptions which seemed necessary and advisable were that the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organization should, in conformity with the powers bestowed upon it by
Article 200 of the Treaty, select the superior officers of the gendarmerie to be stationed in the vilayets of Turkey lying contiguous to the frontiers of Armenia solely from those officers who will be detailed by the Allied or neutral Powers in accordance with Article 159 of the Treaty; and that these officers, under the supervision of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Organization and Control, should be especially charged with the duty of preventing military preparations directed against the Armenian frontier.

It is my confident expectation that the Armenian refugees and their leaders, in the period of their return into the territory thus assigned to them, will by refraining from any and all form of reprisals give to the world an example of that high moral courage which must always be the foundation of national strength. The world expects of them that they give every encouragement and help within their power to those Turkish refugees who may desire to return to their former homes in the districts of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis, remembering that these peoples, too, have suffered greatly. It is my further expectation that they will offer such considerate treatment to the Laz and the Greek inhabitants of the coastal region of the Black Sea, surpassing in the liberality of their administrative arrangements, if necessary, even the ample provisions for non-Armenian racial and religious groups embodied in the Minorities
Treaty signed by them upon August 10th of this year, that these peoples will gladly and willingly work in completest harmony with the Armenians in laying firmly the foundation of the new Republic of Armenia.

I have the honor to submit herewith the text of my decision.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Woodrow Wilson

The White House,  
Washington,  
November 22, 1920.
DECISION
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESPECTING
THE FRONTIER BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA,
ACCESS FOR ARMENIA TO THE SEA
AND THE DEMILITARIZATION OF TURKISH TERRITORY ADJACENT
TO THE ARMENIAN FRONTIER

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Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States,
to Whom it Shall Concern,

Greeting:

Whereas, on April 26, 1920, the Supreme Council
of the Allied Powers, in conference at San Remo, addressed
to the President of the United States of America an invita-
tion to act as arbitrator in the question of the boundary
between Turkey and Armenia, to be fixed within the four
Vilayets of Erzerom, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis;

And whereas, on May 17, 1920, my acceptance of
this invitation was telegraphed to the American Ambassador
in Paris, to be conveyed to the Powers represented on the
Supreme Council;

And whereas, on August 10, 1920, a Treaty of
Peace was signed at Sèvres by Plenipotentiary Representa-
tives of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and
of Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania,
and Czecho-Slovakia, of the one part and of Turkey, of the other part, which Treaty contained, among other provisions, the following:

"Article 89

"Turkey and Armenia, as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier";

And whereas, on October 18, 1920, the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference, acting under the instructions of the Allied Powers, transmitted to me, through the Embassy of the United States of America in Paris, an authenticated copy of the above mentioned Treaty, drawing attention to the said Article 89;

How, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, upon whom has thus been conferred the authority of arbitrator, having examined the question in the light of the most trustworthy information available, and with a mind to the highest interests of justice, do hereby declare the following decision:
The frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, shall be fixed as follows (see annexed map on the scale of 1:1,000,000):  

1. The initial point* shall be chosen on the ground at the junction of the Turkish-Persian frontier with the eastern termination of the administrative boundary between the Sandjaks of Van and Hakkiari, of the Vilayet of Van, as this administrative boundary appears upon the Bashkala sheet of the Turkish map, scale 1:200,000, editions published in the Turkish financial years 1330 and 1331 (1914 and 1915). From this initial point the boundary shall extend southwestward to the western peak of Merkezer Dagh, situated about 6 kilometers westward from point 3350 (10,990 feet), about 2 kilometers southeastward from the village of Yokary Ahvalan, and approximately 76 kilometers southeastward from the city of Van, the Sandjak boundary specified above, then the administrative boundary between the Kazas of Mamuret-ul-Hamid and

* It is my understanding that this initial point will lie upon the former Turkish-Persian frontier referred to in Article 27 II (4) of the Treaty of Sèvres; but 40 miles of the said frontier, within which the initial point of the Armenian frontier is included, were left undemarcated by the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission in 1914. The initial point contemplated lies about 1 kilometer southward from the village of Kara Hissa and approximately 25 kilometers southwestward from the village of Kotur, and may be fixed on the ground as near this location as the Boundary Commission shall determine, provided it lies as the junction of the Van-Hakkiari Sandjak boundary with the frontier of Persia.
Elback, then the same Sandjak boundary specified above, all modified, where necessary, to follow the main water-parting between the Zap Su (Great Zeb River) and the Khoshab Su and dividing equably the summits of the passes Krdes Gedik and Chokh Gedik;

thence northwestward about 28 kilometers to Klesiry Dagh,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings between the Khoshab Su and the streams flowing into the Shatak Su, and traversing the pass south of the village of Yokary Ahvalan, and passing through Shkolans Dagh (3100 meters or 10,170 feet) and the Belereshuk pass;

thence southwestward to the junction of an unnamed stream with the Shatak Su at a point about 10 kilometers southward from the village of Shatak,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, and passing through Koh Kiran Daghlar, Sari Dagh, (3150 meters or 10,335 feet), Kevmetala Tepe (3500 meters or 11,480 feet), point 3540 (11,615 feet), in such a way as to leave to Armenia the village of Eyreti, and to Turkey the village of Araz, and to cross the Shatak Su at least 2 kilometers southward from the village of Dir Mouem Kilisa;

thence westward to the point where the Bitlis-Van Vilayet boundary reaches the Moks Su from the west, situated about 18 kilometers southward from the Village of Moks,
a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Armenia the villages of Kachet, Sinpass, and Ozim, passing through Kanisor Tepe (3245 meters or 10,645 feet), an unnamed peak about 3 kilometers southward from Arnus Dagh (3550 meters or 11,645 feet), crossing an unnamed stream about 2 kilometers southward from the village of Sinpass, passing through point 3000 (9840 feet), following the boundary between the Vilayets of Van and Bitlis for about 3 kilometers south-westward from this point and continuing southwestward on the same ridge to an unnamed peak about 2 kilometers eastward from Moks Su, and then descending to this stream;

thence northward to an unnamed peak on the boundary between the Vilayets of Van and Bitlis about 3 kilometers westward from the village of Sorsy and about 6 kilometers northward from the pass at Mata Gedik,

the administrative boundary between the Vilayets of Van and Bitlis, modified south of Vankin Dagh (3200 meters or 10,500 feet) to follow the main water-parting;

thence westward to the peak Meidan Chenidiani, situated on the boundary between the Sandjaks of Bitlis and Sairt about 29 kilometers southeastward from the city of Bitlis,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, passing through Veberhan Dagh (3110 meters
or 10,200 feet), crossing the Kesan Dare about 2 kilometers southward from the village of Khoros, leaving to Turkey the villages of Semhaj and Nevaleyn as well as the bridge or ford on the trail between them, and leaving to Armenia the village of Chopans and the trail leading to it from the northeast;

thence westward to the Guzel Dere Su at a point about 23 kilometers southward from the city of Bitlis and about 2 kilometers southward from Nuri Ser peak (2150 meters or 7050 feet),

the administrative boundary between the Sandjaks of Bitlis and Sairt, and then, a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, and passing through points 2750 and 2700 of Kur Dagh, (9020 and 8860 feet, respectively), Biluki Dagh (2230 meters or 7315 feet), and Sihaser Tepe (2250 meters or 7580 feet);

thence westward to the junction of the Bitlis Su and the unnamed stream near the village of Deshtumi, about 30 kilometers southwestward from the city of Bitlis,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Turkey the villages of Lered and Daruni, and to Armenia the village of Enbu and all portions of the trail leading northeastward to the Bitlis Su from Mergelu peak (1850 meters or 6070 feet), and passing through Mergelu Tepe and Shikh Tabur ridge;
thence westward to the Zuk (Gharsan) Su at a point about 11 kilometers northeastward from the village of Hazo and approximately 1 kilometer upstream from the village of Zily,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Armenia the village of Deshtumi, passing through the eastern peak of Kalmen Dagh (2710 meters or 8890 feet), and continuing in such a manner as to leave to Armenia the upland dolina, or basin of interior drainage, to traverse the pass about 3 kilometers westward from the village of Avesipy, passing through Shelash Bagh (1944 meters or 6380 feet);

thence westward to the Sassun Dere at a point about 4 kilometers southwestward from the village of Kabil Jeviz and approximately 47 kilometers southward from the city of Mush,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings through Cheyardash peak (2001 meters or 6565 feet), Keupeka peak (1931 meters or 6335 feet), an unnamed peak on the Sassun Bagh about 4 kilometers southwestward from Malato Bagh (2967 meters or 9735 feet), point 2229 (7310 feet), and leaving to Turkey the village of Gundenu;

thence northwestward to the Talury Dere at a point about 2 kilometers upstream from the village of Kasser
and approximately 37 kilometers northeastward from the village of Seylevan (Farkin),

    a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings and passing through an unnamed peak about 2 kilometers eastward from the village of Seyluk, and through point 2073 (6800 feet), leaving to Armenia the village of Heyshtirem;

    thence northwestward to the western tributary of the Talury Dere at a point about 2 kilometers eastward from the village of Helin and approximately 42 kilometers southwestward from the city of Mush,

    a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, and passing through point 2251 (7385 feet);

    thence northwestward to the junction of the Kulp Boghazy (Kulp Su) and Askar Dere, approximately 42 kilometers southwestward from the city of Mush,

    a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Turkey the village of Helin and to Armenia the village of Kehirvanik;

    thence northwestward to a point on the administrative boundary between the Sandjaks of Gendj and Mush northeast of Mir Ismail Dagh, and situated about 5 kilometers westward from the village of Pelekoz, and approximately 19 kilometers southward from the village of Ardushin,
a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, and passing through the Komiss Dagh;

thence northwestward to the Frat Nehri (Murad Su, or Euphrates) at a point to be determined on the ground about 1 kilometer upstream from the village of Dorne and approximately 56 kilometers westward from the city of Mush, the administrative boundary between the Sandjaks of Gendj and Mush northward for about 2 kilometers, then a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings westward to an unnamed peak approximately 6 kilometers east of Chutela (Akche Kara) Dagh (2940 meters or 9645 feet), then northward passing through Hadije Tepe on Arshik Dagh, leaving to Turkey the village of Kulay and to Armenia the village of Kluhuran;

thence northwestward to the Gunik Su at a point about midway between two trails crossing this river about half way between the villages of Elmaly and Chenajky, and approximately 26 kilometers northeastward from the village of Cholik (Chevelik),

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, passing through an unnamed peak about 2 kilometers westward from the village of Shanghar, along Solkhan Dagh, and through point 2200 (7220 feet), leaving to Turkey the villages of Shanghar and Chenajky, and to Armenia the villages of Kumistan, Lichinak, and Elmaly;
thence northwestward to the boundary between the vilayets of Erzerum and Bitlis at an unnamed peak near where a straight line between the villages of Erchek and Agha Keui would intersect said vilayet boundary,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, passing through point 2050 (6725 feet);

thence northward to an unnamed peak on said vilayet boundary about 8 kilometers northwestward from the Kartalik Tepe on the Choris Dagh,

the administrative boundary between the Vilayets of Erzerum and Bitlis;

thence westward to the Buyuk Su (Kighi Su) at a point about 2 kilometers upstream from the junction of the Ghabzu Dere with it, and approximately 11 kilometers northwestward from the village of Kighi,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings of the Sheitan Daglar, passing through points 2610 (8565 feet), Sheitan Dagh (2906 meters or 9535 feet), Hakstun Dagh, and leaving to Armenia the village of Dinek and the ford or bridge southwest of this village;

thence westward to the Dar Boghaz (Kuttu Dere) at a point about 3 kilometers southward from the village of Chardaklar (Palumor),
a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Armenia the villages of Shorakh and Ferhadin, passing through Ghabarti Dagh (2550 meters or 8365 feet), Sian Dagh (2750 meters or 9020 feet), the 2150 meter pass on the Palumor-Kighi trail near Mustafa Bey Konaghy, Feziria Tepe (2530 meters or 8300 feet), point 2244 (7360 feet), and point 2035 (6675 feet);

thence westward to the point common to the boundaries of the Sandjaks of Erzingan and Erzerum and the Vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz, situated at a sharp angle in the vilayet boundary, approximately 24 kilometers westward from the village of Palumor and 32 kilometers southeastward from the city of Erzingan,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, and passing northwestward through an unnamed peak about 2 kilometers southwestward from Palumor, through Silos (Kersinod) Dagh (2405 meters or 7890 feet) to an unnamed peak on the southern boundary of the Sandjak of Erzingan, about 8 kilometers southwestward from the Palumor-Erzingan pass, then turning southwestward along said sandjak boundary for nearly 13 kilometers, passing through Karaja Kaleh (3100 meters or 10,170 feet);

thence westward to an unnamed peak on the boundary between the Vilayets of Erzerum and Mamuret-ul-Aziz about 3 kilometers northeastward from the pass on the trail across the Monzur Silsilesi between Kemakh on the
Euphrates and Pelur in the Dersim, the peak being approximately 40 kilometers southwestward from the city of Erzingan,

the administrative boundary between the Vilayets of Erzerum and Mamuret-ul-Aziz, modified*, in case a majority of the voting members of the Boundary Commission deem it wise, to follow the main water-parting along the ridge between an unnamed peak about 2 kilometers southwest of Merjan Daghlar (3449 meters or 11,315 feet) and Katar Tepe (3300 meters or 10,825 feet);

* At the locality named, the vilayet boundary (according to Khozat-Dersim sheet of the Turkish General Staff map, scale 1:200,000) descends the northern slope of the Monzur-Silsilesi for about 7 kilometers. The junction of the boundary between the Kazas of Erzingan and Kemakh in Erzingan Sandjak of Erzerum Vilayet with the boundary of Dersim Sandjak of Mamuret-ul-Aziz Vilayet lies within 14 kilometers of the Euphrates River. This leaves to Turkey a military bridgehead north of an 11,000-foot mountain range and only 20 kilometers south of the city of Erzingan. I am not empowered to change the administrative boundary at this point, and these 40 square kilometers of territory lie outside of the four vilayets specified in Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

However, I venture to call the attention of the Boundary Commission to the desirability of consulting the local inhabitants with a view to possible modification of the vilayet boundary at this point.
thence northward to the Frat Nehri (Kara Su, or Euphrates) at a point to be determined on the ground about 6 kilometers eastward from the village of Kemakh and approximately 35 kilometers southwestward from the city of Erzingan,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Turkey the trail from Pelur in the Dersim to Kemakh on the Euphrates, and to Armenia the village of Koja Arbler;

thence, northward to the boundary between the Vilayet of Erzerum and Trebizond at a point to be determined about 1 kilometer west of peak 2930 (2630? or 8625 feet) and about 4 kilometers southward from the village of Metkut or approximately 39 kilometers northwestward from the city of Erzingan,

a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Turkey the villages of Chalghy Yady, Toms, and Alamlik, and to Armenia the village of Erkghan and the road and col south of the village of Metkut, passing through Utch Kardash Tepe, Kelek Kiran (Tekke Tash, 2800 meters or 9185 feet), Kehnam Dag (or Kara Dagh, 3030 meters or 9940 feet), dividing equably between Armenia and Turkey the summit of the pass about 2 kilometers westward from the village of Zazker and, similarly, the summit of the pass of Kral Khani Boghazy near the village of Chardakli, passing through point 2760 on Kara Dagh (9055 feet), point 2740 (8990 feet), and a
point to be determined on the ground, situated near the Iky Sivry stream less than 2 kilometers westward from the Chimen Dagh pass, and located in such a manner as to leave to Turkey the junction of the two roads leading westward to the villages of Kuchi Keui and Kara Yayrak, and to Armenia the junction of two other roads leading to the villages of Metkut and Kirmana; the Boundary Commission shall determine in the field the most equitable disposition of the highway between points 2760 and 2740;

thence northwestward to the Kelkit Chai (Kelkit Irmak) at the point where the boundary between the Vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas reaches it from the south, the administrative boundary between the Vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum, and then the administrative boundary between the Vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas;

thence northward to an unnamed peak on the boundary between the Vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas about 4 kilometers southwestward from Borgha Paya (2995 meters or 9825 feet) the latter being situated approximately 38 kilometers southwestward from the city of Gumush-khana, a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings leaving to Armenia the villages of Halkit, Sinanli, Kiliktin, and Kirtanos; and to Turkey the villages of Kar Kishla, Sadik, Kara Kia, and Ara, crossing the pass
between the western tributaries of the Shiran Chai, and the eastern headwaters of the Barsak Dere (Kara Chai) about 43 kilometers eastward from the city of Karahissar Sharki (Shebin Karahissar);

thence northeastward, northward, and westward to an unnamed peak on the boundary between the Vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas situated about 7 kilometers northwestward from Yerchi Tepe (2690 meters or 8825 feet) and approximately 47 kilometers south southeastward from the city of Kerasun, the administration boundary between the Vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas;

thence northward, from the point last mentioned, on the crest of the Pontic Range, to the Black Sea, at a point to be determined on the seacoast about 1 kilometer westward from the village of Kesbah, and approximately 9 kilometers eastward from the city of Kerasun, a line to be fixed on the ground, following the main water-partings, leaving to Turkey the fields, pastures, forests, and villages within the drainage basin of the Komit Dere (Ak Su) and its tributaries, and to Armenia the fields, pastures, forests, and villages within the drainage basins of the Yaghaj Dere (Espiya Dera) and the Venasit Dere (Keshab Dere) and their tributaries, and drawn in such a manner as to utilize the boundary between the Kazas of Tripoli (Tireboli) and Kerasun in the 7 kilometers just south of Kara Tepe (1696 meters or 5565 feet), and to provide the most convenient relationships
between the new frontier and the trails along the ridges, as these relationships may be determined by the Boundary Commission in the field after consultation with the local inhabitants.

2. In case of any discrepancies between the text of this Decision and the maps on the scales of 1:1,000,000 and 1:200,000 annexed, the text will be final.

The limits of the four Vilayets specified in Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres are taken as of October 29, 1914.

The frontier, as described above, is drawn in red on an authenticated map on the scale of 1:1,000,000 which is annexed to the present Frontier Decision. The geographical names here mentioned appear upon the maps accompanying this text.

The chief authorities used for the names of geographical features, and of elevations of mountains, and the location of vilayet, sandjak and kaza boundaries, are the Turkish General Staff map, scale 1:200,000, and, in part, the British map, scale 1:1,000,000.

The maps on the scale of 1:200,000 are recommended to the Boundary Commission, provided in Article 91, for their use in tracing on the spot the portion of the frontiers of Armenia established by this Decision.

II

The frontier described above, by assigning the harbor
of Trebizond and the valley of the Karshut Su to Armenia, precludes the necessity of further provision for access for Armenia to the sea.

III

In addition to the general provisions for the limitation of armaments, embodied in the Military, Naval and Air Clauses, Part V of the Treaty of Sèvres, the demilitarization of Turkish territory adjacent to the frontier of Armenia as above established shall be effected as follows:

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organization provided for in Articles 196-200 of the Treaty of Sèvres shall appoint the superior officers of the gendarmerie stationed in those vilayets of Turkey lying contiguous to the frontiers of the state of Armenia exclusively from the officers to be supplied by the various Allied or neutral Powers according to Article 159 of the said Treaty.

These officers shall, in addition to their other duties, be especially charged with the task of observing and reporting to the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organization upon any tendencies within these Turkish vilayets toward military aggression against the Armenian frontier, such as the building of strategic railways and highways, the establishment of depots of military supplies, the creation of military colonies, and the use of propaganda dangerous to the peace and quiet of the adjacent Armenian territory. The Military Inter-Allied Commission
of Control and Organization shall thereupon take such action as is necessary to prevent the concentrations and other aggressive activities enumerated above.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done in duplicate at the city of Washington on the twenty-second day of November, one thousand nine hundred and twenty, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and forty fifth.

(Signed) WOODROW WILSON

By the President:

(Signed) BAINBRIDGE COLBY

Secretary of State.
Area, Population, and Economic Character of the New State of Armenia.

Roughly estimated, the size of the future Republic of Armenia will be about 60,000 square miles. In equivalent American areas, it will compare closely to the size of Illinois or twice the size of Maine. In comparison with European countries it will be about the size of Czecho-Slovakia.

In climate and geography the country is most nearly comparable to Switzerland. Except along the narrow coastal strip of Trebizond, it is a mountainous plateau, in which the arable area will be not more than one-fifth of the total area. The cultivable land lies chiefly in the mountain valleys which vary from 3,000 feet to 5,000 feet above sea level. Some wheat is grown, however, on the mountain slopes to the level of 7,000 feet.

The pre-war agricultural production of the country was chiefly in cattle, sheep, and goats; tobacco, chiefly in the Trebizond and Van regions; wheat; barley; and legumes. The principal exports from the harbor of Trebizond in the years 1912 and 1913 were in the order of their value, filberts, tobacco, sheep, and cattle, eggs, beans, hides, and jerked beef.
Complete and trustworthy data upon the mineral resources of the country are not available. It is safe to say that its prospective mineral production has probably been exaggerated. But geologists believe that the Armenian mountains are heavily mineralized and that, with the advantages of a stable government, attracting foreign capital and able to build railways, the past mineral production will be greatly increased. As in the past, the chief mineral wealth of the country will be in salt and copper. If the Zangezur and Ala Verdi districts of the province of Erivan fall to the Armenian state in the fixation of the northern boundaries between the Armenians, the Azerbaijani, and the Georgians, Armenia will be especially well supplied with copper.

For the development of industries based upon this prospective mineral output there is water power, especially in Trebizond Vilayet, and an important new coal field north of Olti in Kars province. The total coal resources of this field are known to be about 200,000,000 tons.

Until the question of the northern borders of Russian Armenia shall have been decided, any estimate of the pre-war or present total population and its ethnographic distribution is decidedly problematic. For the purposes of establishing a rough knowledge of the population and its ethnic elements we have included the entire provinces of Erivan and Kars of the former Russian Empire in our calcu-
lations, although some portion of these areas will, presumably, not go to Armenia and the Armenian percentage may thereby be slightly lowered.

The total pre-war population of the future Armenian state was, according to our own careful estimates, about 3,570,000. Of these the Moslems, including Turks, Kurds and Tartars, formed about 49%, the Armenians about 40%, the Greeks about 4%, the Lazes about 5%. The remaining 1% was composed of Yezidis, Chaldaean Christians, Russians, etc. It is problematic whether the Kurds, comprising about 10% of the pre-war Moslem total of 49%, will be more friendly to the Armenian aspirations than to the Turkish opposition thereto. The provision in the Turkish Treaty for an autonomous Kurdistan, lying south of Armenia, with the possibility of independence from Turkey after a year, has changed the entire political relationship of the Kurds toward the Turks, though not the religious ties which tend to bind them to Pan-Moslem interests.

The attitude of the Kurds, both nomad and sedentary, will be determined somewhat by the amount of influence which Great Britain will be able to exercise over them from Mesopotamia, and France in her sphere of interest as defined in the tripartite convention signed at Sèvres by Great Britain, France and Italy on August 10th. The Armenians have always maintained, and continue to assert, that they will work in amity with the Kurds in the
Armenian districts when, once for all, Turkish domination over them is removed. The Kurds are racially more akin to the Armenians than to the Anatolian peasantry, and their various types of Mohammedanism are regarded as distinctly unorthodox by the Anatolian Turks. At present they are playing their own hand, equally against the Armenians and the Turks. They form, therefore, an unascertainable political and ethnic factor in the situation.

The one certain result of the pre-war population estimates, as given above, is that the Moslems, including the Lazes, held a majority over the Christians (Armenians and Greeks) in the area which will be the Armenian State.

Any attempt to estimate the probable population of the new Armenian state, as it will be after a year of the shifting of refugees and return of other emigrants, must in the nature of the case, lead to very doubtful results. The attempt, however, must be made, in order to calculate, with what precision may be attained, the probable future of this state.

We conclude that the population of the entire area which will make up the Armenian state will have been reduced, after a year of re-adjustment, from the pre-war total of 3,570,000 to about 3,000,000. Due to the tremendous losses of the Turkish and Tartar populations by war casualties, the terrible ravages of diseases (the
typhus mortality was well above 50% of those stricken), of massacres, and refugee movements before the Russian advance, the Turkish and Tartar elements have suffered in about equal proportion to the Christian elements. The Armenian refugees will return in relatively large numbers into independent Armenia. A lesser number of the Turks and Tartars who have left these regions will return thither for permanent residence if the Armenian state is really established. Considering these elements, our guess is that the population percentages will have shifted within a year after the establishment of the new state, as follows: Turks, Kurds and Tartars, about 40%; Armenians, about 50%; Greeks, about 3%; Lazes, about 6%; with the remaining 1% divided among the Chaldaean Christians, Yezidis, Russians and others. The relative increase in the Armenian population should, in the following generation, certainly be continuous and rapid.

In this area and with the immediate ethnic distribution estimated above, the greatest element of hope for the future good of this backward part of the world lies in the Armenian people. American military observers and relief workers who have visited the Armenian districts during the war and the period of the armistice, saw the country and its peoples when they were at a tremendous disadvantage. This is especially true of the Armenians. It is fundamentally correct to start upon the assumption
that the conditions of life existing in Turkish Armenia for the past fifty years, in Russian Armenia more particularly since the armistice, can have produced no other result than to lower greatly the moral stamina and the productive capacity of both Moslem and Christian inhabitants, and in about equal degree. We have no doubt that the appointment of a mandatory power would have been by all odds the best solution for the welfare of this country. There is grave reason for the apprehension expressed by General Harbord (Harbord report p. 18) in regard to the capacity of the Armenians to govern themselves and especially to govern the land in conjunction with the almost equal number of Moslems who will continue to live within their borders. It is for this reason that we have recommended the insertion of a clause in President Wilson's report of the boundary decision warning the Armenian people of the expectation of the civilized world that there will be no reprisals against the Moslems when Armenian military forces occupy the four eastern vilayets of the former Turkish Empire and impressing upon them the expectation that they will not attempt to rule as conquerors over subject peoples.

The hope we place in the Armenian people is based upon the tremendous vitality they have shown under the outrageous and brutal persecutions of the past fifty years, their tenacity in respect to their religious
beliefs, the capacity conceded to them by all competent and unprejudiced observers, their industry and thrift, and their initiative. This belief in the fundamentally sound character of the Armenians, despite many unattractive traits appears most markedly in the writings of German travelers and observers who have studied the country and peoples and have written numerous books upon them during the first three years of the war. The eagerness with which the Armenians, both in their own country and away from it, have grasped at every opportunity for training and higher education, warrants the belief that their undoubted powers of leadership among the Near Eastern peoples will increase with the responsibilities incurred by independence. Ample provision has been made in the Minorities Treaty signed by the Armenians and the Principal Allied Powers upon August 10 at Sèvres for the protection of the Moslems and the remaining Christian non-Armenian groups.

Before the war there was but one railway within the area which will be Armenia, the branch line of the Russian-Transcaucasian Railway system connecting Tiflis in Georgia with Alexandropol, Kars and the border town of Sari Kamish, with a branch from Alexandropol via Erivan and Nakhchivan to the town of Djulfa on the Persian border. The caravan and wagon routes have greatly deteriorated since the retreat of the Russian forces which occupied almost all of this territory in the years 1915-1917. Nevertheless the
transportation facilities of Armenia have been greatly increased in consequence of the construction of railways dictated by the southwestward military advance of Russian troops. Djulfa has been connected with Tabriz in Persia. Northern Persia has been brought into railway connection with Turkish Armenia by spurs which run well into Erzerum Vilayet and touch also the border between Persia and the Vilayet of Van. The city and plain of Erzerum in Turkish Armenia are already tapped by another extension of the Alexandropol-Kars division of the Russian system running westward from Sari Kamish. Under Armenian initiative, if the Armenians can obtain the requisite financial support, the completion of this last line through to Tirebolı may be confidently expected in the near future. This will give an immediate impetus to the commercial development of the Armenian state.
The Present Political Situation in the Near East.

In view of the unfortunate historic and geographic situation of Armenia, the immediate chances of the successful establishment of this state may fairly be open to question. It lies wedged in between hostile Moslem populations and is internally permeated with strong and inassimilable Moslem elements. The great western Powers have all expressed, or passively acknowledged, their unwillingness or their inability to aid the Armenians in their present crisis. It is quite evident that the fiat of the Supreme Council will not exorcise the Turkish Nationalists out of Erzerum. The problem is a military-political one, in the solution of which the Armenians stand alone.

RUSSIA

The two great external political factors which, immediately and in the future, will determine the fate of Armenia are Russia and the British Empire. The imperialistic advance of Russia over Transcaucasia during the nineteenth century was continued in her policy during the World War. The result of the Russian campaigns of 1915 and 1916 brought under Russian occupation almost the entire area of the four Turkish vilayets assignable to Armenia.
by the Turkish Treaty. It was partially the apprehension aroused in the foreign offices of France and Great Britain by this Russian advance which gave rise to an agreement between Russia, France, and Great Britain in the spring of 1916 by which the territorial acquisitions or spheres of influence to be acquired by these Powers in Asiatic Turkey, in case of a victorious conclusion of the war, were fixed. The areas of special interest of France and Italy in Anatolia were definitely assigned on August 10th at Sèvres in the "Tripartite Convention between the British Empire, France and Italy relative to Anatolia." The Russian Revolution was the opportunity out of which the independence of Armenia arose. The geographic proximity of Russia, the economic interdependence of Russia and western Asia, and the force of Russian political tradition, all make it impossible to conceive an Armenian state free from Russian influence and interest, whatever the form of the Russian government may be. This Russian influence may in the end be decidedly favorable to the maintenance of Armenian independence.

GREAT BRITAIN

Freely granting the humanitarian sympathy of the British public and government for Armenia, it is necessary also to evaluate British policy in relation to Armenia from the standpoint of statecraft. Before the World War the diplomacy of the British Foreign Office with relation to the Middle East (Persia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and
India) and the Near East had as its dominating purpose the
defense of the strategic frontier of the British Empire
in its two soft spots, toward India against attack by land
from the west, toward the Suez canal against attack by
land from the east. Essentially these purposes may be re-
garded as one, namely the defense of the Empire of India.
As a result of the war Mesopotamia has been added to the
defensive liabilities of the British Empire under the
mandate granted by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers.
The Moslem population under British tutelage has been con-
siderably increased. The frontier on land has been greatly
extended and greatly weakened. The acquiescence of Great
Britain in the acknowledgment, on January 10, 1920, by the
Powers then represented upon the Supreme Council, of the
independence of Georgia and Azerbaidjan is, similarly, a
part of her broad Middle Eastern defensive policy. In
line with this policy an independent state of Armenia will
be regarded by Great Britain as one of the buffer states
for the long and weak Mesopotamian line of defense. The
interests of Great Britain, therefore, combine with the
general sympathy of the British public caused by the
Armenian horrors of the past thirty years in forecasting
continued British support of Armenia. For the present the
effectiveness of this support is not great because of the
tremendous strain put upon the British Empire by the heavy
responsibilities it has incurred as a result of the war
and the peace terms with the several enemy states.

AZERBAIDJAN

The immediate neighbors of Armenia, under the dominating shadow of the two great powers, Russia and Great Britain, affect the Armenian situation more directly. These are, upon the north, the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Azerbaijan Socialist Republic; upon the east, Persia; upon the south and west, Kurdistan, a region which, according to Article 62 ff. of the Treaty of Sèvres, will be for the space of a year an autonomous part of Turkey, thereafter perhaps independent; upon the west, Turkey.

The government of Azerbaidjan which was recognized by the Allied Powers upon January 10, 1920, was the anti-Bolshevik "Independent Republic of Azerbaidjan." It had proclaimed its independence of Russia on May 28, 1918. On April 28, 1920, this government was overthrown and the present Azerbaidjan Socialist Soviet Republic took its place. The Republic of Azerbaidjan may be regarded at present as a dependency of Soviet Russia, although vaguely treated by the Bolshevist regime as an independent Communist state. A position of advantage was thus gained by Soviet Russia for the projected Bolshevist-Tartar-Turkish attack upon the British line of defense in Persia and Mesopotamia and for the stiffening of the Nationalist Turkish forces of Mustapha Kemal in
Anatolia with Bolshevist reinforcements. The latter move-
ment, if it carried through will be extremely dangerous
to the Armenian state if the Bolshevist leaders are in a
position to enter upon and pursue the plan with any vigor.

There is reason to doubt this ability. The Bolshevist
control of Azerbaidjan since May of this year has been
signalized by a massacre of several thousand Tartars
(estimates from 5,000 to 12,000) in Elisavetpol. This has
had a sobering effect upon Georgia and Armenia and stif-
fened their opposition to Bolshevist propaganda. It has
created a hatred of the Bolshevist regime in Azerbaidjan
itself and weakened Bolshevist influence. This weakening
has been accentuated by the defeat upon the Polish front
and the probability that the internal situation will force
the Bolshevist regime to attempt to recoup its reputation
against the Poles or to deal with General Wrangel in the
Crimea, before beginning serious operations so far afield
as in Transcaucasia and Turkey*.

GEORGIA

The Georgian Democratic Republic concluded a treaty
with Soviet Russia on May 7. An attempt at a coup d'état

* The New York Times of September 4, 1920,
prints a communiqué from Trotzky that the Bol-
shhevist forces have been forced to evacuate
Baku. This report has not been officially
verified. The general trend of recent reports
from the Near East is to minimize the danger
of actual Bolshevist military aid to the Tur-
kish Nationalists.
in Georgia by local Bolshevists assisted by the forces of
the Azerbaidjan Soviet Republic was defeated. The common
danger from Bolshevism has helped to compose the border
disputes between Armenia and Georgia and the relations
between their respective governments are now more friendly
than at any other time since the spring of 1918.

PERSIA

The Persian government, which is under strong British
influence, will certainly not be hostile to the Armenian
state. But the control of the Persian government over the
Tartars of northwest Persia is minimal and the local chief-
tains may always be expected to aid rather than hinder Bol-
shevist-Tartar-Turkish opposition to or attacks upon Ar-
menia. Movements of Bolshevist-Azerbaidjanese troops into
the Vilayet of Erzerum may at any time be effected through
the district of Maku lying just east of Mt. Ararat; and
the Armenian forces, until their occupation of Turkish
Armenian territory shall have taken place, will be utterly
powerless to prevent it.

KURDISTAH

In regard to Kurdistan, the terms of the Turkish
Treaty provide that a Commission of Three is to prepare
a scheme for the autonomy of the Kurdish regions of
Turkey, lying to the south and southwest of the four
vilayets. If the Kurdish populations shall, within a year after the treaty goes into force, address the Council of the League of Nations with proof that the majority of the Kurds desire to be independent of Turkey, the Council of the League has the power to grant this independence. The details are to be determined by a special convention between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey.

Whatever may be the principal objects of these provisions regarding Kurdistan, they have a direct bearing upon the immediate chances of the successful establishment of the Armenian state. The possibility of independence thus presented to the Kurds, who have always been restive under Turkish domination, must certainly alienate them from the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustapha Kemal, which has as its avowed purpose the maintenance of Turkish control over as great a part of the old Turkish Empire as possible. The aims of the Kurds are now allied to those of the Armenians by the fact that the Kurdish desire for independence has been changed into a definite plan for attainment of that end. This will probably not mean active support of the Armenian attempt at occupation of the four vilayets. It should mean, however, that the Armenians will not have to meet active hostility upon the part of the 300,000 or 400,000 Kurds resident in the area of the four vilayets, or the possibility of attack from the Kurds living south of the Armenian border.
For the present the existing Arab outbreaks against the British forces of occupation in Mesopotamia have nullified the chances of immediate active help to the Armenians from British influence to the south. The Treaty of Sèvres provides that Mesopotamia is to be independent under a mandatary to be chosen by the Principal Allied Powers. This mandatary will be Great Britain. In that case we may confidently expect a liberal enforcement and development of the mandatory obligations which the British government will assume, and that this will gradually result in the pacification and prosperity of Mesopotamia. For the future welfare of Armenia the British influence toward the south will be decidedly favorable.

TURKEY

The Sultan's government at Constantinople has signed the treaty and is in a position where it must acquiesce in the treaty's provisions. The actual control over inner Anatolia lies, however, in the hands of the Nationalist Turkish party headed by Mustapha Kemal Pasha. The leaders of this party are honestly and unalterably opposed to the separation of the Vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond from the Turkish Empire. They will probably put up what fight they can against its enforcement. They are, however, much more interested in combating the Greek occupation of the Smyrna district than against the pros-
pective Armenian occupation and their troops are massed chiefly against the Greek, French and British forces who are aligned in western Asia Minor and along the zone of the Straits. The poor showing of the Nationalist forces before the Greek troops in northwestern Asia Minor in June has no doubt lowered the morale of the nationalist irregulars to the extent that this becomes a favorable factor in the solution of the Armenian problem of occupation.

SUMMARY

The Armenians have a small but well-trained force ready to advance from Russian Armenia into the four vilayets when the decision of President Wilson is given out. They have recently been supplied with arms and ammunition. Despite the Bolshevist coup d'état in Azerbaidjan the political situation is favorable to their success. They themselves have confidence in their ability to carry out the occupation against the weak Nationalist forces in the four Eastern vilayets of former Turkey. A disturbing and unappraisable factor in the situation is what the Bolshevist leaders can and will do to assist the Turkish Nationalists in their resistance.

In the absence of mandatory supervision and protection by one of the great Powers, the continued maintenance of Armenian independence is precarious. Without such protection the play of the persistent historic forces,
which have always operated in this unhappy region, may be expected to continue. The chances are that the mountainous plateau of Armenia will again, as so often in the past, be the point of contact of great historic movements in the Near and Middle East. If the traditional motives and methods of our international relations should undergo same great change, Armenia may more happily come within the protective orbit of some great power, probably Russia, and thereby maintain a great measure of its individuality and independence.
Immediate Financial Outlook of the Republic of Armenia.

The estimated pre-war debt of the Turkish Empire that will be subject to apportionment among states acquiring Turkish territory is LT 141,106,093. For the fiscal years 1910-11 and 1911-12, the average revenues of that portion of the territory of the four Turkish vilayets which will be assigned to the Armenian state was, in round figures, LT 1,630,000 ($7,172,000), or about 5.4 per cent. of the total revenues of the Turkish Empire. Assuming a population of 1,700,000 the estimated per capita contributions of the inhabitants of the Turkish vilayets ceded to Armenia will be LT 0.96 ($4.22). For purposes of comparison, the per capita contributions in the United States, Great Britain and Bulgaria may be cited. In the year 1919, per capita contributions in the United States amounted to $47.00 and in Great Britain to $85.00. Before the war Bulgaria had per capita revenues of about $11.00, and, though considered very low, even they are 260 per cent. greater than the estimated per capita revenues of the Armenian state.
According to Article 241 of the Turkish Treaty all states acquiring territory from Turkey agree to participate in the annual charge for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt. The amount of these annual charges is to be fixed by determining the ratio of the average revenue of such detached territories in the fiscal years 1909-10, 1910-11, and 1911-12 to the average total revenue of the Turkish Empire for the same years.

On this basis the amount of the Ottoman Public Debt to be assumed by the Armenian state should be about L T 7,619,729 ($33,526,807). If we may assume that those areas of Armenia which were detached from Turkey will produce, in the succeeding years, approximately the same annual revenues as before the war (L T 1,630,000 or $7,172,000), the service of the Ottoman Public Debt will consume L T 489,467 ($2,153,654) of this amount. The surplus of revenue from this area available to the Armenian state for general administrative purposes would be L T 1,140,533 ($5,018,545). This may be compared with the pre-war situation in Bulgaria which had an estimated area of 43,300 square miles and population of 4,750,000, with a debt of $300,000,000 and debt charges of $15,000,000.

In making this general and problematic estimate of the resources which should be available for Armenia, our
calculations have not included the Armenian territory of the former Russian provinces of Kars and Erivan. For we assume that some fair portion of the pre-war debt of Russia will later be assigned to the Armenian state, as was done in the case of Poland (Article 21 of the Polish Treaty), and as would be entirely just in the case of Armenia. This unknown obligation of Armenia has precluded any attempt to estimate, even roughly, the debt and revenues of the Armenian state as a whole.

The figures given above are entirely inadequate and unsatisfactory, as we know. They may serve, however, to indicate that the financial outlook of Armenia is not bright. Yet it is not desperate. The Republic of Armenia will need, especially in the first decade of its existence, able and conservative financial leadership, which will avoid pretentious governmental enterprises of all kinds. In case no mandatary power is assigned to Armenia, such leadership may possibly be found among Armenian financial experts, especially those already trained in the public service of the Turkish Empire. But sympathetic and disinterested encouragement from without is essential. By its technical advice, and possibly by small loans, the government of the United States could be of the greatest service to Armenia during the early years of its independence.
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Number 1

(Extract Paraphrased)

ALLIED RECOGNITION OF ARMENIA

Paris,
19 January 1920

Wallace to Lansing:
    File No. 763.72119/8740 conf.

    A meeting of the Supreme Council was held this morn-
ing, with Clemanceau presiding. Marshal Foch was also
present; and, for Great Britain, Field Marshal Wilson,
Admiral Beatty, Lord Curzon, Winston Churchill and Long...\(^2\)

    The representatives of Azerbaidjan and Georgia were
heard with regard to the situation in the Caucasus.
Tseretelli advised that Daghestan and Armenia be ac-
corded \textit{de facto} recognition.

    The Georgian and Azerbaidjani representatives having
withdrawn, and after further discussion, the Council
decided as follows:

    "It is agreed: (1) that the government of
the Armenian State shall be recognized as a \textit{de
facto} government on the condition that this recog-
nition in no way prejudices the question of the
 eventual frontier. (2), that the allied govern-
ments are not prepared to send to the Trans-

\(^2\) The name is missing in the original text. Probably it was the first Lord of the Admiralty Walter Hume Long. (A.P.)
caucasian states the three divisions contemplated by the Inter-Allied committee. (3) (a) to accept the principle of sending to the Caucasian States arms munitions and if possible food. (b) Marshal Foch and Field Marshal Wilson are invited to consider of what these supplies shall consist and the means for their despatch.

"The American and Japanese representatives will refer these decisions to their respective Governments."
Appendix I
Number 2

REPORT AND PROPOSALS OF THE COMMISSION
FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF ARMENIA.

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Composition of the Commission

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BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. R. Vansittart, M. V. O.
Colonel W. H. Gribben, C. M. G., C. B. E.

FRANCE

M. Kammerer.
Colonel Chardigny.

ITALY

M. Galli.
Colonel Castoldi.

JAPAN

Lieutenant Commander Anno.
After having heard the statements of the Georgian and Armenian Delegations, the Commission has drawn up the present report on the boundaries of the future State of Armenia.

I.

In fixing the extent of territory to be allotted to Armenia three factors must be taken into account:-

(1) The number of Armenians that it will be possible to bring back into Turkish Armenia. According to the data at present available, this number does not exceed 500,000 of whom 150,000 are refugees in Russian Armenia, while the rest are in Turkey or would come from Persia, Bulgaria or America. The Armenian territory must therefore not be too extensive in order that the American$^3$ element may rapidly obtain preponderance. The proposed boundaries make allowance for the possibilities of the expansion of the race. Armenia, as delimited below by the Commission, exceeds its present possibilities. At

$^3 =$ Armenian (A.P.)
the time of its creation it would have a population of approximately 1,200,000 Armenians in Russian Armenia and 500,000 in Turkish Armenia, in all less than 2 million persons.

2) Strategical reasons.

The frontier of the new state ought not to be too extensive in proportion to its population and should be easily capable of defence. From this point of view it would have been desirable to include Trebizond and Erzinjan within Armenian territory, both forming advantageous point for the concentration of enemy forces, while their approaches are easy of defence, on the one side on the road from the coast, on the other side in the defiles traversed by the two roads which lead from Erzinjan to Kemak and Enderes. The Commission has, however, considered that it is not expedient, for ethnographical and political reasons, to deprive the Turks of a district in which they have always been greatly in the majority, and where the Armenians only represent a small fraction of the population. Finally the existence on the eastern frontier of Armenia of the Tartar State of Azerbaijan, which as a matter of fact, has always been hostile to it, is a further reason for not unduly extending the boundary of Armenia.
towards the West, so that the length of her principal line of communication from West to East may be diminished, and too many non-Armenian elements may not be introduced into the territory which the Armenians may be called upon to defend.

3) The necessity for ensuring Armenia an Outlet to the sea.

From this point of view, Armenia is in a very unfavorable situation, since before the war the Armenian population did not extend as far as the Sea.

It is therefore necessary that this difficulty should be overcome by the expedients suggested below.

II

Notwithstanding the desire of the Commission to give Trebizond to Armenia in order that she may be assured her own outlet to the Sea, the considerations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 have induced the Commission to propose that Trebizond and Erzinjan should be left to Turkey, as well as the road by which they are connected.

The Commission has considered the possibility of incorporating the mining district of Gumush Khaneh with Armenia, but as this district is crossed by the road from Erzinjan to Trebizond, which constitutes the outlet of the region of Erzinjan to the sea, the
incorporation of the district of Gumush Khaneh with Armenia appeared to be incompatible with the maintenance of the region of Erzincan and Trebizond under Turkish rule.

The boundary between Armenia and the free State of Batum must be determined on the spot by an Interallied Commission, on the principle that the State of Batum shall be as small as possible and that the Kars-Ardahan-Batum road shall belong to Armenia as far as the frontier of that state. The attached map indicates two possible lines.

As regards the boundary between the State of Armenia and Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Commission considers that, it is advisable for the present to await the results of the agreement, provided for in the treaties existing between the three Republics, in regard to the delimitation of their respective frontiers by the States themselves.

In the event of these Republics not arriving at an agreement respecting their frontiers, resort must be had to arbitration by the League of Nations, which would appoint an interallied Commission to settle on the spot the frontiers referred to above, taking into account, in principle, of ethnographical data.
The proposed boundaries on the North, South and West are given in the annex hereto.

In order to give Armenia an outlet to the sea, and since it appears necessary that Trebizond should remain Turkish, the Commission submits the following propositions:

(1) Creation of a Free State of Batum, with which Armenia would be in direct contact through the Valley of Chorok, through which the railway to be constructed between Kars and Batum is eventually to pass.

On the other hand, the frontier between Georgia and Armenia would be fixed in such a way that the present road from Kars to Batum via Ardahan and Artvin would remain in Armenian territory, as far as the Free State of Batum, with a sufficient zone of protection on the north.

Batum would thus be the free port of Trans-Caucasia, of Armenia and of the eastern portion of Lazistan (see below).

It has since been decided to drop the provision of autonomy for Lazistan. The people are not really in a fit state to exercise it: and Armenia has moreover agreed to sign the treaty drafted by us, giving very ample assurance for the protection of the interests of minorities. This fully covers Lazistan and there is no reason why the Lazes should
have any special regime of their own as compared with the other minorities elsewhere in Armenia who are certainly much more advanced than the Lazes.

(2) Creation of an autonomous State of Lazistan under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia, who may in future convert into carriage roads the bad roads from Baiburt to Surmenek and Of (which latter was constructed by the Russian Army during the war). These roads are included in the zone which would be allotted to the autonomous State of Lazistan.

Lazistan is a mountainous country, inhabited by a primitive, uncultivated Moslem population, of Georgian origin, it is true, (Lazes to the west, Ajars to the East) but with no Georgians sympathies, as was proved by the events of 1914 and 1918. These people, whose leanings are if anything Turkish, were as a matter of fact not very submissive to Turkish rule before the war. Their chief desire is to live as independently as possible.

(3) Right for Armenia to the free use of the road from Erzerum and Baiburt to Trebizond, which, with Platana, would be a port in which would enjoy special privileges for her import and export trade.

In the Hinterland of Trebizond between Tereboli, Ardasa and Surmench (1) the Turks would not

(1) see attached map.
be entitled either to maintain troops or to keep stores of munitions; the present fortifications of Trebizond would have to be demolished.

IV.

The Commission wishes to lay stress on the fact that, in its opinion, the creation of an Armenian State including territory formerly Turkish would appear possible only under the two following conditions:—

(1) Turkish troops to be withdrawn from the zone allotted to Armenia within a period to be determined by the Allies.

The Turks will not in present conditions withdraw their troops unless very strong pressure is brought to bear. It is beyond the functions of the Commission to indicate the means to be adopted for exercising such pressure, but it is its duty to call attention to this point, in order that the necessary steps may be considered.

(2) Even if the Turkish troops evacuate the formerly Turkish zone allotted to Armenia, the Commission feels bound the point out that the formation of an Armenian State will be extremely difficult without the presence of European troops. Should none of the powers be willing to furnish these troops, the only solution would be to supply Armenia
with all the officers and material necessary for the creation of a solid national army, stiffened, if possible, by volunteers recruited from among the Allied and Associated Powers.

(3) In any event, the protection of the League of Nations should be assured to Armenia, in order that she may be supplied with all material aids to continued existence and economic development.

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Appended hereto is (1) a map showing the boundaries of Armenia on the territory that was Turkish in 1914 (the proposal of the Commission);

(3) map showing approximate boundaries between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and the territory in dispute between them;

(4) A map showing the two solutions suggested for the area of the Free State of Batum.
ANNEX

Proposed line of the Western boundaries of Armenia.

(a) Northern Boundary. The ridge of the Pontic mountain chain from a point to the north-west of Mezra to the former Russo-Turkish frontier. This ridge now marks the boundary between the vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum. 1)

(b) Western Boundary. From the ridge of the Pontic mountain chain to the north-west of Mezra to the pass on the Baiburt road, following the present boundary of the vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum as far as Phor; then in a straight line as far as Almali; the Baghir Dagh, Shaitin Dagh and Chavresh Dagh ridges; a line passing to the west of Ognet, following the course of the Murad Su as far as Ardushan and ending at the southern watershed of the Murad Su, 20 kilometres west of Mush in such a way as to leave within Armenian territory the road between Almali, Fam, Milikhan and Bashkei to the valley of the Charbukhur Su, to the west of Bingol Dagh.

1). This would from the southern boundary of the autonomous State of Lazistan, whose western frontier has been brought as far as the western valley of Surmanch, in order to include the roads from Baiburt to Of and Surmench.
(c) **Southern Boundary.** The watershed bordering on the south the Mush plain, Bitlis and its environs remaining within Armenian territory then the ridge of the heights bordering the southern bank of lake Van, including the high-lying valley of the Clgindig Su as far as Saris, the southern ridge of the Khoshab Su valley as far as Barajul Dagh. From here the boundary is formed by the line of heights taking a north-easterly direction and ending at the Persian frontier south-west of Kotur in such a way as to leave the high lying valley of Bashkala to the Kurds. The former Turco-Persian frontier as far as Mt. Ararat. The former Russo-Persian frontier from Mt. Ararat to a point to be determined on the Aras below Julfa, where the boundary of Azerbaijan will begin.

A technical description of the foregoing lines is also appended.

**FRONTIERS OF ARMENIA**

From a point to be selected on the southern shore of the Black Sea about 1 kilometre west of the mouth of the Yanboli Dere in a south-south-westerly direction to a point to be chosen on CHAKAR GEUL DAGH, the line of heights forming the western limit of the basin of the YANBOLI DERE;
thence in a south-easterly direction to the point of the salient of the western boundary of the VILAYET OF ERZERUM about 4 kilometres south-west of ZELFEH DAGH,
    the line of heights forming the watershed between the basins of the Kharshit Dere and the Yanbolı Dere;
    thence in a south-south-westerly direction to a point to be selected on HATAB DAGH,
    the western boundary of the VILAYET OF ERZERUM;
    thence in an easterly direction to the junction of the Poluk Chai with the KARA SU about 10 kilometres north of Baghir Pasha Dagh,
    the course of the KARA SU down stream;
    thence to a point on the Biyük SU about 12 kilometres north of KŁIŁI;
    a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights Baghir Pasha Dagh, Sultan Dagh, Aktaş and Ghabarti Dagh;
    thence in a general south-easterly direction to a point on the Geunik Su about 10 kilometres south-east of Oğnut,
    a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights Shaitan Dagh and Chorish Dagh;
    thence in a general southerly direction to the junction of the Masla Dere and Murad Su,
a line following the watershed between the MASLA DERE and GEUNIK SU;
thence to a point to be chosen on the MURAD SU about 15 kilometres east of ARDUSHIN,
the course of the MURAD SU upstream;
thence in a general south-easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the RU SU about 1 kilometre north-west of TATVAN, a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights KOZMA DAGH, KURTIK DAGH, KACH RASH DAGH and KAMRAN TEPE;
thence in a south-easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the BITLIS SU about 2 kilometres west of SHETEK,
a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights SHEIKH OMAR TEPE and KAMBUS DAGH;
thence in an easterly direction to a point about 3 kilometres south of OLHK SIFLA (OLEK ASHAGHI) where a stream joins the GUZEL DERE,
a line reaching and then following as far as possible the watershed between the BITLIS SU and the GUZEL DERE,
thence eastwards to the point where the KARA SU and EJKIS DERE meet about 7 kilometres east of the village of KARASU SIFLA,
a line passing through KURDAGH and following the
southern limits of the basins of the TASIK DERE and KARA SU;

thence eastwards to the point of junction of the DARNIS DERE with the stream flowing from PASHANDASHT DUZ, a line reaching and then following as far as possible the southern limit of the basin of the EJEKIS DERE, then the southern limit of the basins of the rivers which flow into VAN GEUL, then the watershed between the PASHANDASHT DUZ and the DARNIS DERE;

thence eastward to point 3050 (ref. Turkish Staff Map), a line to be fixed on the ground following as far as possible the DARNIS DERE downstream;

thence north-eastwards to VAVIRAN DAGH, a line following the line of heights to the west of the SHATAK SU;

thence in a general easterly direction to SHAKULANS DAGH, a line following the northern and northeastern limits of the basin of the SHATAK SU and passing through KUSH DAGH, BASHIT DAGH, and KUCHKIRAN DAGH;

thence northwards and then eastwards to a point to be chosen on the salient made by the old frontier between Turkey and Persia about 4 kilometres south of KARA HISSAR, a line following the watershed between the ZAB SU
on the east and the KHOSHAB SU on the west;
    thence northwards to AGHRI DAGH (Ararat), the old frontier between Turkey and Persia.

    Boundary of Demilitarized Area.

    From a point on the southern shore of the BLACK SEA 3 kilometres southwest of TIREBOLI southwards and then eastwards to the point where it meets the western boundary at the VILAYET of ERZERUM,
    the western and southern limits of the basin of the KHARSHIT SU;
    thence northwards to the BLACK SEA,*
    the northwestern frontier of ARMENIA as it may be determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

    [On the map showing the various frontiers suggested for the state of Batum it has been agreed that the smallest (that drawn in red) is the only practical one.]

* The Demilitarized Area described above covers only half as much territory as the Demilitarized Area shown upon the appended map (G.S.G.S. № 2944).
Mr. Secretary of State:

I have had the honor orally to inform Your Excellency on the 9th of this month that the work of framing the peace treaty with Turkey had progressed far enough in the London Conference to make it possible to think of calling the Turkish delegates at an early date. I told you then how glad my Government would be to know, as soon as possible, whether the Government of the United States, which takes no part in the said conferences, intends to disclaim interest in the Eastern affairs or, on the contrary, proposes, as the President of the Council would much prefer, to claim its share of influence, activities and responsibilities in the final restoration of universal peace.

Upon your alluding to the nature of the contemplated solutions, I telegraphed to my Government, which puts me in position to let you know that they are as follows:

1–Frontier of Turkey in Europe: The Enos-Midia

His Excellency

The Honorable Frank L. Polk,
Acting Secretary of State.
of more likely Tchataldja line.

2-Frontier of Turkey in Asia: In the North and West, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, the Mediterranean Sea. In the East, the frontier of the Armenian State. In the South, the stream of the Djaihun Irmak (Cilicia) and a line running north of Aintab, Biredjik, Urfa, Mardin and Djesireh-Ibn-Omar.

3-Zone of the Straits: The Turkish Sultan and Government will be maintained at Constantinople, that decision however being conditioned on the execution of the terms of peace and observance of the guarantees thereby stipulated in favor of the minorities. There shall be no Turkish troops, except the Sultan's bodyguard, left in Constantinople.

The right of a military occupation of Turkey in Europe and of a zone South of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmora will be reserved to the Allies.

An international Commission will be created, with executive and financial powers to secure the freedom of the Straits that will be guaranteed in peace as in war. The Commission, which shall exercise its powers in the name of and by delegation from the Sultan, will have its own flag and budget, with power to borrow money on its revenues. It will collect taxes levied on the basis of the complete equality of all countries. It will do the works required for navigation and be
vested with naval police rights. France, England, Italy and eventually the United States and Russia will each have a representative on the Commission commanding two votes. Roumania, Greece, and ultimarily Bulgaria will have a representative with one vote. None but the representative of one of the Great Powers can hold the office of President. Several other questions, particularly those connected with the passage of warships and the regime of the Straits in war time are still under advisement. If Greek territory should stretch to the Sea of Marmora, the Greek shore would be under the same regime as the Turkish shore.

4 - Greek sovereignty will be set over such part of Thrace as is not left to the Turks. Special guarantees will be granted to Ottomans at Adrianople. A free port will be set apart for the Bulgarians.

5 - A special arrangement concerning the three great Mediterranean Powers is in preparation for the purpose of reserving to each in a determined region a preferential right in the matter of furnishing advice and instructors.

6 - The independence of Armenia which shall perfect her financial and military organization with the assistance of the League of Nations will be recognized. Special rights over Lazistan will guarantee her outlet
to the sea.

Turkey would relinquish all rights to Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria and all the Islands.

7 - Smyrna and a zone not including Aidin would be administered by the Greeks under the Sultan's suzerainty. The port shall be free and one portion specially set apart for the Turks.

8 - In the field of economics many questions have only received preliminary examination and met with difficulties that will have to be solved by the Supreme Council. But an agreement has been reached on the following points: liquidation of German property in Turkey; continuance of the concessions granted to aliens in territories undergoing a change of sovereignty, except that if there be occasion the concessions may be revised or canceled upon payment of an indemnity; creation of a financial commission charged with the supervision of all the revenues and expenditures of Turkey, continuance of the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt and of the privilege of holders of bonds of that debt on the securities that have been pledged to them; reimbursement of the cost of military occupation restricted to the occupation of territories that are to stay Turkish.

These are substantially the points upon which the Powers represented at the London Conferences have reached
a preliminary understanding.

   Be pleased to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my high consideration.

JUSSERAND.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1920

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of March twelfth, relative to the conferences regarding the Peace Treaty with Turkey and the present status of the negotiations between the principal Allied Powers, and in reply to inform you that the President does not deem it advisable in the present circumstances that the United States be represented by a Plenipotentiary at the conference. The President feels, however, that as this Government is vitally interested in the future peace of the world, it should frankly express its views on the proposed solutions of the difficult questions connected with the Turkish Treaty. While it is true that the United States of America was not at war with Turkey, yet it was at war with the principal allies of that country and contributed to the defeat of those allies and, therefore, to the defeat of the Turkish Government. For that reason, too, it is believed that it is the

His Excellency,
J. J. Jusserand,
Ambassador of the French Republic.
duty of this Government to make known its views and urge a solution which will be both just and lasting.

The Government of the United States understands the strength of the arguments for the retention of the Turks at Constantinople, but believes that the arguments against it are far stronger and contain certain imperative elements, which it would not seem possible to ignore. It was the often expressed intention of the Allies that the anomaly of the Turks in Europe should cease, and it cannot be believed that the feelings of the Mohammedan people, who not only witnessed the defeat of the Turkish power without protest, but even materially assisted in the defeat, will now so resent the expulsion of the Turkish Government as to make a complete reversal of policy on the part of the great Powers desirable or necessary.

As to the line given as the southern frontier of Turkey, it is assumed that this boundary is meant to be the ethnological frontier of the Arab people, in which case, it is suggested, certain rectifications would seem necessary. If, however, other considerations entered into the choice of this line, this Government, without any intention to criticize, would appreciate being furnished with the arguments
dictating such a choice.

The Government of the United States notes with pleasure that provision is made for Russian representation on the International Council, which it is proposed shall be established for the Government of Constantinople and the Straits. This Government is convinced that no arrangement that is now made concerning the government and control of Constantinople and the Straits can have any elements of permanency unless the vital interests of Russia in those problems are carefully provided for and protected, and unless it is understood that Russia, when it has a Government recognized by the civilized world, may assert its right to be heard in regard to the decisions now made.

It is noted with pleasure that the questions of passage of war ships and the regime of the Straits in wartime are still under advisement as this Government is convinced that no final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia.

As for Thrace, it would seem right that that part of East Thrace, which is outside of the zone reserved for Constantinople, should become part of the Kingdom of Greece with the exception of the northern part of that province. As this, the northern part, is clearly Bulgarian in population, justice and fair dealing
demand that the cities of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisseh and the surrounding territory should become part of Bulgaria. Not only is the claim of Bulgaria worthy of most serious consideration on ethnic and historical grounds, but it would also seem that Bulgaria is entitled to have its claim to this territory favorably considered in view of its having been compelled to surrender purely Bulgarian territory and many thousands of Bulgars on its western boundary on no other grounds than the rather doubtful grounds of securing a strategic frontier for Serbia.

In connection with the proposed preferential right of the three great Mediterranean Powers to furnish advisers and instructors in certain zones, this Government feels that it is necessary for it to have more information as to the reason and purpose of such a plan before it can express an intelligent opinion.

There can be no question as to the genuine interest of this Government is the plans for Armenia, and the Government of the United States is convinced that the civilized world demands and expects the most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country. Its boundaries should be drawn in such a way as to recognize all the legitimate claims of the Armenian people and particularly to give them easy and unencumbered access to the sea. While unaware of the considerations governing
decision reached by the Supreme Council, it is felt that special rights over Lazistan would hardly assure to Armenia that access to sea indispensable to its existence. It is hoped that, taking into consideration the fact that Trebizond has always been the terminus of the trade route across Armenia and that Mr. Venizelos, on behalf of the Greeks of that region, has expressed their preference for connection with Armenia rather than Turkey, the Powers will be willing to grant Trebizond to Armenia.

In regard to the relinquishment by Turkey of her rights to Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and the Islands, this Government suggests that the method resorted to in the case of Austria be adopted, namely, that Turkey should place these provinces in the hands of the great Powers, to be disposed of as those Powers determine.

In regard to the arrangement for Smyrna, this Government is not in a position to express an opinion as the question is too important to be passed on with the limited information this Government has as to the exact arrangement that is contemplated and the reasons for the same.

The Government of the United States can quite understand the difficulties that have confronted the Supreme Council in dealing with the economic questions
that present themselves for settlement in connection with this Treaty. It is easy to see that the problems are complex and fruitful of misunderstanding because of the conflicting interests involved, but this Government has every confidence that the problems will be dealt with in a spirit of fairness and with scrupulous regard for the commercial interests of victor, vanquished and neutral.

It is evident that there is yet much to be done before a comprehensive plan can be worked out and this Government will welcome further information on the subject of the economic clauses of this Treaty. Incidentally, the plan that has apparently been worked out by the Supreme Council in connection with continuation of concessions granted to aliens and giving the right to revise or cancel concessions on payment of indemnity, referred to in the eighth paragraph of Your Excellency's note, has grave possibilities and would seem to require careful elucidation.

Let me say in conclusion that it is the understanding of the Government of the United States that whatever territorial changes or arrangements may be made in the former Ottoman Empire, such changes or arrangements will in no way place American citizens or corporations, or the citizens or corporations of any other country in a
less favorable situation than the citizens or corporations of any Power party to this Treaty.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) BAINBRIDGE CILBY
April 23, 1920

No.

Sir:

Referring to communications heretofore received from you on the subject of the proposed recognition of your Government by the Government of the United States, I am pleased to inform you, and through you, your Government, that, by direction of the President, the Government of the United States recognizes, as of this date, the de facto Government of the Armenian Republic.

This action is taken, however, with the understanding that this recognition in no way predetermines the territorial frontiers, which, it is understood, are matters for later delimitation.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Bainbridge Colby, 
Secretary of State.

Dr. G. Pasdermadjian,  
Representative of the Armenian Republic, 
Congress Hall Hotel, 
Washington, D. C.
Appendix I
Number 6

(Extract Paraphrased)

San Remo
24 April 1920

Johnson to Colby:
File № 763.72119/9728

This afternoon when I entered the Conference I found that the question of mandates was being considered. The agenda included: (1) Boundaries of Armenia, (2) Mandates, (3) Hedjas, (4) Report of the Drafting Committee, (5) Russia. Point (1) had already been discussed. I am informed that, on Lloyd George’s suggestion, I shall tonight be asked to submit the Council’s decision to the President. It would appear that Armenia is to have an outlet to the sea via Batum ---.
These points were considered at today’s meeting of eleven A.M.: (1) Mandates, (2) Armenia, (3) Hejas, (4) Russia...

(2) While Armenia did not figure on the Agenda, a Resolution previously proposed was brought up again and passed. The gist of this resolution was, first, to request the United States to take over the Armenian mandate, and, second, to invite the President – in case America refuses the mandate – to settle the boundaries between Turkey and Armenia. The Council agreed that I. rather than Nitti, the Chairman, should forward this paper. I shall see Curzon about it tomorrow morning and report by telegraph as promptly as may be. As the Treaty is to be handed the Turks on May 10th, Lloyd George said that it would be highly advantageous to have a reply regarding the mandate before that date. He said further that he had received reports of additional massacres in Cilicia and of the withdrawal of the French. Millerand taxed the Armenians with exaggeration and declared that there might be military
movements in Cilicia but that there was no question of evacuating...
Appendix I
Number 8

(Paraphrase)

San Remo
26 April 1920

Johnson to Colby:
File № 763.72119/9746

In confidential conversation with an important personage, I have just heard the story of what has been happening with regard to Armenia. The drafting of the Turkish treaty was referred, at a meeting of the Supreme Council held in London in January, to a conference of Ambassadors under the Chairmanship of Lord Curzon. Thus was the ground prepared for San Remo. An expert commission submitted to the conference of Ambassadors a report on frontiers, etc., which has not been made public. Van, Bitlis, Mush, the province of Erzerum, and Lazistan, were to be added to Armenia. Trebizond was not included for fear the Armenians would be unable to hold it, but a demilitarized zone was recommended in order to provide access to the sea through Trebizond.

These proposals were transmitted to San Remo by the London Conference of Ambassadors. They were supported by Curzon, by the French, and, naturally, by the Armenians. Lloyd George and Nitti attacked them,
however, on the following grounds.

1. Very few Armenians are left in this territory, which is now predominantly Turkish.

2. The Turks will not give it up without fierce fighting.

3. The Armenians are not strong enough to take it by force.

4. As France and England are already preoccupied in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, the Allies are in no position to aid the Armenians.

5. Who else can furnish this aid?

In the circumstances, it was agreed not to indicate in the Turkish Treaty the frontier with Armenia, and to invite Mr. Wilson to settle the question. According to my informant, there will be an outcry among the Armenians and their friends in America when the Treaty is handed to the Turks and it transpires that San Remo has evaded the Armenian problem. In this respect, the Conference will be judged a fiasco. I replied that in view of the hopelessness of the Armenians a couple of day ago, they were well out of the difficulty for the moment, and that my informant perhaps took too dark a view of the case.

Curzon will lay three documents before the Conference this afternoon: (1) A despatch to the League of Nations in reply to a communication from the latter declining the
Armenian mandate; (2) A replay to the American Note on the proposed Treaty with Turkey; (3) A request to Washington in the matter of Armenia. This will be in three sections: first, an appeal to America to assume the mandate; second, an invitation to the President to draw the Western frontier; third, a statement as to American assistance needed, both military and financial.

Two maps of Armenia and a copy of the London sub-commission’s report are being forwarded by pouch.
At the Monday afternoon meeting of the Supreme Council a reply to the Washington despatch on the proposed Turkish Treaty was approved as follows. It was agreed that this reply should be signed by Nitti and transmitted by myself.

"While the Governments of the Allied Powers attach importance to the frankness of the views expressed by the Government of the United States, they have perforce postponed their answer to Mr. Colby’s Note until the clauses of the proposed Treaty with Turkey should have reached the point where they could be laid before the San Remo Conference.

"The Supreme Council takes note of the fact that Washington does not intend to be represented at the Conference otherwise than by an observer. Whence it appears that America does not propose to be party to the Turkish Treaty.

"The Council is happy to be assured by the presence of Mr. Johnson, however, that his Government relaxes none
of its interest in the conditions of peace to be offered Turkey, and take pleasure in hereby extending further information as to details passed upon before the arrival of the American Ambassador at Rome. The wish of his Government to be kept informed is not interpreted as signifying that the conclusion of the Treaty should be postponed for an exhaustive discussion of each point in the American Note and for a final agreement between the parties concerned. In the circumstances, such a course would have precluded the possibility of conducting negotiations to any profitable end.

"The Governments of the Allied Powers have made no secret of their desire that America should take part in drawing up and signing the instrument which is to reconstitute Turkey on just and permanent foundations. This desire caused them to postpone the Turkish negotiations, not without risk of a renewal of the war. They entirely comprehend the reasons, which have prevented the United States from becoming signatory to the Treaty. The task of negotiating it has not been simplified, however, by this postponement, and in the circumstances it has fallen to the Allied Governments alone. They have not evaded this burdensome duty, and have attempted to discharge it as best they could. They are
assured that the terms which they are soon to offer the Constantinople Government will not be found inharmonious with the spirit shared by the United States and themselves in carrying on the war and in drawing up the other treaties of peace.

"The Allied Governments are at one with United States in its desire that the present Treaty be just and impartial to all the parties concerned. It can not be justice, however, to grant the same consideration to the Turks, who made common cause with the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians in their attack upon the peace of Europe, as to their former subjects who have been freed from Turkish tyranny at immense cost to the Allies of treasure and blood.

"The Supreme Council will now consider the particular points mentioned in the Note of the American Government...

"7" The Supreme Council fully participates in the concern expressed by America with regard to Armenian independence. The Allies have every wish to grant Armenia such territory as she may within reason desire for the necessities of the present and of the future. No question of the entire treaty has been more baffling of solution, and the Supreme Council has been faced by the most discouraging difficulties. Another Note will present the problem in full to the American Government.*

* See Johnson to Colby; San Remo, April 27; File № 763.72119/9749. Appendix I, No. 10.
San Remo
27 April 1920

Johnson to Colby:
File № 763.72119/9749

See my cables of 25 and 26 April.
At its Monday afternoon meeting the Supreme Council accepted Curzon's proposed note to the President with reference to Armenia. Agreed that Nitti should sign the Note and I forward it. Text follows:

"Merely cursory reference to the Armenian question is made in today’s despatch to the American Government, replying to the communication of March 26th from the Secretary of State, with the additional statement that this subject will be dealt with separately. The Supreme Council now wishes, accordingly, to lay the following consideration before the Government of the United States.

"An inquiry was addressed, early in the course of the negotiations in London and Paris with regard to the terms of peace with Turkey, to the Council of the League of Nations, as to the degree in which that body, interested as it was known to be in Armenia's destiny, might be disposed to assist in assuring to the future state
her safety and independence.

"In the circumstances, since the League of Nations is not itself a state and lacks the forces or the resources to assume a mandate, the Supreme Council had no intention of requesting the League to undertake the responsibilities of a mandatory. In replying, however, the Council of that body stated that although the League sympathized fully with the aim, which the Principal Allied Powers had in view, that aim would be most successfully attained through the cooperation, as mandatory, of a member of the League or of some outside Power.

"While examining this answer, the Supreme Council was immediately put in mind of a belief which it has long held that the United States is the sole Great Power qualified both by her sympathies and by her resources to assume on behalf of humanity the duty of a mandate. The Note of the American Secretary of State truly describes this duty as "the demand and expectation of the civilized world". The Supreme Council has at no time forgotten that nowhere than in the speeches of Mr. Wilson has the aim of a free Armenia, among the various aims for which the Allies and America carried on the war to a successful conclusion, been more eloquently presented.
"The Supreme Council therefore takes this occasion to invite the United States to assume a mandate for Armenia. In so doing, the Supreme Council has no wish whatever to escape its natural responsibilities. It does so because the resources of the Allies will be strained to the last degree by obligations already incurred in reorganizing the Turkish Empire as it existed in 1914, as well as because the Supreme Council believes that a Power untrammelled by the alliances and preoccupations of Europe will command greater confidence and offer stronger guarantees of stability than a cis-Atlantic government.

"Questions as to the extent of the responsibility which Washington is requested to undertake, involving as it does the area and confines of the new Armenia, may well be asked in America. It lies in the power of the American Government to answer those questions in its own terms.

"No point of the negotiations which have been taking place has been more seriously discussed or has been found thornier than that of the frontiers of Armenia. The plea for a larger Armenia has been consistently upheld by President Wilson; but circumstances with which he is acquainted made it necessary to curtail these hopes in part, while the idea of a state stretching to the Mediterranean
and including Cilicia has long been given up.

"It remained to decide what parts of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond, which the Turks still hold, might be added without danger or impropriety to Russian Armenia, and in what way the new State might be rendered self-sufficient by means of access to the sea. In short, the precise western and southern frontiers of Armenia to be indicated in the Turkish Treaty had yet to be drawn. It is hoped that the frontiers with Azerbaijan and Georgia will be delimited by common accord, and at all events, there is no necessity of considering them now.

"Neither is it necessary to refer to the arguments presented, bearing on both sides of the question at issue. It is enough to say that the Supreme Council agreed upon an appeal to a disinterested and entirely impartial arbiter as being the best of the possible solutions. The Supreme Council therefore decided to add a request in this sense to its invitation to the President. The Supreme Council hopes that, however the American Government may reply in the wider matter of the Mandate, the President will undertake this honorable duty not only for the sake of the country chiefly concerned but for that of the peace of the Near East. The Supreme Council has accordingly decided:

"(a) To communicate to President Wilson a request
that the United States assume, within the limits stated in Section 5* of the first printed draft of the Turkish Treaty, a mandate over Armenia;

"(b) To invite the President, whatever be the reply of the American Government with regard to the mandate, to arbitrate the frontiers of Armenia as described in the draft article;

"(c) To insert in the Treaty an article on Armenia in sense as follows: The high contracting parties consent to refer the question of the frontier between Turkey and Armenia, in the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond, to the President of the United States and to abide by his arbitration, as by any condition he may lay down providing for Armenia’s access to the sea. Until the President’s decision has been handed down, the boundaries of Armenia and Turkey will remain as they are now. As for the northern and eastern frontiers of Armenia, in case the three Caucasian Republics fail to reach an agreement on this subject, the Supreme Council will delimit the disputed boundaries at the time when the Armenian-Turkish boundary is given out.

"Aside from these questions, there are other phases of the situation which the Supreme Council feels it important to bring to the sympathetic notice of the Govern-

* Apparently Section VI of the first draft of the Turkish Treaty.
ment at Washington. After the reestablishment of peace with Turkey, there must unavoidably supervene, in whose hands soever the guidance of Armenian affairs may lie, a period of transition during which, unless the new state be able to count on help from outside, its safety and even its existence will hang in the balance. Armenia will find herself in instant need of two things: military forces adequate to ward off aggression from without, and financial resources sufficient for the internal organization of the country and for the development of its economic possibilities. These needs may both, in the last resort, be regarded as of a financial order.

"The Supreme Council is of the opinion that the military problem is less formidable than might at first be thought. The forces of the existing Armenian Government have until the present time been chiefly engaged in unfortunate clashes with those of Georgia and Azerbaijan. An agreement has recently been made between the three republics, however, and it is hoped that with the settlement of these disputes Armenia will be able to concentrate her forces on her new frontiers. The Allies have thoroughly considered the possibility of enforcing the territorial clauses of the Turkish Treaty in this quarter by means of their own military aid. While ammunition and arms are already being supplied, neither the Armenians nor their friends in other countries should delude them-
selves with the hope that Allied troops can be spared for this purpose. Not only have the Principal Allied Powers already assumed very heavy responsibilities in Europe and elsewhere, but the necessity of occupying and administering regions which formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire and the possibility that they may be compelled to enforce the Treaty in parts of Turkey itself, will make it impossible for them to undertake further military burdens. Armenia will therefore be compelled to rely on her own resources, eked out by Allied supplies and instructors, unless she succeeds in obtaining immediate aid from some outside Power. Volunteers from America or from some other country would undoubtedly be gratefully received and employed to the greatest advantage. But still more advantageous, enabling Armenia to apply her manpower in the most effective manner to her own defense, would be an offer, by a great civilized state, on an organized scale, of material assistance and technical specialists. The Supreme Council considers it of great importance to learn whether the Government or the people of the United States find in themselves any willingness to be of service in this degree to Armenia.

"Still more urgent, however, is the matter of credits. We understand that the Council of the League of Nations
has under consideration a proposal to the Assembly of that body to recommend an Armenian loan, underwritten by all the countries belonging to the League. What response might be made to such an appeal, if issued, the Supreme Council naturally has no means of knowing. But even if the response were favorable, it could not be acted upon without a further lapse of time. The loan might not, furthermore, be sufficient to meet the necessities of Armenia; and, for obvious reasons, the American Government could not in any case be included in an appeal to members of the League of Nations. Thus in the very country where the consequences of the war are believed to be less burdensome than among any of the recent belligerents, where the drain upon the resources of a powerful and wealthy people has been least serious, and where sympathy for Armenia is most active and sincere, help might fall to be forthcoming.

"It is not for the Supreme Council to point out to America how the Armenian cause could best be furthered—whether by act of Government or by public or private contributions. A loan of a few millions sterling by the United States might suffice to put Armenia upon her feet at once. It is believed, on the other hand, that there are in America numerous private bodies, which would willingly subscribe to a cause so deserving. The Armenians themselves, moreover, would hardly hesitate at such a crisis in the affairs of their country to put their hands in
their pockets. They would not expect or desire to be wholly dependent upon the alms or the impulse of foreigners. We are convinced that well-to-do Armenians will donate generously toward that rehabilitation of their homeland, which they have awaited with such patience, with suffering so protracted and so cruel. Indeed few worthier appeals have been addressed to the conscience and to the heart of humanity, and mankind might well vie in responding to it.

"The Supreme Council has no wish to press the American Government in the matter of reaching decisions so momentous. But it goes without saying that Armenia will be in extreme anxiety, and the return of peace to the Near East may he unhappily or even disastrously retarded, while these questions remain in suspense. The various countries concerned would therefore be greatly relieved if the United States found it possible to express as soon as may be convenient its views on any or all of the above questions. And in conclusion we venture to voice our very sincere hope that the response may be of a favourable nature."

(Signed) Nitti.
Colby to Wallace:
№ 949

See Johnson’s cable of 25 April from San Remo, regarding Armenia (763.72119/9749).

Having studied the question of the invitation tendered by the Principal Allied Powers that he consent to delimit the southern and western frontiers of Armenia, the President wishes his acceptance to be convoyed to those Powers. He is happy to be able to serve the Armenians in this manner. You are requested to transmit this reply to the members of the Supreme Council.
Appendix III

MAPS USED IN DETERMINING ACTUAL BOUNDARIES
OF THE FOUR VILAYETS
AND
IN DRAWING THE FRONTIERS OF ARMENIA

In attempting to define the exact boundaries of "the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis" mentioned in Article 89 of the Turkish Treaty, we found marked discrepancies even in the most recent maps. Unless there is a definite understanding as to what outer boundaries of these four Vilayets were intended, the frontier established by President Wilson might be so drawn as to depart from the clear intention of the Principal Allied Powers in drafting the treaty.

It is obvious for example that the Vilayet of Erzerum referred to in Article 89 is not coextensive with the Vilayet of Erzerum as it existed before the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878 (Spezialkarte von Armenien, von A. Petermann, 1:1,200,000, published in Petermann's Mittheilungen, volume 24, 1878, Table 16), when it included the sandjaks of Kars, Tschaldyr, and Lazistan, the port of Batum lying within the latter. Nor can the Vilayet of Erzerum be regarded as including the Kharput district as it did in the early nineteenth century. This extent of Erzerum the Armenian leaders have referred to in a recent petition, as giving them a possible claim to Kharput.
The Vilayet of Trebizond referred to in Article 89 of the Turkish Treaty of 1920 does not include the sandjak of Djanik and the seaport of Samsun, although it is so shown in several fairly-recent Turkish, French, British, and Russian maps (a) Empire Ottoman, Division Administrative, 1:1,500,000, dressé d’après le Salnamé de 1899/1317, par R. Huber; (b) Carte de la Turquie d'Asie, Feuille No. 3, 1:1,000,000; (c) British International Map, Sinob and Batum sheets, 1:1,000,000, editions of 1916, 1918; (d) Russian 10-verst map of Asiatic Turkey, (sheets printed 1907 to 1914). Janik, or Djanik, was a sandjak of the Vilayet of Trebizond until 1910, but was formed into a separate administrative entity in that year called an "independent sandjak" and so appears in the statistics published by the Turkish Government in 1912.

The best general maps of the four eastern vilayets of Turkish Armenia are as follows:

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The best large-scale maps are:

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<td>1:250,000 (Eastern Turkey in Asia)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1901-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1:400,000 (Kiepert’s Klein-asien)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1902-06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See sheets with names transliterated by British War Office.
Only the Turkish large-scale map shows boundaries of both vilayets and sandjaks. The British and French 1:1,000,000-scale maps and the Russian five-verst map give vilayet boundaries. All four differ from each other in certain details, but agree in a general way with the official Turkish maps showing administrative divisions, except upon the sandjak of Djanik in relation to the vilayet of Trebizond. Djanik is shown as a separate unit on Turkish maps issued in 1919 and on the Turkish 1:200,000-scale sheets, published between 1915 and 1918.

All of these maps differ from each other in completeness of political boundaries and in the positions of vilayets and sandjak boundaries in relation to mountains, rivers, and cities. We have adopted the Turkish 1:200,000-scale map as official in determining what the existing vilayet boundaries are, having confidence in its superiority over the others. This confidence in its accuracy, gained by me through use of all the maps in the field, when travelling with the Harbord Mission, has been strengthened by our present study in preparation of this report.

We have reduced the vilayet boundaries on the Turkish 1:200,000-scale map to the scale of 1:1,000,000 and transferred them to our map herewith, using a newly-compiled base. It was impossible to use the British War Office
map (G.S.G.S. 2944, London, Feb. 1920) as a base, because reduction of the vilayet boundaries from the Turkish 1:200,000-scale sheets to our new base on the scale of 1:1,000,000 shows that the vilayet boundaries on this British and the French 1:1,000,000-scale maps are four miles to twenty-two miles out of position in extreme cases. These maps almost nowhere agree exactly with the Turkish maps in position of administrative boundaries and of mountain crests and river courses. Upon our new base we present a generalization of our recommended southern and western boundary of Turkish Armenia within the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. The map contains all the geographical names and all altitudes of peaks used in the boundary decision.

We have recommended that the Boundary Commission, provided in Article 91 of the Treaty of Sèvres, use the sheets of the Turkish 1:200,000-scale map (Seifke Pasha survey) in tracing on the spot the frontier between Armenia, Turkey, and Kurdistan. For the convenience of the Boundary Commission we have attached to the boundary decision a series of 1:200,000-scale maps, showing in red, the frontier we recommend, from the Persian border south of Mt. Ararat to the Black Sea west of Trebizond.

-- Major Lawrence Martin,
General Staff Corps, U. S. Army;
Geographer to the Harbord Mission.
THE QUESTION OF KHARPUT

I

Origin and Statement of the Question

As originally presented at the Peace Conference, the claims of the Armenians of Turkey comprised, roughly, the so-called six Armenian Vilayets, namely Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput and Sivas, with the Vilayets of Trebizond in the north and Adana (Cilicia) in the south. When the terms of peace with Turkey began seriously to be considered, however, and it became evident that this Armenia was not destined to emerge from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians and their partisans in the United States exerted themselves to save what they could of Greater Armenia. Especially since the San Remo Conference, and since the President’s acceptance of the responsibility of delimiting the Turco-Armenian frontier, has a systematic pressure been brought to bear upon the White House and the State Department, in an attempt to induce the President to extend his action beyond the limits set in the San Remo invitation and in the Treaty of Sèvres. This pressure has been exerted chiefly by representatives and partisans of
Turkish Armenia, and has tended in the main toward influencing the President to include within the boundaries of the Armenian State, if not the entire Vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Aziz (Kharput) and Diarbekir, at least the Sandjaks of Dersim and Kharput, together with a portion of the Sandjak of Arghana.

The more important of the documents bearing on this situation are the following:

I. A memorandum of January 15, 1920 (File No. 860J.01/178), to the Secretary of State from Dr. Garo Pasdermadjian, Diplomatic Representative in Washington of the Armenian Republic, indicating among Armenian desiderata the Sandjaks of Dersim and Kharput.

II. A memorandum of May 1, 1920 (860J.01/247), to the same from the same, requesting the Vilayet of Kharput.

III. A telegram of May 4, 1920 (860J.01/251), to the Secretary of State from Boghos Nubar Pasha, President of the Armenian National Delegation in Paris, representing the Armenians of the former Ottoman Empire, and from Mr. Avetis Aharonian, President of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic to the Peace Conference, claiming the Sandjak of Kharput.

IV. A despatch of August 20, 1920 (860J.01/336), to the Secretary of State from the American Embassy in Paris,
transmitting a letter to the President from Boghos Nubar Pasha and Mr. Avetis Aharonian on the boundary question, together with two memoranda and a number of accompanying documents. The leaders of the Armenian delegations in Paris petition the President to include the Kharput area in Armenia, a suggesting that the western and southern boundaries "be drawn to correspond with the boundaries of the former province of Erzerum." Reversion to the boundaries of the Vilayet of Erzerum, as it existed in the first half of the 19th century, would permit the inclusion in Armenia of the city and plain of Kharput, as well as the entire valley of the Chorokh River to its mouth near Batum. In fact, it is suggested that the Armenians would be willing to renounce certain portions of the four Vilayets, and notably the western part of the vilayet of Trebizond, in exchange for the above-mentioned districts.

V. A memorandum by Major-General J. Bagratuni, Chief of the Armenian Military Mission to the United States (760J. 6175/15) submitted May 22, 1920, to the Secretary of State by the Appointed Armenian Minister, recommending the inclusion of the Sandjaks of Dersim and Kharput and that part of the Sandjak of Arghana traversed by the valley of the Upper Euphrates (Murad Su).
VI. A memorandum of May 5, 1920 (860J.01/266), to the Secretary of State from the Honorable James W. Gerard, Chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, claiming for Armenia "all territories east of the Euphrates River."

VII. A memorial to the President and to the Secretary of State (860J.01/311), presented July 21, 1920, by a delegation representing the United Educational and Benevolent Societies of Harput, Armenia, calling upon the President to include the Province of Kharput, "as well as all the other Armenian provinces", within the frontiers of the new state.

VIII. "Observations Regarding the Boundaries of Armenia" (860J.01/313), by Reverend Ernest W. Riggs, President of Euphrates College, Kharput (under the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions) and Temporary Secretary and Treasurer of the Armenia America Society, New York, submitted July 24, 1920, to the President and to the Secretary of State. Mr. Riggs suggests that the President recommend to the signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres the attribution to Armenia of Kharput, as well as of various localities in the Vilayets of Sivas, Diarbekir and Adana.

IX. A letter of August 28, 1920 (760J.6715/16) to the President from representatives of the Armenians of the city and Province of Diarbekir, who in a mass meeting
held at West Hoboken, New Jersey, on August 22, resolved to appeal to President Wilson "to include their city and province within the boundaries of the New Armenian Republic."

In addition to the documents listed above, a large number of letters and telegrams has been addressed, both to the President and to the Secretary of State, by individuals, organizations and mass meetings, calling for the inclusion of Kharput within the frontier to be delimited by the President.

It may be added, finally, that an unofficial intimation has been conveyed to the Committee drawing up this report, by representatives in America of the Armenian Republic, to the effect that what their Government chiefly wishes to secure is the Plain of Kharput, lying in the loop which the Euphrates here makes to the west, together with a suitable corridor via the valley of the Murad Su into the Vilayet of Bitlis.

II

Arguments in Favor of Including Kharput within the Boundaries of Armenia.

The data adduced by the above documents in support of their main contention, namely that the whole or a part of the Vilayet of Kharput should be included within the President's terms of reference, may be summarized as follows:
1. Historical Data.

Kharpur is historically a part of Armenia Major and was long included in the Turkish Eyalet of Erzerum or Ermenistan (Document IV: Memo. to the President, pp. 2, 3, 4).

Kharpur is one of the six so-called Armenian Vilayets of the former Ottoman Empire, so recognized in at least four international instruments signed since 1878 (VI, p. 3; VII, p. 1).

Diarpkur is historically Armenian, the seat of Tigranes the Great (IX, p. 1).

2. Cultural Data.

Kharpur has long been an important Armenian cultural centre. There are in the province 2 Armenian colleges and 27 Armenian high schools, besides 2 French schools, one German school, and the American Euphrates College (whose original name of Armenia College was suppressed by the Turks). The students of these foreign institutions "are exclusively Armenians," as well as the doctors and lawyers of the province-which has supplied 75% of all the teachers and clergy of "Armenia". "Of the 360 villages and towns of the Province of Kharpur not a single one is without a church, a monastery, or a cemetery whose inscriptions and crosses attest to its Armenian origin" (VII, pp. 1,2).
3. Ethnological Date.

Kharput has always been recognized as a predominantly Armenian province.

It is an Armenian-speaking district. 40% or 40-45,000 of the Armenians in this country come from Kharput. There is now, within the boundaries of the Armenian Republic and in the territory east of the Euphrates in Turkish Armenia, as Armenian population of about 1,700,000, as against a maximum of 750,000 Moslems of various races (VI, pp. 3, 4).

In 1914, according to Dr. Pasdermadjian, the Province had a population of 168,000 Armenians, as against 102,000 Turks and 95,000 Kurds (II). These are the figures given by Documents IV and VII, taken from "La Question Arménienne" by Marcel Léart, 1913, and from the Orange Book of the Russian Foreign Office, 1915. But the Sandjak of Malatia is not included, while the total is increased by 5000 Syrian Christians and 80,000 non-Moslem Kizilbashis.

It is claimed that in the Vilayet of Diarbekir the Armenians also predominate. The statistics of the Armenian Patriarchate at Constantinople for 1912 are as follows (IX, p. 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedentary Kurds</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomadic Kurds</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Christians
Armenians........105,000
Miscellaneous......60,000
Total.........................165,000
Miscellaneous non-Christians.......31,000
Grand total..................296,000

4. Economic data

Kharpout, economically, is the richest region of Armenia. The Sandjak of Kharpout is an exceptionally rich agricultural region (IV, Notes for Peace Conference, No.3, p. 1). The mineral wealth of Armenia is available only along the edge of the central plateau, where the immense lava crust has been broken by seismic disturbances (IV, Memo. to the President, p. 5).

"Kharpout is rich in minerals, and therefore, desired by Europe (II).

"Armenia would be insufficient in the ... economic sense, if the Districts of Erzerum, Trebizond and Kharpout were to be excluded from it." "We believe the reason for the objection raised by the European Powers to the inclusion of ... Kharpout in Armenia is that ... the rich silver mine of Kebeen-Maden is situated in the District of Kharput" (VI, p. 3).

"The entire commerce, agriculture and industry of Kharpout were in the hands of the Armenians. The bankers ...
and artisans were exclusively Armenians. The most intelligent, industrious and capable element of the population was the Armenian... Without the rich and fertile provinces of Kharput, Sivas, Diarbekir and Cilicia, which abound in a coal, iron, silver, and other minerals, Armenia would be a barren mountainous country, deprived of the necessary means to become a strong self-sustaining country" (VII, pp. 1, 2).

"Industrially the Armenians are even more the predominant element in the city of Diarbekir... The Armenian Republic economically needs the Province of Diarbekir. It should not be deprived of the rich copper mines of Argheny (Arghana), nor of the fertile soil and great water power along the Tigris River" (IX, p. 2).

5. Geographic Data.

Kharput is geographically a part of the central plateau of Armenia (IV, Notes to Peace Conference, No. 3, p. 1; Memo. to President, pp. 4, 5, 6; Geographic Appendix by Z. Khanzadian).


Perhaps the most convincing of the arguments presented in the documents cited is set forth by Major-General Bagratuni. First stating that Erzerum is the central and most essential point of the Armenian plateau, the nodus of its trade routes and the strategic key of eastern Asia Minor,
he goes on to say that "the Sandjak of Kharput is the gateway to ... the Armenian Plateau. The ... natural barrier of Armenia, - the line of defence of the Armenian Taurus Mountains - is intercepted by the Murad River, which cuts through that barrier in the vicinity of Kharput and opens the way to the Armenian Plateau. Kharput has always been the point from which have started all attempts of invasion from the west... In order to assure the defence of the Armenian plateau, it is essential to include in Armenia those mountain chains, which encompass Armenia in the neighborhood of Kharput between Chimish-Gezek (Dersim), Kharput, and Palu (Arghana). Otherwise, the southwestern frontier of Armenia will be exposed to the Turkish menace" (V; also IV; Notes to Peace Conference, No. 1).
Arguments Against Including Kharput within the Boundaries of Armenia.

It will be readily admitted that the Armenian contention, considered in the abstract, is in the main well grounded. Insofar as the question may be regarded as still open to discussion, however, candor requires it to be pointed out that the more cogent of the foregoing arguments are by no means unanswerable.

A. If Kharput is an important cultural centre for Armenians, it is no less so for the Turks and other Moslems. The Medressehs of Kharput, or Mohammedan schools of theology and law, rank second only to those of Constantinople. According to the French authority Cuinet, there were 45 of these institutions in the Vilayet in 1891, 28 of them being in the Sandjak, with 22 primary schools.

B. The pre-war population of Kharput was, according to all available figures, predominantly Moslem.

According to Consul L. A. Davis, whose long report of February 9, 1918, is on file in the State Department (867.4016/392), the total population of the vilayet in 1914 was about 500,000, of whom some 150,000 were Armenians. Mr. Davis does not give the source of his
information, nor does he furnish figures per Sandjak. He states however that "the city of Kharput was largely Mohammedan, but in Mamuret-ul-Aziz (Mezreh) and the country around it, nearly half the inhabitants were Armenians". This estimate, presumably, would apply to the Sandjak or to the Kaza of Kharput.

The population estimates for the Sandjaks of Kharput and Dersim, as compiled by the two authorities most relied upon by this committee, are tabulated below in comparison with the estimate of the Armenian Delegation at Paris. The latter, as previously stated, is based upon the Orange Book of the Russian Foreign Office, 1915, and Marcel Léart's "La Question Arménienne," 1913.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armenian Delegation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Kızilbashis</td>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>Armenians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kharput</strong></td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>168,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dersim</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  |         |         |         |         |
|                  | Cuinet (1891)                  |          |          |         |
| **Sandjaks**     |         |         |         |         |
| **Kharput**      | 139,956 | 20,950  | 88,800  | 650     | 45,348   |
| **Dersim**       | 15,460  | 12,000  | 27,700  | 650     | 8,170    |
| **Totals:**      | 155,416 | 32,950  | 116,500 | 650     | 53,518   |
According to all three of these authorities, the Armenians were before the war in a minority in the Sandjaks of Kharput and Dersim as compared with the combined Moslems. According to Cuinet this is also the case in the Kaza of Kharput, which very nearly coincides with the minimum desired by the Armenian military advisers. Cuinet's figures for this Kaza are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sandjaks</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
<th>Kizilbashis</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kharput</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>c.100,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dersim</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>c. 50,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But to connect this Kaza with the vilayet of Bitlis it would be necessary to detach a portion at least of the Sandjak of Arghana, in the vilayet of Diarbekir. Magie's figures for this Sandjak, used by the American Peace Delegation at Paris, are as follows:
Here again, however, the Armenians were largely outnum-
bered before the war, and now are in a hopeless minority.
From a strictly ethnological point of view, it would therefore
appear inadvisable to add to Armenia a frontier region con-
taining so great a majority of Turks and Kurds. To include
both Sandjaks would accentuate the numerical inferiority of
the Armenian. To include the plain of Kharput alone, with
its eastward corridor, would cut off the important Kurdish
district of Dersim from the rest of Kurdistan, creating dis-
content and unrest on the borders of this Armenian enclave.

C. While it may be conceded that before the war the
greater part of the commerce and agriculture of Kharput was
in the hands of the Armenians, the same cannot be claimed
today. But even if it were, the fact remains that the
economic outlet of Kharput does not follow the course of
the upper Euphrates or of the Kara Su into the vilayets of
Bitlis and Erzerum. The main line of communication between
Kharput and the sea is by way of Sivas and Amasia to Samsun,
which will be Turkish territory according to the Treaty of
Sèvres. Other channels strike southward to Diarbekir and Mesopotamia or to Marash and Cilicia. But the character of the country and the altitude of the Armenian plateau, making the roads to the north and to the east at all times difficult and in winter wellnigh impassable, have discouraged the flow of traffic in that direction. This fact is recognized in two of the documents cited in the first section of this Appendix: tacitly in No. VI (page 2, paragraph 3) and explicitly in No. VIII (page 2, paragraph 1). If Kharpout were added to Armenia, accordingly, the province would be obliged to change all its habits of trade. And the onus of this experiment in running counter to geographical and racial lines of least resistance would fall upon the Turkish and Kurdish majority, who would not thereby be rendered more contented with their new status.

D. The strategic argument put forth by Major-General Bagratuni (V) in favor of attributing Kharpout to Armenia is in certain respects sound. Kharpout is, geographically, the westward buttress of the Armenian plateau, and it is the most advantageous point at which armies may be massed for an advance either upon Erzerum or upon the region of Lake Van. The argument appears to be based, however, upon considerations, which are not strictly concerned with the defence of Armenia. The first is the possession of the rich plain of Kharpout, with its uncontested Armenian traditions. The second may well be a natural desire to
establish a bridge between Armenia proper and Armenia irredenta beyond the Euphrates. The possibility of making an arrangement with the French whereby those portions of the Armenian provinces of Turkey under their control may in some way be saved for Armenia has more than once been mentioned, and is alluded to in No. VI of the documents cited above (page 2, paragraph 2 and 3)*.

In case the Armenians actually decide to renounce Tireboli and Trebizond out of consideration for the Pontic Greeks, the strategic advantages of holding Dersim will largely disappear, while there would be distinct disadvantages in holding Kharput alone. But although Kharput may be geographically a part of the Armenian plateau, and is the point whence diverge the main land routes into Armenia, it is an outlying spur of that plateau, and those routes traverse defiles and passes farther to the East, the loftiest of which will lie within the confines of Armenia proper. In view of the unfavorable ethnological situation of the new state, however, not to speak of other difficulties by which the Armenians will be faced, it may be argued with equal if not greater force that the strategic position of Armenia will be stronger if she has shorter interior lines to defend, with room behind them in which to deploy her forces. Moreover it must be kept in mind that if the projected Armenia

* The Tripartite Convention of August 10, 1920, between Great Britain, France and Italy, includes Kharput in the French Area of Special Interest.
exists at all, it will be primarily because the Turks have submitted to the Treaty of Sèvres. And in that case the threat of invasion from the west will be greatly diminished. For not only will the Turkish army be reduced to a maximum of 50,000 men (Articles 152 and 155 of the Treaty), but the distribution of those forces will be strictly supervised by the Allied Commission of Control (Articles 156, 157 and 200), while the security of Armenia will be further safeguarded by the establishment of demilitarized zones.

E. If there were no other argument against the inclusion of Kharput within the boundaries of Armenia, there remains one which in the opinion of the Committee making this report is conclusive. This is that President Wilson has accepted, without reservations, the invitation extended by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers to arbitrate "the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia, in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis." No part of the Vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Aziz, in which Kharput lies, or of Diarbekir, is included in the commitment of arbitration. The Draft Treaty stipulating these conditions had already been handed to the Turks when on May 17th the President’s acceptance was telegraphed, without further conditions, to Paris. On
August 10th the Treaty was finally signed at Sèvres, no change having been made in the clauses relating to Armenia. According to a telegram of August 18th from the Embassy in Paris (No. 1572), the Armenians did not officially enter objections to any of the terms of this Treaty. While the Treaty was being drafted, however, they had endeavored to secure the insertion of other terms respecting indemnities, Cilicia, and Kharpout.

IV

Conclusion

Turkey, Armenia, and the Principal Allied Powers have put their formal signature to the terms within which it is understood the President is to act, and the President has agreed unconditionally to act within those terms. It is therefore the sense of the Committee making this report that the President, however sympathetically he may regard the Armenian claims to Kharpout, is not now free to extend his action beyond the limits of the four vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond. Nor, in these circumstances, is it necessary for the President to make special provision with respect to an economic outlet on the Mediterranean, since the Black Sea is the natural outlet of the four Vilayets.
If the principals concerned choose to make rearrangements between themselves, they are of course at perfect liberty to do so. The most the President can do, having once accepted the limit of the four Vilayets, is to indicate the advisability of a friendly understanding between the High Contracting Parties, possibly on the basis of purchase or of a territorial exchange. But even this would not seem desirable or proper, in view of the fact that if territorial exchanges are feasible they will in any case be effected, and that at no earlier time was the question of Kharput raised by this Government.

-- H. G. Dwight,
Division of Near Eastern Affairs,
Department of State.
ECONOMIC POSITION OF PORTS
IN THE TREBIZOND VILAYET

The leading ports in the Vilayet of Trebizond, east to west, - Rize, Trebizond, Tireboli, Kerasun and Ordu - are open roadsteads lacking natural or artificial harbors and frequently subject to violent westerly winds making landings impossible. Their only water connections with European countries (except those bordering on the Black Sea) are (a) via the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles, and (b) via the Danube. A third route being actively considered now is the construction of a canal at the junction of the Danube and Morava rivers following down the Vardar Valley emptying at Salonica on the Aegean Sea, and capable of accommodating ships of 1000 tons.

The five ports mentioned above do not possess navigable rivers, nor interior railway connections. The principal highway is the ancient Teheran-Tabriz-Erzerum route terminating at Trebizond. This alone is responsible for the predominant position of Trebizond which handles approximately 70% of the total imports and 60% of the total exports of these five ports - percentages, moreover, which correspond closely with
the situation thirty years ago, with respect to the five
ports. Riza has the double disadvantage of proximity to
the former Russian border and practical isolation by
reason of the very mountainous back country. Kerasun
and Ordu present no special advantages, are flanked by
the Pontic ranges, and serve a hinterland which will
probably lie outside the Armenian State. The choice of
the chief port of the future is limited, therefore, to
Trebizond and Tireboli.

As between Trebizond and Tireboli, the most
vital consideration is the development of transportation
routes to the interior vilayets of Erzerum, Van and
Bitlis. At the present time the advantage belongs to
Trebizond on account of the well-established caravan
route usable for motor trucks, while Tireboli has no
road worthy the name. Still, it is evident that a rail-
way of some description must be built. Competent
engineers and Turkish government officials have sug-
gested that a railway to either port should properly
pass through Baiburt and Gumush-khana. The question
remaining is the relative merits of the Gumush-khana-
Trebizond and Gumush-khana-Tireboli routes, a ques-
tion which must be decided in favor of the latter due
to the position of the Karshut Valley. In 1911-12
a French company, Régie Générale des Chemin de Fer
made surveys of the Trebizond route, but no definite action was taken. Previously, in 1909, the Turkish Minister of Public Works stated that a broad gauge railway could not be constructed to Trebizond, therefore Tireboli should be selected. The cost of construction he estimated would exceed 16,000 Turkish pounds ($70,400) per kilometer, a figure which should be compared with the estimate of 8,500 Turkish pounds ($37,400) per kilometer for the Samsun-Sivas project, and the most expensive per kilometer construction of any proposed railway in all Turkey. These estimates are based on costs then prevailing, much below the present seals. Neither the physical features of the country nor the prospective traffic would warrant standard gauge construction for many years to come. A 2'6" (1.07 meter) gauge would effect a saving of approximately 20% to 25% over the estimates for standard gauge. Possibly a narrow gauge line would suffice, resulting in still lower costs. Careful surveys are necessary, with proper attention to political conditions, before this important decision could be definitely taken.

There is little choice with respect to port and harbor facilities. Trebizond and Tireboli are located not far distant from each other, and are subject in the main to like climatic influences. The Turkish Minister of Public Works recommended in 1909 the construction of
a port at Tireboli, providing the railway to Trebizond was finally considered too difficult. The needed improvements at either port were reckoned to cost 350,000 Turkish pounds ($1,540,000). British interests, through the National Bank of Turkey (a British institution) concluded with the Turkish Government at August 21, 1911, an agreement for the construction and working of the ports of Samsun and Trebizond. The amount of capital involved for both exceeded 2,000,000 Turkish pounds ($8,800,000), which compared with the Turkish Minister's estimate of 1,250,000 Turkish pounds ($5,500,000) two years previously. The well-known British firm, Sir John Jackson Company, Ltd., had already commenced the erection of a breakwater at Trebizond when work was stopped in the late summer of 1914.

Trebizond offers the following advantages, - (a) established trading and shipping houses; (b) established banks including Imperial Ottoman Bank and Banque de Salonique; (c) established caravan routes; (d) location further distant from Turkish provinces, therefore easier to defend from Turkish aggression; (e) port works started and railway surveys partially made.

Tireboli offers these advantages, - (a) railway construction more feasible; (b) more centrally
located with respect to competitive ports of Batum and Samsun; (c) located nearer to Turkish provinces, affording greater commercial advantages; (d) not subject to the same opposition from the Greek Government or the Anatolian Greeks; (e) apparently preferred by the Armenians themselves.

Neither Trebizond nor Tireboli were highly regarded by the Turkish Minister of Public Works in 1909. In fact judging by the estimates for the various port projects, he seemed to consider either Trebizond or Tireboli as relatively unimportant. While it is possible that the determining fact in this case was the desire not to favor Turkish Armenia, undoubtedly the future of either port would not compare economically with some of the other ports considered, such as Samsun and Mersina. Considering the whole Turkish Empire, the Turkish Minister regarded the proposed railway as only thirteenth in importance and in his third grouping.

Trebizond has lost most of its old Persian transit trade because of the Transcaucasian railways and Russian-Persian tariffs, freight rates, and commercial treaties. Despite Persia's increased prosperity and the higher scale of prices, her exports to Trebizond declined from $5,237,000 for the five-year period 1861-5 to $675,000 for the five-year period 1906-10; Persia's
imports from Trebizond dropped from $6,560,000 to $1,580,000, contrasting these two periods. It is doubtful if this port can regain much of the trade even with railway connections to the Black Sea coast. An important factor is the question of customs tariffs and regulations at the various frontiers. A mutual agreement between Armenia and Turkey allowing goods in transit to move freely and not subjected to burdensome export or import duties will accrue to the benefit of Tireboli because this seaport is nearer the productive regions of Kerasun and Ordu, and in fact, all of Anatolian Turkey. It is not reasonable to expect that Turkish Armenia can depend on much transit trade from the countries eastward.

-- Eliot Grinnell Mears

American Trade Commissioner,
U.S. Department of Commerce;
Industrial and Commercial Expert,
Harbord Mission to Armenia and Transcaucasia.
Appendix V
Number 2

RAILROAD PROJECTS FOR TURKISH-ARMENIA
BEFORE THE WAR

In 1908 when, as the representative from the Vilayet of Erzerum in the Ottoman Parliament, I became acquainted with the railroad projects for Turkish-Armenia, it became evident to me that Russia and Germany had agreed not to allow any railroad construction in Turkish-Armenia. France, on the other hand, in order to please her powerful ally, had adopted a policy of disinterestedness in this matter.

In the face of this situation, I undertook to interest American capitalists in the railroad construction in Armenia and I was meeting with considerable success when German interests stepped in and, by virtue of their diplomatic influence with the officials of the Turkish Government, attempted to block the way of American capitalists. From 1909 to 1911, two American companies pursued the proposed plan of building about 2,000 kilometers of railroads in Armenian Vilayets, but finally, due to German intrigues, dropped the matter in disgust.

In 1911-1912 lengthy negotiations took place between French capitalists and the Turkish Government, on the one hand, and between French capitalists and the
Russian Government on the other. As the outcome of these negotiations, Russia agreed to yield in favor of the French capitalists in this railroad project, with the understanding that the above-mentioned roads were to be built on account of the Turkish Government and not as an exclusive concession to French capitalists, so that Russian capital would also participate in the project.

On the part of French capitalists, these negotiations were conducted by the Regie Generale des Chemins-de-fer. In the summer of 1911 two separate expeditions were started for the survey of the proposed railroad lines: (a) Samsun-Sivas-Kharput; (b) Trebizond-Erzerum; one by the French capitalists and the other by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works.

These two separate investigations concurred in their conclusions that the line running from Trebizond or Riza to Erzerum would incur an exorbitant and prohibitive expense, and concluded that the railroad leading from the Black Sea to the highlands of Erzerum could be more economically built from Tripolis (Tireboli) by way of the Karshut Valley to Erzerum.

When the result of this survey expedition became known in 1912, the Ministry of Public Works undertook
to start a survey of the Tripolis (Tireboli) Harbor. Then the representatives from Trebizond in Parliament protested against the Ministry and demanded that preference be given to the Harbor of Trebizond in this matter of railroad development, and succeeded in compelling the Ministry to abandon the survey of the Harbor of Tripolis.

By an ex-Member of
the Ottoman Parliament.
STATEMENT OF PREMIER VENIZELOS ON TREBIZOND BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF TEN

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday 4 February, 1919, at 11:00 o'clock A. M.

The United States of America was represented at this meeting by President Wilson, Mr. Lansing, Mr. Frazier, Mr. Harrison, Lieutenant Burden, Mr. Day, and Mr. Westermann.

Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Greece, were represented by Messrs. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, Makino, Venizelos, and a number of others for each of the countries concerned.

M. Venizelos had been asked the previous day by M. Clemenceau to explain the territorial claims of Greece. On this day he continued his explanation and spoke, inter alia, regarding Trebizond as stated below:

"In reply to an enquiry which had been addressed to him by President Wilson, he explained that Trebizond, containing a population of 360,000 Greeks, had claimed to be formed into a small Republic. He did not favour this proposal as he thought it would be very undesirable to create a
large number of small States, especially as the country surrounding the town comprised a very large number of Turks. In his opinion, the vilayet of Trebizond should form part of the State of Armenia.

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Venizelos had any idea as to what should constitute the Armenian State.

"M. VENIZELOS said that in his opinion the Armenian State should include the six Armenian vilayets, together with Russian Armenia and the vilayets of Trebizond and Adana.

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Cilicia would be included in the Armenian State.

"M. VENIZELOS replied in the affirmative and said that Armenia would contain all the territories around Mount Ararat.

"PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the whole question was mixed up with humane considerations. The American missionaries had said that the Turks had also treated the Turks very badly at the time they were ill-
treating the Armenians. He enquired if M. Venizelos could throw any light on this report.

"M. VENIZELOS said that no Turks had been ill-treated; but Mahomedans, such as Arabs, Kurds, etc., had certainly been persecuted, and that was quite natural."
The terms of the Turkish Treaty were read before the Boule yesterday by the Prime Minister. During the course of his ensuing speech M. Venizelos gave voice to the hope that the Armenia to be constituted by President Wilson might be as large as practicable. The Premier expressed a belief that the President would not grant Armenia access to the sea through Trebizond and thus divide the Vilayet of Trebizond. When the question was first discussed M. Venizelos was of the opinion that Armenia and Pontus might be placed under the jurisdiction of mandatories, and that the territorial divisions might be manipulated in such a way as to constitute a federation of the two regions, the populations concerned had, whether happily or unhappily he could not say, disapproved of this solution. But he would not be disturbed if the whole province of Trebizond were detached from Turkey and made a part of Armenia. The Hellenism of that region was too strong for cooperation.
with another Christian people to be feared. He thought it impracticable to partition Pontus by severing a portion of it in order to add it to another country. The Armenian representatives at the Peace Conference fully agreed with him on this point. He stated in conclusion that he had thus expressed his views at length on account of the allusion to access to the Black Sea for Armenia made in a note of President Wilson.

As for the Balkan Peninsula, M. Venizelos denied emphatically that Greece entertained an ambition to be the paramount Power in that part of the world. Both Rumania and Serbia had expanded territorially more than Greece, who welcomed this widening of their frontiers. Greece, aside from the unsettled question of Northern Epirus, wished no further territory northward or in the direction of Bulgaria. As the spokesman of the Liberal Party, he also stated that Greece did not desire, either, to expand eastward. She would even be pleased to enter into relations with Turkey after the terms of the Treaty of Peace had been fulfilled. The Greek people nevertheless had cause for pride in that, after having survived centuries of tribulation, they had been enabled to rise once more and to effect their unity as a nation in the very countries where for three thousand years they had maintained an unbroken foothold.
Right Honourable Sir,

Now that the Ottoman Delegation is discussing at Paris with the Allied Governments the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty, we deem it our imperative duty to respectfully draw the attention of the Conference to the situation of the unredeemed Greeks of the Euxine Pontus.

On several occasions we ventured to submit various memoranda to the Conference asking for the liberation of our fellow-countrymen by the establishment of an independent Pontian Republic on the southern shores of the Black Sea stretching from the town of Rizeh to the west of Sinope. Although this suggestion was based upon the principle of the right of each people to self-determination of which the victory of the Allies was to consecrate the triumph, it did not receive the support of the Conference; we therefore asked in our memorandum of last March, addressed to the Peace Conference in London, for the establishment in Pontus of at least an autonomous form of government similar to that in force in the Lebanon before the war. We were answered that our desiderata had been under examination by the Supreme Council.

To the Right Honourable Woodrow Wilson,

President of the United States of America,

WASHINGTON.

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However, the Peace treaty handed to the Turkish Delegates contains no special clause concerning the Pontus which is only to enjoy the general guarantees relating to minority rights. Yet Pontus constitutes a geographical and economic unit entirely separate from the rest of Asia Minor. It is inhabited by a population which although having different religious opinions, forms nevertheless a homogenous whole ethnically seeing that the bulk of this population is beyond all doubt a pure Greek descent, for even a great number of Mussulmans numbering more than 200,000 have retained their Greek speech and are conscious of their origin.

To these arguments which strengthen our claims, must be added the sufferings which our fellow-country-men have endured during the war and are still enduring. More than 160,000 of them were brutally deported from their hearths and homes by the Turks and more than 60,000 of them died during this cruel exile.

About a quarter of a million others fled into Russia to escape Turkish persecutions. After the armistice, they began to return, trusting to be able to take up again their peaceful occupations and live without fear of being disturbed by their savage oppressors.

Not only has their legitimate hope not been realized but many of these refugees, natives of in-
land villages, have not even caught a glimpse of their homes, owing to the constant danger of travelling arising from the bands of Turkish brigands and irregulars with whom the country is infested.

After having dragged out a miserable existence during a long time in the towns along the coast, where they lived on the charity of our fellow-countrymen who had bitterly suffered from the war themselves, they resigned themselves to the idea of returning into exile in Russia, a country now become inhospitable for them owing to the Greeks participation in the expedition against the Bolsheviks, and where they had just lost excellent situations gained by long years of work and patient frugality. They preferred however Russian anarchy to Turkish oppression and brutality.

From reliable news which has been reaching us from several months, the situation in Pontus grows steadily worse. Bands of Turkish irregulars created and supported with money stolen from the Greeks unceasingly terrorize them, unarmed and defenceless as they are, while the Turkish population have been provided with arms by the authorities.

The aim of all these measures is to take away from this region its clearly Greek character, which it has preserved after five centuries under a foreign yoke,
and to make it appear Turkish by rendering life there intolerable to the Greeks.

In short, since their coming, the Turks have done nothing but spread poverty, ruin and desolation in this country which being abundantly blessed with all sorts of natural wealth, was worthy to have a better fate.

We therefore venture to appeal once again to the feelings of justice and equity of the Allied Governments, imploring them in the name of the most elementary principles of humanity to take urgent steps to put an end to this deplorable situation in which a whole population is threatened with extinction.

We ask for nothing more then a decent existence for three quarters of a million human beings, nothing but a modicum of security for their lives, honour and property, so that they may live by honest work in peace and harmony with their neighbours.

These rights have been recognised to every nation, however small they may be, and we fail to imagine how the democratic Powers of the Entente, who have proclaimed and accomplished the liberation of so many oppressed peoples, who have encouraged and helped the establishment of free states in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Armenia, etc., can think of refusing us rights which they are said to be ready to grant to the Kurds, since
there is talk of creating an independent Kurdish state. Moreover an independent Pontian State situated on the confines of Armenia and living on friendly terms with it, would render the existence of this latter more easier.

The fact must not be lost sight of that this is not the first time of a trial of self-government being made in Pontus. Just before the occupation of Trebizond by the Russian Army in 1916, the Governor General of the Province of Trebizond handed over the civil administration of the region to a Provisional Government composed of members belonging to the Greek nationality under the leadership of the Metropolitan and said: "We took this country from the Greeks, it is to them that we hand it back to-day."

This Greek Government, which was also recognised by the Russian authorities, continued to assume the responsibilities of civil administration to the general satisfaction of the whole population without any distinction of nationality or creed during the whole time the Russian occupation lasted, and during the critical days from the Russian retreat until the Turkish re-occupation.

It was a just and equitable government, desirous above all of assuring the interests of each and every inhabitant and which showed itself capable of safe-
guarding order and discipline. It was thanked even by the Turkish authorities themselves, represented by General Vehib Pasha, commanding the 3rd Turkish Army.

We venture to hope that the Entente Powers who have at heart the establishment of peace and order in the Near East will take into account our legitimate national aspirations in the settlement of the Turkish problem and consider the urgent steps to be taken in order to save the Pontian population from utter destruction.

We beg to remain,

Sir,

Your obedient Servants.


CONGRES DES ORIGINAIRES DU PONT-EUXIN

Le Président

(Signed) C. J. G. Constantinidès,

Signed: Constantin-Jason G. Constantinidès,
President of the Pan-Pontic Congress.

(Signed) S. Economos, (S E A L)

Signed: Socrates Economos,
President of the National League
of the Euxine Pontus at Paris,
28, rue Serpent, PARIS VI.
Appendix V
Number 6

THE GREEKS OF PONTUS

1. (a) The Vilayet of Trebizond, according to Turkish estimates, contained 1,122,947 persons in 1914, with the following ethnic-religious distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Various</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>921,128</td>
<td>161,574</td>
<td>40,237</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Greek estimates suggest that the Greek population of Trebizond may have been as much as 300,000 to 360,000 before the war and that the Armenians numbered 50,000. The Pontic Greeks claim that only 340,000 of the Trebizond Moslems are true Turks, the remainder including Surmenites, Circassians, Oflis, and Stavriotes.

(c) The estimates made for American Commission to Negotiate Peace at Paris are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sandjak</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Various</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trebizond</td>
<td>568,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumush-khana</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazistan</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Permanent Bureau of the Congress of Greeks originating from Pontus Euxinus, in a memorandum to the President of the United States dated February 14, 1919,
and signed by the Bisheps and other notables of various territories in Pontus, sets forth the national claims of the unredeemed Greeks of these regions. The memorandum urges that Pontus be restored to Greece, or else that it be declared an autonomous Greek state under a Greek commissioner, and under the direct protection of Greece.

3. Mgr. Chrysanthos, Archbishop of Trebizond, submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference on May 2, 1919, urging that Pontus be constituted an autonomous Greek state, and concluding:

"The near neighborhood of the future Armenian state, and the commercial relations and common sufferings of the two peoples constitute bonds between them which we would gladly bind still closer. For these reasons we are ready to welcome the creation of bonds of close cooperation between the two States, but on the express condition that each Autonomous State shall possess absolute independence."

4. M. Venizelos, explaining the territorial claims of Greece at the Peace Conference on February 4, 1919, said that he did not favor the proposal of a small republic of Trebizond, and that, in his opinion "the vilayet of Trebizond should form part of the State of Armenia."

Speaking in the Greek Chamber upon the Turkish Treaty on May 14, 1920, Premier Venizelos gave it as his
desire that President Wilson would give as much territory as possible to Armenia, but that he should not grant a part of Trebizond vilayet to the Armenian state. He stated that he would not view with displeasure a decision which would grant all of Trebizond vilayet to Armenia, but though that the Pontic Greeks ought not to be divided between Turkey and Armenia.

5. On July 10th, 1920, representatives located in Paris of several organizations of the Pontic Greeks sent to President Wilson a petition, which was a copy of a similar one previously submitted to the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers. They claim that Pontus is a geographical and economic unit entirely separate from the rest of Asia Minor and protest that the Pontic Greeks should be granted either independence or at least autonomy.
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ARMENIA'S ACCESS TO THE SEA

The note addressed to the President from San Remo by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers, inviting him to undertake the responsibility of fixing the frontier between Turkey and Armenia, stated that a clause would be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey to that effect, farther binding the High Contracting Parties to accept his decision as well as any stipulation he might make with regard to access for Armenia to the sea. Such a clause, in fact, appeared in the Draft Treaty handed to the Turks before the President had accepted the invitation of the Supreme Council, and reappeared without material change in the final form of the Treaty as signed at Sèvres on August 10.

In virtue of the authority thus conferred upon and accepted by him, it has been recommended to the President by the Committee making this report that he attribute to Armenia the eastern part of the Vilayet of Trebizond, with its sea coast, from the Georgian frontier to a point between Tireboli and Kerasun. In case this recommendation be accepted, the Armenian Republic will be given direct access to the sea and full sovereignty over a number of undeveloped ports and their hinterland.
In view of the fact, however, that access to this coastal area from the tableland of Armenia proper has been rendered by nature exceptionally difficult, that it contains at present a comparatively small percentage of Armenians - practically all of whom, furthermore, inhabit the western end of the area - and that the Turkish, Laz and Greek elements of the indigenous population may make difficulties for the Armenians in the work of developing their new ports and the communications of the latter with the interior, it has been thought advisable to draw particular attention to those clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres which, independently of the President's decision, provide Armenia with access to the sea.

**Trebizond**

In Article 335 of the Treaty the City of Trebizond is declared a Port of International Concern and placed under the régime prescribed in Articles 336-345 for eight Eastern ports. (In a separate convention between the Principal Allied Powers and Greece, Dedeagatch is also declared a Port of International Concern, subject to the same régime.) The nature of this régime is described in Article 336 as follows:

"In the ports declared of international concern the nationals, goods and flags of all States Members of the League of Nations shall enjoy complete freedom in the use of the port."
In this and all other respects they shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality, particularly as regards all port and quay facilities and charges, including facilities for berthing, loading and discharging, tonnage dues and charges, quay, pilotage, lighthouse, quarantine and all similar dues and charges of whatsoever nature, levied in the name of or for the profit of the Government, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations or establishments of every kind, no distinction being made between the nationals, goods and flags of the different States and those of the State under whose sovereignty or authority the port is placed.

"There shall be no impediment to the movement of persons or vessels other than those arising from regulations concerning customs, police, sanitation, emigration and immigration and those relating to the import and export of prohibited goods. Such regulations must be reasonable and uniform and most not impede traffic unnecessarily."

There are further stipulations with regard to equality of dues and charges (Articles 337-8), to the responsibilities
of the State under whose sovereignty the port is placed as to works maintaining and improving the port and approaches thereto (Articles 339-40), to free zones in the port (Articles 341-44), and to the settlement by the League of Nations of differences with regard to the interpretation or application of the foregoing Articles (Article 345).

Farther reference to Trebizond is made in Article 352, in the following terms:

"Subject to the decision provided for in Article 89, Part III (Political Clauses), free access to the Black Sea by the port of Trebizond is accorded to Armenia. This right of access will be exercised in the conditions laid down in Article 349.

"In that event Armenia will be accorded a lease in perpetuity, subject to determination by the League of Nations, of an area in the said port which shall be placed under the general régime of free zones laid down in Articles 341 to 344, and shall be used for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to that State.

"The delimitation of the area referred to in the preceding paragraph, its connection with existing railways, its equipment and ex-
exploitation, and in general all the conditions of its utilization, including the amount of the rental, shall be decided by a Commission consisting of one delegate of Armenia, one delegate of Turkey, and one delegate appointed by the League of Nations. These conditions shall be susceptible of revision every ten years in the same manner."

Special attention is drawn to the first phrase of the above article.

**BATUM**

The Treaty of Sèvres also grants Armenia access to the sea through the port of Batum, which Article 335 includes in the list of ports declared to be of international concern, "subject to conditions to be subsequently fixed", and placed under the régime defined in Articles 336-345. This right might have been considered as implicit, in view of the facts that Batum is the natural outlet of northern Armenia, that the Treaty of Berlin had already made an eventually unsuccessful attempt to convert Batum into a free port (Article LIX), and that Armenia will presumably become a member of the League of Nations. But Armenian rights in Batum are explicitly recognized in Article 351, as follows:

"Free access to the Black Sea by the port of Batum is accorded to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Persia, as well as Armenia. This right of
access will be exercised in the conditions laid down in Article 349."

Georgia, it is true, is not a party to the Treaty of Sèvres; and on May 7th of this year she signed a Treaty with Soviet Russia, which recognized her absolute possession of Batum. But the Department of State is informed, both from Tiflis (Cable No. 69 of August 23) and from London (Cable No. 1383 of September 14), that before evacuating Batum in July the British exacted as the chief condition of their withdrawal a formal promise that Georgia would grant to Armenia and Azerbaijan free transit to and free use of the port of Batum.

ALEXANDRETTA AND OTHER PORTS

Other ports which by implication will be free to Armenia are Haidar Pasha (Constantinople), Smyrna, Alexandretta, Haifa and Basra. Article 335 of the Turkish Treaty declares them ports of international concern, open on equal terms to all members of the League of Nations, while Articles 328 and 353 assure freedom of transit across Turkish territory to the goods and conveyances of the Allied Powers, without individual discrimination in charges or treatment.

For this reason, and in spite of the fact that certain friends of Armenia have urged the creation of an economic corridor to the Mediterranean and the designation of Ayas,
on the Gulf of Alexandretta, as an Armenian port, it has not been considered necessary to recommend special measures providing the new Republic with an outlet to the south. If it had been possible to include Kharput in Armenia the case might have worn a different aspect, since the economic currents of that province run westward or into the Mediterranean. But in the circumstances the claim falls away of itself. The Black Sea is the natural outlet of the Armenian highlands, no point of which lies within 300 miles of Alexandretta, the nearest southern port, and none of whose trade has hitherto reached the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, since the attribution to Armenia, for purely economic reasons, of a considerable Black Sea littoral, will tax to the utmost the administrative resources of the young state and the patience of her neighbors, it has been felt that neither for the Armenians of Armenia nor for those of Turkey would it be just to lend even so slender encouragement to the disturbing dream of a Greater Armenia as might seem to be implied by the stipulation of special rights in some Cilician port. If at any future time railways should pierce the barrier of the Eastern Taurus, connecting Erzerum or Bitlis with Kharput and Cilicia or Diarbekir and the Mesopotamian
system, and traffic should begin to flow back and forth between the Armenian plateau and the Mediterranean Sea, it will in all probability be found that the existing provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres are in this direction adequate for the economic necessities of Armenia.
Appendix V
Number 8

TEXT
OF THE
ARMENIAN MINORITIES TREATY
TREATY

BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED POWERS AND ARMENIA
SIGNED AUGUST 10, 1920
AT SÈVRES

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN, the Principal Allied Powers,
on the one hand;
And ARMENIA,
on the other hand;

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have recognized Armenia as a sovereign and independent State,
And Whereas Armenia is desirous of conforming her institutions to the principles of liberty and justice,
and of giving a sure guarantee to all the inhabitants of the territories over which she has assumed or may assume sovereignty;
The High Contracting Parties, anxious to assure the exception of Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey,
Have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OT GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA:


And

for the DOMINION of CANADA:
The Honourable Sir George Halsey Perley, K. C. M. G., High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom;

for the COMMONWEALTH of AUSTRALIA:
The Right Honourable Andrew Fisher, High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom;

for the DOMINION of NEW ZEALAND:
The Honourable Sir James Allen, K. C. B., High Commissioner for New Zealand in the United Kingdom;

for the UNION of SOUTH AFRICA:
Mr. Reginald Andrew Blankenberg, O. B. E., Acting High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in the United Kingdom;

for INDIA:
Sir Arthur Hirtzel, K. C. B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India;
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:
Mr. Alexandre Millerand, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Frédéric François-Marsal, Minister of Finance;
Mr. Auguste Paul-Louis Isaac, Minister of Commerce and Industry;
Mr. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France;
Mr. Georges Maurice Paléologue, Ambassador of France, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY:
Count Lelio Bonin Lelio Longare, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the King of Italy at Paris;
Mr. Carlo Galli, Consul;

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN:
Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the Emperor of Japan at London;
Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the Emperor of Japan at Paris;

ARMENIA:
Mr. Avetis Aharonian, President of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic;
Mr. Boghos Nubar, Representative of the Joint Armenian Council at Constantinople;

WHO having communicated their full powers found in good and due form HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

CHAPTER 1.

ARTICLE 1.

Armenia undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this Chapter shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2.

Armenia undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Armenia without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Armenia shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.
The penalties for any interference with the free exercise of religion will be the same whatever the religion concerned.

ARTICLE 3.

Armenia undertakes to recognize such provisions as the Principal Allied Powers may consider opportune with respect to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of persons belonging to racial minorities.

ARTICLE 4.

All Armenian nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

The Armenian Government will within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty present to the Principal Allied Powers a draft electoral system giving due consideration to the rights of racial minorities.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Armenian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Armenian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
Notwithstanding any establishment by the Armenian Government of an official language, adequate faculties shall be given to Armenian nationals of non-Armenian speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 5.

Armenian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Armenian nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 6.

Armenia will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Armenian nationals of other than Armenian speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Armenian nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Armenian Government from making the teaching of the Armenian language obligatory in the said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Armenian nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

ARTICLE 7.

Armenia agrees to take all necessary measures in relation to Moslems to enable questions of family law and personal status to be regulated in accordance with Moslem usage.

Armenia undertakes to afford protection to the mosques, cemeteries and other Moslem religious establishments. Full recognition and all facilities shall be assured to pious foundations (wakfs) and Moslem religious and charitable establishments now existing, and Armenia shall not refuse to the creation of new religious and charitable establishments any of the necessary facilities guaranteed to other private establishments of this nature.

ARTICLE 8.

Armenia agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the
guaranty of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree, not to withhold their assent from any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Armenia agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Armenia further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Armenian Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Armenian Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party there to demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.
ARTICLE 9.

Each of the Principal Allied Powers on the one part and Armenia on the other shall be at liberty to appoint diplomatic representatives to reside in their respective capitals, as well as Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents to reside in the towns and ports of their respective territories.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents, however, shall not enter upon their duties until they have been admitted in the usual manner by the Government in the territory of which they are stationed.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents shall enjoy all the facilities, privileges, exemptions and immunities of every kind which are or shall be granted to consular officers of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 10.

Armenia undertakes to make no Treaty, Convention or arrangement and to take no other action which will prevent her from joining in any general Convention for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.
Armenia also undertakes to extend to all the Allied Powers any favours or privileges in Customs matters which she may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which since August, 1914, the Allied Powers have been at war, or to any State which in virtue of Article 222 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria has special Customs arrangements with such States.

ARTICLE 11.

Pending the conclusion of the general Convention referred to above, Armenia undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied Powers who accord similar treatment to Armenian vessels.

As an exception to this provision the right of any Allied Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved.

ARTICLE 12.

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general Convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, Armenia undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied State over Armenian territory, and to treat them at least as favourably as the
persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails respectively of Armenian or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions and all other matters.

Tariffs for transit traffic across Armenia and tariffs between Armenia and any Allied Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of the Allied Power concerned.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

Provided that no Allied Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject-matter.

If within a period of five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, Armenia shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present Article.

ARTICLE 13.

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing Articles to the Allied Powers shall be accorded equally to all States, Members of the League of Nations.
The Present Treaty, in French, in English and in Italian, of which in case of divergence the French text shall prevail, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A prosès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the prosès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at Sèvres, the tenth day of August one thousand nine hundred and twenty, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic,
and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the signatory Powers.

(L. S.) DERBY.
(L. S.) GEORGE H. PERLEY.
(L. S.) ANDREW FISHER.
(L. S.) JAMES ALLEN.
(L. S.) R. A. BLANKENBERG.
(L. S.) ARTHUR HIRTZEL.
(L. S.) A. MILLERAND.
(L. S.) F. FRANCOIS-MARSAL.

(L. S.) JULES CAMBON.
(L. S.) PALÉOLOGUE.
(L. S.) BONIN.

(L. S.) K. MATSUI.
(L. S.) A. AHARONIAN.
ARMENIAN PETITION TO PRESIDENT WILSON
REGARDING TO BOUNDARY DECISION

(a) Despatch from the Embassy at Paris.

No. 1537

Paris, August 20th, 1920

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington

Sir:

Referring to the Embassy's telegram No. 1533, August 11, 6 p. m., transmitting a message from Mr. A. Aharonian, President of the Armenian Peace Delegation, I have the honor to enclose herewith a communication addressed to the President under date of July 22nd, and signed by Mr. Aharonian and by Boghos Nubar Pasha, President of the Armenian National Delegation, relative to the arbitration of the western frontier of Armenia in accordance with the provisions of Article 89 of the Turkish Treaty. The documents accompanying this communication are transmitted under separate cover.

At the time of presenting these papers, Mr. Aharonian called attention to the map of Armenia (No. 10)
and explained that the Armenian Government was prepared to renounce its claim to the western part of the Vilayet of Trebizond and the southern part of the Vilayets of Bitlis and Van which are marked in green oblique lines on the map in question - although these territories are included in the four provinces mentioned in Article 89 of the Turkish Treaty. While the Armenian Government hoped that the western portion of the Vilayet of Trebizond might of its own volition federalize itself with the Armenian Republic, it did not desire to seek the forcible inclusion of this territory within the boundaries of Armenia. On the other hand, the Armenian Government asked that the coast from a point east of Trebizond to a point west and south of Batum should be given to Armenia in order to ensure to her free access to the sea.

Finally: Mr. Aharonian called attention to the portion of the Vilayet of Kharpout marked in red oblique lines on the map. Although not included in the four Vilayets mentioned in Article 89, this territory was claimed by Armenia for two reasons, first, as it formed part of the Central Plateau, and, second, as the majority of the population was unquestionably Armenian.

There is also transmitted under separate cover a map composed of four sheets of the 1:1,000,000 map
with the boundaries of the proposed Armenian State clearly indicated, which was furnished me by Mr. Aharonian.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Enclosure:-
For the Ambassador:
Original letter to the President. (Sgd) Leland Harrison

Accompaniment.

- - - - - -

(b) The Armenian Petition.
(Extracts only)

FRONTIERS OF ARMENIA.
-:-:-:-:-:

Determining the area within which the President of the United States of America will fix the frontiers of Armenia, the Turkish Peace Treaty designates the four provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Bitlis and Van.

Even if the President of the United States, while adhering to the letter of the Treaty, were to attribute to Armenia the whole of these four provinces, the resulting frontiers would have none of the characteristics of a geographical unity.
The present boundaries of the above mentioned provinces were fixed by the Turkish Government in pursuance of a political object, and took into account neither geographical necessities nor local requirements, much less the ethnical unity of their populations. The project, on the contrary, aimed at the "denationalization" of the Armenian provinces by changing their boundaries, by attaching portions of an Armenian province, arbitrarily mutilated, to other adjoining provinces inhabited by Mussulmans, so as to prevent the formation of an Armenian Majority in regions essentially Armenian.

For more than half a century this system has been so often applied that at the present day no two maps, official or non-official, will be found to agree in regard to the administrative limits of the Ottoman provinces. ...

We find that, in the time of Suleyman, the geographical unity of Armenia was preserved within the limits of the first Ottoman administrative provinces, under the name of one province, the "eyalet of Erzerum" (Principality).

The boundaries of this province, corresponding to the natural lines of the soil, are, on all the maps of the speech, identical with the ancient delimitations of
Armenia Major, the territories of which constitute a perfect geographical unity, and which, in the science of Stratigraphy, is known as the Central Plateau of Armenia.

It is bounded on the west by the river Euphrates, on the South by the Armenian Taurus, on the East and North East by the Turco-Persian frontier and the Russo-Turkish frontier as it was before 1878; on the North by the province of Trebizond.

The province of Erzerum, thus delimited, was called by the Turks *Ermenistan* (Armenia) and retained its boundaries from the time of the first administrative code of the 16th century till the Salnames (Official Almanachs of the Ottoman Government) of the 19th century.

Heliographical fac-simules of the best maps of Asiatic Turkey before 1878 are annexed to this memorandum. The President of the United States will see by these documents the extent and administrative limits of the province of Erzerum (Levassieur's map).

Comparing the administrative divisions of the British map accompanying the Treaty, with those of the former "Eyalet" of Erzerum it will be noticed that different portions of one and the same orographically indivisible unity have been detached artificially from the province of Erzerum.

These divisions were operated more particularly in the south. ...
The Taurus, has always been the frontier, not of a province, but entirely of two different countries.

In regard to the Euphrates, this river constitutes the historical line of demarcation between Greater and Little Armenia.

When the first Ottoman administrative delimitations were effected the Euphrates was taken as the natural western boundary of the Eyalet of Erzerum. The geographical and statigraphical maps annexed hereto show the strength of this line.

The Armenian Delegation ventures to insist on this point more particularly because, apart from administrative, statigraphical and ethnical considerations it should not be forgotten that, from an economic point of view, as explained in the Armenian note handed to General HARBORD on September 4, 1919, the mineral riches of the country can only be reached where seismic upheavals have broken the immense sheet of lava covering the Central Plateau. It is in the water-course depressions around the Plateau that the Armenian wealth is accessible.

The mineralogical map of Armenia (See Annex) indicates nine minefields of different descriptions in the depression of Kharput alone.

The Armenian Delegation, although aware that the scope of the present arbitration is limited to the four
provinces of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis and Van, begs leave to submit to President Wilson's judgment the foregoing historical, economic and (particularly) geographical considerations relative to Kharput, which is not included in the four provinces mentioned in the Treaty.

The Delegation trusts that these considerations, in view of their great importance, will be taken into account; more particularly as it has deemed desirable to abandon all claims to certain non-Armenian regions such as Hakkari, and the greater portion of the Vilayet of Trebizond, which, nevertheless, are comprised within the four provinces the attribution of which is submitted to arbitration.

The Armenian Delegation begs therefore to express the following hopes:

I. That the western and southern frontiers of Armenia will be drawn to correspond with the boundaries of the former province of Erzerum, as indicated on the map annexed hereto (see Annex). It should be particularly remarked that this province represents Ancient Armenia Major and, scientifically, the Central Plateau of Armenia, one and rationally indivisible.

II. That the northern frontier will be delimited so as to include the Black Sea coast—from 0ff-Surmené to the former Russo-Turkish frontier on the mountains sloping to the river Chorok, thus giving Armenia means of com-
munication between the interior and the sea.

These conditions being observed, the frontier line desired by Armenia would start at a point west of Off, on the shores of the Black Sea, ascend towards the Pontic Chain, past westward along the crests of the latter to Gumuch-Khané in Armenian territory, and thence descend Southwards, following the Western Administrative limits of Erzerum as far as the Euphrates, which would thence form the frontier, as far as the great barrier of the Armenian Taurus stretching Eastward from Teleck to Bache Kale, South-East of Van, to meet the Persian frontier. ...

TOPOGRAPHICAL PARTICULARITIES
OF ARMENIAN LAND COMMUNICATIONS.

The rivers Kelkid and Chorok mark an arc-shaped longitudinal depression running from East to West, parallel with the Coast.

The whole stretch of the narrow band of territory between the mouth of the Chorok and that of the Yeshil-Irmak is occupied by the Pontic Chain, which the well-known English geologist Oswald described as the coast-chain of the Armenian Plateau (See Annex). Its greatest width is in the middle of the arc, South of Trebizond, at the Source of the two rivers. The width of the chain here,
from Cape Yeres, west of Trebizond, to the source of the Velkid and Chorok, is about 100 kilometres; while at the two extremities of the arc it is only 60 kilometres. Its greatest altitudes are in the Eastern portion of the Chain, where the summits rise to 3000 and 3.500 metres, and even (South of Rizeh) 3.700 m. In the centre, South of Trebizond and Kirassounde, there are also a few peaks of 3.000 metres. The western portion is comparatively low, the summits not exceeding 2.000 metres.

The littoral thus delimited was the northern rampart of the Kingdom of Armenia before becoming, under the Byzantine Empire, the Kingdom of the Pont-Euxine. ...

No attempt has ever been made by the Ottoman Government to build roads connecting the interior with the Coast and taking advantage of the topographical features of the country. Of those that exist only the Trebizond road is more or less fit for carriage traffic; the Rizeh, Off and Atineh roads are more mule tracks.

The variations of altitude of these four roads compared with those of a possible route descending southward of Rizeh along the river Kalepontamos are such that the advantages of the latter route are incontestable. For, whereas all the other routes traverse all four zones of the Chain the Kalepontamos road would not rise even to the third zone.
Whatever its advantages, however, this road does not yet exist, and for the present and for some time to come, the only practicable communications between the interior of Armenia and the Black Sea are the two valleys traversing the central and eastern fractions of the Pontic Chain: on the west, the valley of Kershut, which is utilized by the Trebizond road from Ardassa, in the heart of Western Armenia; on the East, the valley of the Chorok, the main artery of Eastern Armenia.

Armenia cannot be reconstituted and prosper if these two main arteries be detached from her geographical unity.

The first, the Trebizond road, is suitable for carriage traffic, and is the only practicable route. From Trebizond to Ardassa it belongs to the region of Trebizond, but on leaving Ardassa it enters the heart of the Armenian Plateau.

The Erzinghian carriage road joins it at Tekkeh. The Armenian Delegation respectfully begs President WILSON to consider the desirability of including this junction of Tekkeh in Armenian territory.

In regard to the valley of the Chorok it represents incontestably the whole economic future of Armenia. ... The mouth of the Chorok is the natural line of demarcation between two young republics. It is navigable, and the valley of the Chorok constitutes the sole route
providing access to the interior of Eastern Armenia.

Trebizond being attributed to Turkey, Batum to Georgia, the only site meeting the requirements of a maritime debouché for the Armenian Plateau is the Bay of Rizeh. Until a railway is built the Trebizond-Rizeh and Rizeh-Chorok roads must continue to be the only means of communication between that port and the interior of the country.

As indicated on the Topographical map (Annex I, No 9) it is indispensable that, on the west, the mouth of the Surmené and the cross-roads of Tekkeh; and on the East the mouth of the Chorok be comprised within the frontiers of Armenia.

The Armenian Republic has unfortunately already experienced the bitter disadvantages and perils of a state encircled and deprived of an outlet to the sea. This lack of communication with the world is responsible for the death of 180,000 Armenians from famine.

The reports presented by Colonel Haskell, the indefatigable American Commissioner, indicate the extraordinary difficulties encountered in the despatch of American wheat to Armenia.

These difficulties are due solely to the lack of a port and direct communication between the interior
of Armenia and the sea.

The Armenian Delegation confidently trusts, therefore, that the President of the United States, will attribute to Armenia a suitable outlet to the Sea with adequate means of communications with the interior.
In order to prevent confusion and dispute regarding the point on the frontier between Turkey and Persia at which the new frontier between Armenia and Turkey begins, it has been described in the text of the President's decision as a point upon the administrative boundary between the Sandjaks of Van and Hakkari. This method of definition has been chosen because it enables the Boundary Commission to shorten or elongate this administrative boundary in order to attach it definitely to the old boundary between Turkey and Persia.

This method of description was necessitated by the fact that the position of the boundary between Turkey and Persia, which depends upon the "Treaty of Limits between Turkey and Persia, signed at Erzeroum, May 19/31, 1847", is entirely unsettled. This Treaty is published in "British and Foreign State Papers", 1854-1855, vol. 45, London. 1865, pp. 874-876.

Attempts were made to settle this boundary in 1849 and again in 1878. The boundary was finally marked in
1913-14 by a Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, which demarcated the whole length of the frontier from Fac on the Persian Gulf to Mt. Ararat, a distance of 1180 miles. Of this distance 1140 miles were marked with boundary monuments, leaving 40 miles undemarcated near the Persian village of Kotur. The work of this Commission is described in "Records of the Survey of India", Volume IX, 1914-15, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 164-173.

Unfortunately the eastern terminus of the Armenian frontier established by President Wilson in 1920 lies within these 40 miles.

A summary of the points in dispute within the forty miles left undemarcated in 1913-14 will be found in the Reports of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. These reports discuss the various controversies between the Persians and the Turks regarding the village of Kotur and the highway through the pass west of that village.

An authenticated copy of the "Carte Identique" covering this area was reproduced, facing p. 2976, in Sir Edward Hertslet's "The Map of Europe by Treaty, showing the various Political and Territorial Changes which have taken place since the General Peace of 1814, with numerous Maps and Notes", Volume IV, 1875 to 1891, London, 1891. The same collection of treaties explains the status of the boundary near Kotur and the various attempts to settle and mark it.
It would be well, in case the matter comes up, to study Article XVIII of the Treaty of San Stefano, 1878 (pp. 2686-2687); the note on Kotur and the Armenians (p. 2756); the representation of the Turkish-Persian Frontier near Kotur as shown on the "Sketch Map of the Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia, Based upon the Russian Staff Map, showing the Boundaries as proposed by the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano and as Fixed by the Treaty of Berlin" (this map faces pp. 2794 and leaves the village of Kotur in Turkey rather than in Persia); Article LX of the Treaty of Berlin by which "the Sublime Porte cedes to Persia the town and territory of Khotour, as fixed by the Mixed Anglo-Russian Commission for the delimitation of the frontiers of Turkey and Persia." (This is printed on p. 2796, with a long footnote describing attempts to settle the boundary at this point).

A study of these materials and those listed below would give the State Department the necessary details regarding the unmarked 40 miles of the boundary between Turkey and Persia, in case a question arises regarding the point at which the boundary established by President Wilson's decision joins the frontier between Turkey and Persia.

The Turko-Persian frontier Commission of 1914 operated under the terms of a protocol (not seen) signed in Con-

L.M.
stantinople November 17, 1913, by Turkey, Great Britain, Russia, and Persia.

Reference to the negotiations leading up to this agreement and to the terms of the protocol will be found in:

(1) House of Commons Debates (Vol. 64, p. 1063, proceedings of July 18, 1914.);
(2) A speech by Premier Goremykine opening the Russian Duma, February 9, 1916 (see La Question Persane, by G. Demorgny, p. 287;
(3) An article on page 487 of L'Asie Française for November, 1914;

The mapping of the northern part of the boundary, including the Kotur district, was entrusted to the Russians. The Russian maps were prepared on a scale of 2 versts to 1 inch.
Appendix IX


Forces Hostile to and Favorable to Armenian Success.

In January 1918, the Soviet Government of Russia issued a statement, which was repeated on June 17, 1920, that it was willing to recognize the independence of Armenia including all Armenian lands in Turkey and Russia. Despite this pronouncement Armenia lies in the pathway of the Soviet Government’s desire to weaken the hated capitalism of Great Britain, if possible, by attacks aimed at Allied control over Constantinople, and by use of Pan-Islamic agitation against British control of Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Middle East. It is necessary, therefore, to estimate the power of Soviet Russia and weigh it in the balance as the most dangerous among the elements opposed to Armenian independence.

Russia

The approximate total possibility of Bolshevist military strength is 4,000,000 rifles plus seven Labor Armies. Their estimated effectives, in August 1920, were:

- upon the Polish front – 162,500
- " Roumanian " – 10,000
- " Crimean " – 35,000
- " Caucasian " – 60,000
- in Turkestan (Gen'l Kuropatkin) – 56,000
- in Transbaikal – 5 infantry divisions
Fortunately there is no Bolshevist fleet in the Black Sea.

Opposed to these Bolshevist forces are the following active armies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upon the Polish front</td>
<td>- 95,000 Poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Roumanian</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Crimean</td>
<td>- 50,000 troops with Gen’l Wrangel and 15,000 in the Don, Kuban and Terek regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in lower Russia</td>
<td>- 20,000 Social Revolutionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; East Siberia (Gen’l Semenoff)</td>
<td>10,000 troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transcaucasia

Opposed to the Armenian occupation, through their present dependence upon Soviet Russia, are the troops of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the Azerbaidjan Socialist Republic</td>
<td>14,000 regulars 30,000 reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Russian Bolshevist troops in Batum</td>
<td>15,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Momentarily favorable to Armenian desires are:

the Georgians, 14,900 equipped troops.

The available Armenian manpower is to be estimated at about 100,000. In Transcaucasia they have at their disposal.

| Armenian regulars, 20,000 |
| " reserves, 40,000 |

To these are to be added the few Armenians holding out against the Turkish Nationalists in Hadjin and towns
in Cilicia, who have proclaimed what is called the Amanus Republic, and have appealed for the support of General Gouraud’s French troops in Syria.

Persia and Mesopotamia

The British forces in Persia (chiefly Persian Cossacks and British Indians) number about 11,000, plus five regiments of the South Persian Rifles (presumably about 6,000 men). In Mesopotamia the British forces number 9,650 white troops, 61,000 Indians and 6,000 local native levies. These forces, friendly from the Armenian standpoint, are neutralized by the Bolshevist menace from Resht and Enzeli in Persia on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, and by serious Arab outbreaks around Bagdad and to the north of it.

Turkey

By the treaty of Sèvres the Turkish government is empowered to maintain an army of 50,700 troops. The authority exercised by the Inter-Allied Military Commissions, to be appointed in accordance with Part V of the Turkish Treaty, warrants the assumption that these troops cannot be used in opposition to the establishment of the Armenian state.

The most bitter and effective opposition will come from the Milli Teshkilat (literally "Organization of the Nation"), the Turkish Nationalist party under the leader-
ship of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. The maximum effective forces under his command were estimated in early July to be about 150,000. The morale of this army must have been seriously impaired by the rapid Greek advance in June into the interior of Asia Minor from the Mediterranean litoral. The number of 150,000 may, indeed, be much too high an estimate. The Anatolian peasantry is undoubtedly war weary. Recent reports indicate that the necessary requisitioning upon the countryside by Mustapha Kemal and his associate leaders has farther alienated the native Turkish inhabitants. Recent Armenian statements are to the effect that reports of 80,000 Turkish Nationalist forces at Erzerum are absolutely untrue. Their information, coming via Erivan, is that the districts of Bitlis and Van are entirely undefended, and that the Nationalist leader at Erzerum has only 7,000 regular Turkish troops under his command. Though this may be an underestimate, it is incontestible that the Armenians have an advantage in respect to the problem of occupation because the communications from the west (Angora and Sivas) into Erzerum vilayet are in much worse condition than those from the district of Kars, now occupied by the Armenian troops.

The interallied fleet, chiefly British, controls the Black Sea.
FINANCIAL POSITION
OF THAT PORTION OF THE FOUR VILAYETS
ASSIGNED TO THE NEW STATE OF ARMENIA
- - -

Since Article 241 of the Treaty with Turkey stipulates that states acquiring territory from Turkey shall participate in the annual charge for the service of the Ottoman public debt contracted before November 1, 1914, it is assumed that the new state of Armenia will only have to become responsible for the payment of an annual sum, rather than the assumption of its proportionate part of the various pre-war issues of Turkish bonds. This point should be clear as the principle is important. The financial regime of Turkey was extremely complex, that is, instead of issuing bonds the interest on which was to be paid out of general revenues, specific revenues were assigned to the service of particular loans. For example, the receipts of the tithe in a given province would be assigned to the kilometric guarantee of some specified railroad. Armenia should be exempted from the necessity of maintaining in vigor special assignments of revenues which may now apply to the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, so far as these are awarded to Armenia. Unless these complicated arrangements of the Turkish system are cancelled, the new Armenian state would be seriously
handicapped in the establishment of a modern financial system which would have reasonable prospect of success.

In regard to the annual charge for which Armenia becomes responsible, Article 243 specifies that it shall bear the same ratio to the total sum required for the service of the debt as the average revenues of the transferred territory bore to the average revenue of the whole of Turkey during the three financial years 1909-1910, 1910-1911, and 1911-1912. There is little evidence to show that, as is often affirmed, under the Turkish regime districts inhabited by non-Turkish populations were obliged to pay more than their proportionate share of taxes and other contributions. For example, during the fiscal year 1911-1912 the per capita contribution of the inhabitants of the vilayet of Trebizond was L T 1.16, that of Erzerum L T 0.78, of Bitlis L T 0.69, and of Van L T 0.45, while the per capita contribution for the empire as a whole was L T 1.18.

Likewise, receipts per square kilometer in Trebizond were L T 52.56, in Erzerum, L T 12.15, in Bitlis L T 8.09, and in Van L T 3.96, as compared with average receipts per square kilometer for the empire as a whole of L T 16.82. The figure for Trebizond appears to be somewhat excessive, but it is comparable with that of L T 65.60 for the vilayet of Adrianople, L T 49.59 for Aidin (Smyrna), and L T 104.41 for Beirut.
As the distance increases from the administrative center of the empire, Constantinople, there is a tendency for revenues, both per capita and per square kilometer, to decline. In relation to the relative development of the vilayets, portions of which are to be assigned to Armenia, compared with other vilayets of the empire, receipts are perhaps smaller than might be expected. On the other hand, it should be remembered that through the industry and thrift of the Armenians their vilayets are somewhat more highly developed than districts inhabited by Turks, which have equal or superior natural resources. Actual revenues in the Armenian vilayets are therefore a somewhat larger percentage of potential revenues than is the case in other parts of Turkey.

Apportionment of the Turkish debt according to the ratio between the total revenues of the empire and the revenues of those portions of the vilayets to be ceded to Armenia seems by several tests to be eminently fair. In the following calculations it is assumed that Armenia acquires the entire vilayet of Erzerum, 75 per cent. of Trebizon, 66 per cent. of Bitlis, and 63 per cent. of Van. It is assumed further, as is necessary because of the lack of more detailed statistics, that the revenues of those portions of these vilayets, which are ceded to Armenia, are typical of the revenues of the vilayets as a whole. In other words, for purposes of comparison
with the total revenues of Turkey, all of the revenues of Erzerum are considered, 75 per cent. of the revenues of Trebizond, 66 per cent. of those of Bitlis, and 63 per cent. of those of Van. Comparing the revenues of the district to be assigned to Armenia with the total revenues of the empire for the fiscal year 1911-1912, it is found that this district contributed 5.6 per cent. Of the revenues of the empire.

Another way of determining the fairness of the financial obligations assigned to the new state of Armenia is to discover what ratio the population of the district assigned to Armenia bears to the population of the empire as a whole. On this basis of comparison it is found that the district assigned to Armenia contained 7.7 per cent. of the estimated total population of the empire in 1911-1912. Using land area as a basis of comparison, it is found, that the district assigned constitutes 5.0 per cent. of the area of the Turkish Empire.

Since these percentages are in relatively close harmony it may be reasonably concluded that the districts under consideration were not unduly burdened with taxes and, consequently, that the revenues of these districts in comparison with the total revenues of the Turkish Empire may be regarded as a proper basis for the apportionment of the Turkish debt. This statement becomes
even more probable when it is discovered that the revenues of the Armenian district in the fiscal year of 1910-1911 compared with the total revenues of the Empire, constituted 5.2 per cent. of such total revenues, a figure very close to the 5.6 per cent. contributed in the fiscal year 1911-1912. Statistics for the fiscal year 1909-1910 are not available.

Accepting the average contribution of Armenia as 5.4 per cent. of total Turkish revenues and assuming therefore that approximately 5.4 per cent. of the Turkish debt on November 5, 1914, of L T 141,106,093 must be taken over by the new state of Armenia, its obligations would be L T 7,619,729 ($33,526,807). The figures representing the debt of Turkey are those given in Annex 1. of part VIII of the draft Treaty of May 11, 1920. They should not be regarded as more than provisional. The annual charges for the service of this debt are given as L T 9,064,217, and Armenia will thus be called upon to assume annual payments of L T 489,467 ($2,153,634).

If revenues in the district assigned to Armenia approximate those of the fiscal years of 1910-1911 and 1911-1912, the Turkish portion of the Armenian state should furnish about L T 1,630,000 ($7,172,000), for the central government. Estimating that the population of the territory acquired by Armenia from Turkey will
be 1,700,000, after the refugees have been repatriated, the estimated revenues of LT 1,630,000 ($7,172,000) give per capita receipts of only $4.22, and of this revenue, debt charges absorb LT 489,467, ($2,153,654), leaving but LT 1,140,533, ($5,018,345), or LT 0.67 ($2.95), for other administrative purposes. It should be borne in mind that these revenues constitute the income of the central government only and that, under the Turkish system, there are also local revenues of considerable importance but of uncertain amount. In other words, the $7,172,000 above mentioned would not constitute the entire governmental income of the territory to be given to Armenia.

A clear picture of the position of Armenian finances in comparison with those of Bulgaria, Great Britain and the United States may be obtained from the following tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Capita Debt</th>
<th>Per Capita Public Revenue</th>
<th>Per Capita Dept Charge</th>
<th>Ratio of Dept.Chg. to Total Rev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dollars</td>
<td>Dollars</td>
<td>Dollars</td>
<td>Per.Cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia (1920)</td>
<td>19.72</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (1914)</td>
<td>63.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>(1919) 229.00</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>(1919) 753.00</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though by comparative standards the debt of Armenia is negligible, the new state is so poor, as evidenced by its
pitiful per capita revenues, that even this small debt requires for its service the same proportion of the estimated income of the government as does the enormous debt of Great Britain. If due caution is exercised Armenia is by no means in an intolerable financial position, but even slight extravagance would dissipate its very slender income and leave nothing for ordinary governmental purposes. The margin between solvency and bankruptcy is in the case of Armenia unusually narrow, and the government should clearly realize that though technically sound, the financial position of the State is in reality quite precarious.

It is, of course, impossible to calculate what revenues a state as yet unconstituted will require for the administration of its government. But, if the proper occasion arises, it would be a friendly act for the United States Government to point out that extreme conservatism should be exercised in the establishment of governmental agencies of an expensive character. As thirty per cent. of the estimated revenues of the central government are already pledged to the service of the debt assigned to Armenia, further borrowings should be undertaken with the greatest caution, as the debt charges are already of more than moderate weight.

The new state of Armenia will feel the need of so many public services, public works and governmental
agencies, that the temptation will be strong to increase expenditures beyond the bounds of due conservatism, in the face of the fact that funds for such expenditures must be obtained by floating loans in foreign countries. Such procedure can scarcely eventuate in anything but trouble and possible disaster for the new state. It must also be recognized in candor that a distinctly socialistic sentiment prevails, at least among the Armenians of the Erivan Republic, and pretentious schemes for the nationalization of mines, ports, railways, and public utilities in general, are likely to be attempted. Financial history is so replete with losses and bankruptcies incident to the inauguration of new public works, transportation systems and like enterprises, that the Armenian state should be warned against mortgaging its financial future by undertaking injudicious enterprises for which it does not have the requisite domestic financial backing. Nothing is implied either in favor of or in opposition to the nationalization of public utilities in countries which have been long established, but it would be dangerous indeed for a financially weak state to attempt the establishment and operation of enterprises involving large financial outlay, the capital for which can only be borrowed abroad at exorbitant rates.

Another danger which should be clearly pointed out to the Armenian state is involved in granting concessions
of a permanent nature to meet temporary financial requirements. The present state of the money market in such that loans on the best security can only be floated at exorbitant rates, and for a political experiment like the state of Armenia loans would certainly be granted only at extremely usurious rates or because those furnishing the loans secured extremely desirable concessions. Unless the utmost care is exercised, Armenia is likely to find that the natural resources of the country are mortgaged permanently to foreigners, whereas the future solvency of the state depends on carefully conserving its all too meager sources of potential income. It must be realized that concession hunters will be very active and will attempt to take the utmost advantage of the financial necessities of the new state. The United States can render signal service, both by advice and perhaps by small advances from the United States Treasury.

W. W. Cumberland,
Assistant Foreign Trade Advisor,
MAPS

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* The anglicized spelling of certain names is questionable. Nevertheless the spelling is kept as in the original text.
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FULL REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE UPON THE ARBITRATION
OF THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA

Composition of the Reporting Committee

Mr. W. L. Westermann, Chief of the Division of Western Asia, American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

Major Lawrence Martin, General Staff Corps, U. S. Army; Geographer to the Hartord Mission.

Mr. H. G. Dwight, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
Done in duplicate at the city of Washington on the twenty-second day of November, one thousand nine hundred and twenty, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and forty-fifth.

[Signature]

By the President:

[Signature]

Secretary of State.
BOUNDARY
BETWEEN
TURKEY AND ARMENIA
AS DETERMINED BY
WOODROW WILSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Scale 1: 200,000

Contour interval 50 meters

Datum is mean sea level

1920

- Boundary between Turkey and Armenia
- Village boundaries
- Sanjak boundaries
- Kaza boundaries

Maps surveyed by the Turkish General Staff, between 1911 and the date of the armistice and printed in the cartographic establishments in Constantinople and Kutaya, in the Turkish financial years 1910 to 1915 (1914 to 1917)